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ABSTRACT
BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS
IN
HEALTHCARE:
GAME THEORY MODELS
AND
NUMERICAL CASE STUDIES
MAY 2019
PRITHA DUTTA
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
MASTER OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Anna Nagurney
A crucial component of every healthcare system is the safe and steady supply of
the life-saving product, blood. In order to meet the demand for blood consistently,
it is imperative to maintain a robust supply chain. The blood banking industry
in the United States, faced with emerging challenges, which include, an increase in
operating costs, rise in competition among blood centers, insufficient reimbursement
from payers such as insurance companies and government programs, in addition to
inherent challenges such as donor motivation, seasonal shortages, perishability, is
trying to adapt to the changing dynamics to sustain itself economically. The altruistic
nature of this industry and the financial implications for its various stakeholders,
vii
makes the efficient management of blood supply chains an important and interesting
area of study.
In this dissertation, I contribute to the existing literature on blood banking by
modeling the operational and economic challenges throughout the blood supply chain
in the context of competition using game theory. I develop a model for blood ser-
vice organizations competing for donations where they use service quality levels at
collection sites as their strategic variables to increase their collection of blood from
voluntary donors. I further construct a competitive blood supply chain network model
that captures all major activities as well as perishability along the supply chain from
collection of blood to distribution to hospitals.
As a crucial extension to the study on blood supply chains, I develop a network
framework with multiple tiers of decision-makers including payers, that captures the
decentralized nature of the blood banking system in the United States. The solutions
from this multi-objective decision-making problem include quantities of blood to be
supplied and transfused, given demand is known, as well as the financial transactions
between the different tiers of stakeholders. For each model the governing equilibrium
conditions are derived, and equivalent variational inequality formulations presented.
The models and their relevance are further illustrated through simulated case stud-
ies. The results obtained provide valuable insights that can inform healthcare policy
makers and regulators.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Blood supply chains constitute a critical part of the healthcare industry in any
country. Blood transfusions are integral parts of any major surgeries. The number of
units transfused can vary from one pint to dozens of pints for critical surgeries such as
organ transplants. In addition, blood transfusions are used to treat certain diseases,
including, for example, malaria-related anemia (see Obonyo et al. (1998)). Moreover,
blood transfusions are often needed in the case of accidents as well as natural disasters
because of injuries sustained by the victims.
The statistics provided by the American Red Cross on their website give an idea
of the supply of, and demand for blood products in the United States (American
Red Cross (2017)). Every day in the United States approximately 36,000 units of
red blood cells are needed. Nearly 21 million blood components are transfused each
year in the country while on average, 13.6 million whole blood and red blood cells are
collected per year. While supply shortages in other industries imply financial losses
for the organizations, in case of blood supply chains there are greater consequences
as it can lead to societal loss through deaths.
Blood supply chains in the United States are decentralized and form complex
networks with several interconnected stakeholders including the blood service orga-
nizations who collect, store and distribute blood, hospitals and trauma centers that
use blood for transfusions, insurance companies and government payer programs that
reimburse hospitals for their cost, and patients. The nonprofit and altruistic nature
of the blood banking industry coupled with the financial ramifications for its var-
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ious stakeholders in blood supply chains present interesting areas for research. At
every stage in the supply chain stakeholders face numerous operational and strategic
challenges. In the subsequent sections of this dissertation I provide details of these
inherent issues in managing blood supply chains as well as emerging ones which pro-
vide the background and motivation for the research presented in Chapters 3, 4, 5
and suggested in Chapter 6 in this dissertation.
1.1. Supply Side Challenges
A unique feature of the blood banking industry is that the supply of the product
is solely dependent on donations by individuals to the blood banks and blood service
organizations collecting blood, which, for the most part, are nonprofits. Blood can
neither be manufactured nor substituted by any other product. The American Red
Cross (2017) reports that the number of donors in the United States in a year is
approximately 6.8 million. Interestingly, according to the World Health Organization
(2017), globally, 74 countries obtain more than 90% of their blood supply from volun-
tary unpaid blood donors, whereas 71 countries collect more than 50% of their blood
supply from family/replacement or paid donors. In Britain, according to Gregory
(2015), just 4% of the residents regularly donate blood with the National Health Ser-
vice stating that it can no longer guarantee sufficient supplies. In New Zealand, about
4% of the population donates blood (see New Zealand Blood (2016)). According to
the World Health Organization (2010), blood donation by 1% of the population is
generally the minimum needed to meet a nation’s most basic requirements for blood;
the requirements are higher in countries with more advanced health care systems.
However, the average donation rate is 15 times lower in developing countries than in
developed countries. Globally, more than 70 countries had a blood donation rate of
less than 1% in 2006.
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While it is difficult to invoke altruism in people and to motivate them to donate
blood, in some cases individuals who are motivated to donate blood might not qualify
to do so. According to the Food and Drug Administration regulations (FDA (2018)),
in the United States, blood donors have to go through a strict screening procedure.
In addition to meeting the age, weight, and hemoglobin level requirements, as well as
the time period between donations, donors are also screened for disease risk factors
and may get deferred for reasons such as exhibiting signs and symptoms of colds or
the flu, and/or relevant transfusion-transmitted infections, i.e., HIV, viral hepatitis,
etc. (cf. American Association of Blood Banks (2017)). As a result, 38% of the
country’s population is eligible to donate blood at any given time. However, less
than 10% actually donates blood in a year (cf. American Red Cross (2017)). Issues
of seasonality place additional pressures on obtaining blood donations since donors
may be preoccupied with holidays and/or weather-related issues. Hence, since the
blood banking industry has to rely on voluntary donations from altruistic donors, it
faces major challenges in terms of maintaining a sufficient supply of blood and will
continue to do so, given the aging population. This fundamental supply side issue
motivated the research in Chapter 3 and is also taken into consideration in Chapter
4 in this dissertation.
In conjecture to consumable product supply chains one might think of keeping
excess supply as a solution to seasonal shortages. However, blood is a perishable
product, with platelets lasting only 5 days and red blood cells having a lifetime of
42 days (cf. American Red Cross (2017), Blood Centers of America (2018). Hence,
excess supply can also lead to loss through wastage. Moreover, at various stages in the
blood supply chain such as testing, storage, a percentage of the collected blood is lost.
This needs to be taken into account by the blood service organizations while targeting
the collection amount and agreeing to the supply quantity with the hospitals.
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1.2. Role of Competition
The blood banking industry in the United States is at a crossroads and is faced
with several changes in the market dynamics. It is trying to adapt to these changes
to sustain itself economically (cf. Nagurney (2017)). According to the American
Red Cross, the leading supplier of blood in the United States, with about 40% of
the market, there was a 33% decrease in blood transfusions in the period 2010-2014
(Wald (2014)). Further, Ellingson et al. (2017) report that in 2015 the number of
red blood cell (RBC) units transfused in the United States was 11,349,000 marking
a 13.9 percent decrease since 2013. The decrease in demand, resulting, for example,
from medical advances associated with minimally invasive technologies, in addition
to the scarcity of donors, has given rise to stiff competition among blood service
organizations.
Industry experts are noting that the blood supply chain is becoming more and
more similar to traditional commercial supply chains. Consequently, although the
blood banking industry is characteristically not for profit, it is not surprising to find
the prevalence of competition among blood service organizations in the United States.
Competition exists for blood donations as well as for supply contracts with hospitals
and other medical facilities (Snyder (2001), Hart (2011)). Pierskalla (2005), on page
141, emphasized in his overview of the supply chain management of blood banks that
“To some extent there is a war out there. Many of the suppliers are in heavy, mostly
negative competition among themselves and with many of the HBBs (hospital blood
banks)” (see also Cohen, Pierskalla, and Sassetti (1987)).
Competition in the United States blood banking industry has been recognized
in the popular press. As early as 1989, Gorman, reporting on competition among
blood banks in California, remarked that the Palomar-Pomerado Hospital District
established its own laboratory, staff, and recruiting drive to collect blood for use
primarily at its two hospitals striking out against the decades old San Diego Blood
4
Bank. Barton (2002) reported that in Florida the competition between Community
Blood Centers and South Florida Blood Banks had become “ferocious.” Since 2011,
a small Sarasota-based blood bank, SunCoast Communities Blood Bank, had been
competing for blood donations with a much larger organization, Florida Blood Ser-
vices, that served hospitals in Tampa and neighboring areas (Smith (2011)). In 2012
the plight of SunCoast Communities Blood Bank in conducting its operations be-
came more evident when it urged the state of Florida to stop the merger between
three blood service organizations; namely, Orlando-based Florida’s Blood Centers,
the Community Blood Centers of Lauderhill, and Florida Blood Services of St. Pe-
tersburg on grounds of antitrust issues (Smith (2012)). More recently, in Tennessee
(cf. Potts (2015)), a new blood center was opened by Blood Assurance in the town of
Athens, where another blood center, Medic, currently uses six mobile blood centers
with Medic officials noting their concern about the competition and whether they
could honor their existing contracts with hospitals.
In 2013 the Eastern Maine Medical Center ended its contract with the American
Red Cross to do business with Puget Sound Blood Center, a Seattle-based community
blood bank (Barber (2013)). This trend is visible all across the country. Stone (2015)
notes that “loyal blood donors will no longer see the iconic red cross on the side of
the blood mobile next time they give blood at one of Mission Health’s 17 facilities in
Western North Carolina” because of a switch of supplier to a regional nonprofit blood
bank of South Carolina, The Blood Connection, from the American Red Cross, ending
a 30 year old contractual relationship. Prior to this new three year contract during
which The Blood Connection will be the sole blood provider to Mission Health, it
had been providing only a supplemental blood supply to the Mission hospitals. More
recently, at the end of 2016, the American Red Cross lost its business in Central
Arkansas to Arkansas Blood Institute, an affiliate of the Oklahoma Blood Institute.
5
This resulted in a layoff of 44 Red Cross employees at two blood centers (Brantley
(2017)).
It is evident from the above examples that hospitals and medical centers may have
several options for suppliers not only within the community and region, but also from
out of state blood banks that may offer lower prices. In order to mitigate the risk of
shortages due to possible supply shortfalls, hospitals and trauma medical centers may
try to diversify their supplier base and contract with multiple blood service organi-
zations. The contracts vary in terms of price, quantity, product mix and duration
of partnerships ] (Merola (2017)). There have been cases where reduced prices have
led hospitals to switch blood suppliers (Schwartz (2012)). This competitive environ-
ment in the blood banking industry forms the basis of the research presented in this
dissertation.
1.3. Economic Relationships
Blood banking is a multi-billion dollar industry with the global market for blood
products projected to reach $41.9 billion by 2020 (Global Industry Analysts, Inc.
(2015)). The blood banking industry world-wide is a capital-intensive industry in
which, however, the major stakeholders such as the blood suppliers and hospitals /
medical centers in many countries are nonprofit organizations. At every stage in the
blood supply chain the blood suppliers (blood service organizations) incur high costs
associated with the collection of whole blood, the processing of the collected blood
and the segregation of the components, the testing for disease markers, storage of
blood bags at the appropriate temperature, and, finally, distribution to hospitals and
other medical facilities. With strict regulations enforced in the United States by the
Food and Drug Administration and the introduction of new disease markers, such
as the one for the Zika virus to ensure safety of the transfused blood, there is, in
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addition, a recognition of the importance of research and development, which also
requires capital investment (Mulcahy et al. (2016)).
The United States constitutes the largest market for blood products in the world.
However, the annual blood bank revenue is experiencing a decline, falling to 1.5 billion
USD in 2014 from as high as 5 billion USD in 2008 (Wald (2014)) with the indus-
try faced with, on the average, a decreasing demand and a rise in stiff competition
(Nagurney (2017)). It is of utmost importance to ensure the economic sustainability
of the blood service organizations in order to maintain a safe and steady supply of
blood in the country.
The new economic landscape for this industry has been accompanied by an in-
creasing number of mergers and acquisitions (cf. Toland (2014), Masoumi, Yu, and
Nagurney (2017)) with the goal of identifying and exploiting various synergies, in-
cluding cost-based ones. The growing trend of mergers is evident, for example, from
the fact that the number of members in Americas’ Blood Centers, the largest net-
work of nonprofit community blood centers in North America, has dropped from 87
to 68 members due to 19 partnerships and 6 mergers formed in the five years between
2010-2015 among their member blood banks (Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2017)).
Blood service organizations are not the only stakeholders in the supply chain
facing issues in term of cost-effectiveness and revenue margins. There exists a lot of
pressure on hospitals and, similarly, medical centers, in turn, to reduce the number of
transfusions to check the overutilization and wastage of blood while managing their
blood inventory efficiently to avoid shortages. Under financial stress, mergers and
consolidations have been a characteristic of not only blood service organizations but
also of hospitals, lately, and competition among hospitals has decreased (Kacik (2017),
Gaynor, Mostashari, and Ginsburg (2017)). Some policy makers are emphasizing the
need for more competition among health care providers for better service to patients at
lower prices (Hyde (2016)). On another spectrum, industry executives argue that they
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face sufficient competition from neighboring hospitals, new entrants, and alternative
sources of healthcare. The cost of providing healthcare is continuing to increase in
the United States and it is becoming more difficult to negotiate better reimbursement
rates from hard-bargaining insurers (Dafny and Lee (2016)).
Hospitals in the United States get reimbursed for their patients’ procedures, in-
cluding blood transfusions, by different types of payers such as private insurers and
government programs such as Medicare. The process of billing for blood products
and receiving reimbursements for transfused units from different payer groups is a
complicated process and has been a topic of concern among industry professionals
(America’s Blood Centers (2017a)). In 2018 the proposed reimbursement rates for
blood products by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services showed reduction
in prices for several products. These payment policies have been criticized by orga-
nizations, including the America’s Blood Centers, who continue to push the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services for fairer payment strategies (America’s Blood
Centers (2017a)). Inadequate reimbursements may affect the transactions between
hospitals and blood service organizations who struggle to cover the rising cost of
blood collection and testing, and, thereby, impact the economic sustainability of the
entire blood supply chain (Mulcahy et al. (2016)). Although, currently, the payment
methods used by Medicare and other private insurance companies following their suit
succeed in checking for the overutilization of blood, the blood banking industry faces
serious challenges due to a clear disconnect between the payments received and the
actual cost of blood.
Mulcahy et al. (2016) propose alternative payment methods that might be ben-
eficial for all stakeholders in the industry. One of the alternatives is a cost-based
reimbursement policy which would take into account the number of units of blood
transfused, in contrast to the current inpatient payment policy. The Medicare re-
imbursement for blood in inpatient setting falls under MS-DRG (Medicare Severity
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Diagnosis Related Groups) which makes it difficult to separate the exact costs for
the blood products (Toner et al. (2011)), while the outpatient reimbursement rates
are determined using a cost-to-charge ratio methodology which uses data submitted
by the hospitals and is susceptible to errors due to use of improper billing codes.
The majority of blood transfusions occurs in an inpatient setting while around only
10-20 percent occurs in an outpatient setting. Hence, the former accounts for a large
portion of revenue generated from blood transfusion (Mulcahy et al. (2016)).
The changing dynamics in the blood banking industry is forcing blood banks (also
referred to as blood service organizations) to be more innovative in conducting their
business. Blood banks need to price their products competitively based on the sup-
plied quantity in order to recover costs of their operations and to generate revenue for
activities such as research and development required for providing a steady supply of
safe blood. Hence, there is a need for a change in the approach towards blood supply
chain management, which should take into consideration not only the well-defined
problems of perishability, outdating, shortage, and wastage (see, e.g., Nagurney, Ma-
soumi, and Yu (2012)), but also limits on supply capacity and competition among
blood banks. In light of the recent changes in the industry there also needs to be an
intensified focus on the economics of blood supply chain networks to identify ways to
make it more efficient and cost-effective and, hence, sustainable.
In this dissertation, I contribute to the study of blood supply chains by taking a
holistic approach to developing game theory models that capture the current compet-
itive landscape of the industry in the United States and include all major activities
along the supply chain as well as the objectives of multiple stakeholders. The results
obtained from analyzing the mathematical models through simulated case studies pro-
vide valuable insights and can inform policy makers. In particular, this dissertation
attempts to find answers to the following research questions:
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• In a competing scenario, what should be the service quality levels at the blood
collection sites run by different blood service organizations?
• How do the varying service quality levels affect the amount of blood collected
from different collection sites?
• What should be the optimal blood flows along various paths, taking perishabil-
ity and capacity constraints into consideration, in a competitive blood supply
chain network framework to ensure the supply of the minimum amount of blood
required by hospitals?
• How do disruptions in various activities and reduction in capacities along the
supply chain affect the revenue margin for blood service organizations?
• What should be the price per pint of blood charged by the blood service orga-
nizations in order to cover their costs?
• What should be the appropriate reimbursement rates received by the hospi-
tals, and medical centers from the insurance companies and programs for blood
transfusion to ensure economic sustainability of the entire supply chain?
This research adds to the literature on game theory and healthcare and, specifi-
cally, to game theory and blood supply chains, which has been very limited, to-date.
1.4. Literature Review
This section discusses the relevant literature on several topics covered in this
dissertation. I provide a review of the extant literature and identify the gaps that I
have tried to bridge.
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1.4.1 Donor Motivation
As mentioned earlier, due to its reliance on voluntary donations one of the ma-
jor challenges in the blood banking industry is donor motivation. There have been
several studies on the factors that motivate people to become blood donors. While
in some cases blood donations are incentivized even with monetary compensations,
some economists and industry practitioners believe that it is altruism that mainly
drives donors to donate their blood with the idea that it is going to help save the
lives of people, at times, even in their communities, and, sometimes, even themselves
(see, e.g., Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2012) and the references therein). Much of
the theoretical works on blood donor motivation found in existing literature focus on
altruism (Andreoni (1990), Mellstro¨m and Johanesson (2008), Evans and Ferguson
(2013)). Others speculate that blood donors may be motivated by a notion of duty
rather than unselfishness (see Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009)).
In their paper, Gillespie and Hillyer (2002) look at the studies conducted on the
topic of blood donation decisions over the preceding three decades, focusing on both
first time and return donors. They identify blood donation process measures such as
the general donation experience for first time donors in terms of comfort, convenience
of the process, and treatment by the staff in charge of technical and administrative
activities as factors affecting donation decisions. It is further mentioned that negative
donation experiences account for 6-19 percent attrition for all donors and 20 to as
high as 41 percent of the drop-out rate for first time donors. In Charbonneau et al.
(2015) the authors report deterrents among regular whole blood donors, lapsed whole
blood donors and plasma/platelet donors. Based on their survey they found that for
a significant percentage of donors in all three categories too much waiting time is
a deterrent. These claims are also supported by the empirical evidence provided in
Yuan et al. (2011), Finck et al. (2016) and Schreiber et al. (2006). These papers
suggest that, while motivators are mainly altruistic, the deterrents are all factors
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controlled by the blood service organizations. Hence, there is reason to believe that
improving such aspects can have a positive impact on blood donations.
Personal experience and donor satisfaction from the blood donation process, along
with the image or awareness of the impact of the organization collecting blood, have
been pointed out as significant factors in donor motivation and retention in several
studies (Nguyen et al. (2008), Aldamiz-echevarria and Aguirre-Garcia (2014)). In
other words, it can be said that the quality of services provided by the blood banks
during the collection or donation process plays a significant role in the decision-making
process of first time as well as return donors.
There also exists literature on the assessment of blood banks in terms of service
quality as perceived by donors, which, again, suggests a direct relationship between
donor satisfaction and donation decisions (Al-Zubaidi and Al-Asousi (2012), Jain,
Doshit, and Joshi (2015)). For example, Schlumpf et al. (2008), in a survey of over
7,900 blood donors, determined that prior donation frequency, intention to return,
donation experience, and having a convenient location appear to significantly predict
donor return. Craig et al. (2016), in turn, estimated the effect of wait time at
the blood donation center on the satisfaction, intention to donate, and actual return
behavior of blood donors and found that for a 38% increase in wait time there is a 14%
decrease in whole blood donations. Thus, longer wait times entail substantial social
costs and also attest to the importance of the quality of service for blood organizations
in terms of donations. Convenience is also identified in the literature as a factor that
can influence donor behavior (Schreiber et al. (2006)) in terms of clinic accessibility,
which also attests to the relevance of quality of service. Cimarolli (2012) in her
thesis, which focused on blood donations in Canada, emphasized that it is of utmost
importance to improve the experiences of those donating blood, especially first-timers,
by optimizing clinic locations and resources, minimizing negative reactions, lowering
wait time, and increasing donor comfort. Perera et al. (2015) specifically noted, in
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their study of blood donor programs in Sri Lanka, that blood donor programs could
be improved there by addressing the provision of quality service.
While there exists a rich body of literature on the optimization of blood supply
chains, as discussed in the following section, to ensure that demand is met as closely
as possible and that shortages are minimized, with a view towards the perishability
of this life-saving product (see, e.g., Nagurney et al. (2013), Duan and Liao (2014)),
a thorough search of the published journal literature fails to return any significant
work on the modeling of competition for donors among blood service organizations.
Blood donations comprise the very basis of blood supply chains and play a crucial
role in the stability of the entire blood supply system. Hence, it is of academic as
well as practical significance to develop a model capturing the competition among
organizations collecting blood.
1.4.2 Blood Supply Chain
The body of literature on blood supply optimization has been growing steadily
over the years with some of the fundamental literature including that of Nahmias
(1982) on perishable product inventory and that of Cohen and Pierskalla (1979) tar-
geted at hospital and regional blood banks. Belie¨n and Force´ (2012) provide a com-
prehensive review of the supply chain management of blood products. The authors
classify the works according to various categories such as the type of blood product,
the solution method utilized, etc. Given the uncertainty in demand and supply of
blood and the complex nature of blood supply chains, some authors have used simu-
lation techniques to optimize the inventory levels (see, e.g., Rytila¨ and Spens (2006),
Kopach (2008)) while others (see, e.g., Pierskalla (2005), Hemmelmayr et al. (2009))
have used mathematical programming to solve associated facility location and rout-
ing problems. Sarhangian et al. (2017) studied the performance of threshold-based
allocation policies for optimizing blood inventory taking into consideration the trade-
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off between age of the blood and availability. Ramezanian and Behboodi (2017) used
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to solve a deterministic location/allocation
problem for blood collection facilities that takes into consideration the utility of blood
donors in order to motivate them. They further utilized a robust optimization method
to account for the issue of uncertainty in demand for blood. Osorio, Brailsford, and
Smith (2018) distinguish between blood collection methods and present a multiobjec-
tive optimization problem that deals with the issue of assigning donors to a certain
collection method while considering stochastic demand
Fortsch and Khapalova (2016) tackle some of the issues of blood supply chain
management by using various forecasting techniques to better predict the demand for
blood at the blood centers; thereby, reducing the uncertainty regarding the demand
for blood. Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2012) take into account uncertainty in the
demand for blood and construct the full associated supply chain network of a blood
service organization. Dillon, Oliveira, and Abbasi (2017) uses stochastic programming
to deal with the uncertainty in the demand for blood. Another paper that handles
the stochastic demand for blood is that of Zahiri and Pishvaee (2017).
El-Amine, Bish, and Bish (2017) focus on blood screening and consider that the
budget-constrained blood center’s goal is to construct a robust postdonation blood-
screening scheme that minimizes the risk of an infectious donation being released
into the blood supply. Ayer et al. (2017), in turn, consider when and from which
mobile collection sites to collect blood for cryo production, so that the weekly collec-
tion target is met while the collection costs are minimized. Further, in Ayer et al.
(2018), the authors develop a dynamic programming approach to the problem and
create a decision support tool to help the American Red Cross select cryo collection
sites. Hosseinifard and Abbasi (2016) consider the effect of centralized inventory in
a two echelon supply chain model and show how centralization of the hospital level
inventory increases the sustainability and resilience of the blood supply chain. A
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recent interesting work has also considered the design of a blood supply chain net-
work in a crisis via a robust stochastic model (see Salehi, Mahootchi, and Husseini
(2017). Overall, there are few studies that address the supply side in blood banking
(Fahimnia et al. (2017), Ramezanian and Behboodi (2017)) and especially in the
context of competition.
Perishability of blood and wastage due to outdating is another common issue in
blood supply chains and, hence, has been incorporated into some studies (Chazan
and Gal (1977), Nagurney and Masoumi (2012), Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2012),
Duan and Liao (2014), Wang and Ma (2015)). In addition to optimizing the in-
ventory of Red Blood Cells, Duan and Liao (2014) tackle the issue of blood group
compatibility and substitution, while Dillon, Oliveira, and Abbasi (2017) use stochas-
tic programming to deal with the uncertainty in the demand for blood. Much of the
recent work on blood supply chains focuses on the optimization of the inventory at
the hospital and blood bank levels as well as on the optimization of the shipment of
blood from the blood banks to the hospitals (Gunpinar and Centeno (2015), Wang
and Ma (2015)). However, there is a dearth of research on optimization of the entire
blood supply chain network due to its complexity. In their literature review paper,
focusing on quantitative models in blood supply chain management, Osorio, Brails-
ford, and Smith (2015) mention a few studies on integrated models or models that
include all stages of the blood supply chain (see also, e.g., Katsaliaki and Brailsford
(2007), Delen, Erraguntla, and Mayer (2011), Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2012)).
For example, Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2012) developed a multicriteria optimiza-
tion model for a regional blood banking system while capturing the myriad associated
supply chain network activities. Inspired by this work I develop a blood supply chain
network in a noncooperative competitive environment in Chapter 4 which adds to
our understanding of how competition among blood supply chains affects the supply
of the product and the revenue generated by the blood banks.
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1.4.3 Competitive Supply Chain Networks
There exists a body of scientific literature that uses the concept of Nash equi-
librium (cf. Nash (1950, 1951)) in decentralized supply chains, although, overall,
the work is fairly recent (see, e.g., Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002), Ha, Li, and
Ng (2003), Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), Dong et al. (2005), Xiao and Yang
(2008), Anderson and Bao (2010), Toyasaki, Daniele, and Wakolbinger (2014)), with
the books by Nagurney (2006) and Nagurney and Li (2016) providing extensive ref-
erences. In particular, Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002) developed an equilibrium
model for a competitive supply chain network with separate tiers for multiple man-
ufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple demand markets. They formulated and
solved the multitiered supply chain network equilibrium problem as a variational in-
equality problem in order to obtain the equilibrium product flows and prices. Dong
et al. (2005) conceptualized the three tiers in their supply chain network to denote
manufacturers who can use one of several shipment alternatives to send the products
to the distributors who comprise the second tier, and, finally, to retailers who are
faced with stochastic demand. Other papers dealing with competition among supply
chain stakeholders and demand uncertainty include those by Tsiakis et al. (2001),
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005), Xiao and Yang (2008), and Mahmoodi and Eshghi
(2014).
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) studied the equilibrium conditions in a two-
echelon supply chain where a single supplier supplies materials to multiple competing
retailers who face uncertain demand. The authors also explored the impacts of coor-
dination between the two echelons through contracts. Mahmoodi and Eshghi (2014)
considered price competition between two-tiered supply chains consisting of manu-
facturers and retailers. The authors proposed three different algorithms to obtain the
equilibrium solutions in three possible industry structures and examined the effects
of competition and demand uncertainty intensity on the solutions and supply chain
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profits in a numerical example. Farahani et al. (2014) provided a comprehensive
literature review of competitive supply chain design models in which they classified
the papers based on several major features of the models such as the number of tiers
considered, the type of demand, the type of competition, etc. While the majority of
the papers discussed above deal with supply chain structures with two tiers, in reality,
supply chain networks may be more complex and involve multiple network economic
activities as well as several stakeholders competing. Nagurney (2010) proposed a
supply chain competition model with activities such as manufacturing, storage, and
distribution for profit-maximizing firms. Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2012), in
turn, constructed a supply chain network model for oligopolistic competition among
pharmaceutical companies while taking into account the perishable nature of drugs,
whereas Yu and Nagurney (2013) developed a competitive food supply chain net-
work model, which also included perishability and price differentiation. However, as
pointed out in the previous section as well, there does not exist any work on the
modeling of blood supply chain networks in the context of competition.
1.4.4 Capacity Constraints
Capacity constraints in supply chains have been studied extensively as evidenced
in the papers by Gavirneni (2002), Lee and Kim (2002), Choi, Dai, and Song (2004),
Goh, Lim, and Meng (2007), Jung et al. (2008), Nagurney and Li (2016), Nagurney,
Yu, and Besik (2017), and Nagurney (2018). The capacities considered in these works
pertain to physical capacities of production plants, distribution channels, freight ser-
vice providers, etc., which vary from one firm to another. Similar to commercial
firms, blood service organizations have limited resources in terms of space for collec-
tion, processing, and storage, and access to transportation vehicles, etc. Masoumi,
Yu, and Nagurney (2017) introduce upper bounds on the capacity volume of vari-
ous activities in the blood supply chain network consisting of collection, processing,
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shipment, storage, and distribution along with frequencies of supply chain activities.
However, blood service organizations face an additional constraint on the supply side
due to limited number of eligible and motivated donors in any region.
Nagurney, Yu, and Besik (2017) utilize the concept of a Variational Equilibrium
to formulate and solve the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) problem in the
case of commercial supply chain network capacity competition with outsourcing with
capacities associated with shared links of storage and freight service provision. A
detailed discussion of GNE, in the context of a nonprofit, disaster relief framework,
and the associated challenges of formulation and solution, is available in Nagurney,
Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016) and the references therein.
As mentioned earlier, supply side capacity is a major issue in blood supply chains.
While the demand for blood is highly volatile, through supply contracts with blood
banks hospitals try to ensure that they have a minimum amount of blood available to
avoid shortages, and at the same time set an upper bound on the demand to minimize
wastage. Such supply and demand constraints have not been included in the studies
present in the existing literature on blood supply chains.
1.4.5 Game Theory and Nonprofits
Noncooperative game theory is a powerful tool that is used extensively for for-
mulating and solving problems where there is competition. While it is primarily
used in the case of profit-making entities, several studies have used game theory to
model competition among nonprofit organizations; see, e.g., Ortmann (1996), Tuck-
man (1998), Castaneda, Garen, and Thornton (2008), Bose (2015), and Nagurney
and Li (2017). There is, however, a limited number of studies applying game theory
in the realm of nonprofit supply chains and even fewer in the context of blood ser-
vices. Saxton and Zhuang (2013) argued for the relevance of game theory in markets
for charitable contributions and presented a model consisting of an organization and
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a donor. Zhuang, Saxton, and Wu (2014) provided a sequential game theoretical
model of disclosure-donation interactions with one nonprofit organization and mul-
tiple donors. Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016) developed a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium network model in which nonprofit organizations are competing for
financial funds for post-disaster relief operations, while minimizing costs associated
with relief item distribution.
While there are some studies on the effects of competition among nonprofit orga-
nizations (see Muggy and Heier Stamm (2014), Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu
(2016), Nagurney and Li (2017), Nagurney et al. (2018)), and the references therein),
to the best of my knowledge there is no prior work modeling the competition among
blood service organizations.
1.5. Dissertation Overview
The dissertation consists of six chapters with the first chapter dealing with the
research motivation and literature review. In Chapter 2, I recall the methodologies
that are utilized in this dissertation, mainly variational inequality theory (Nagurney
(1999)) and its relation to game theory (Nash (1950, 1951)). Below I present the
contributions in Chapters 3 through 5 and outline a possible extension and future
directions for the blood supply chain research in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
1.5.1 Contributions in Chapter 3
It is of great value and importance to blood service organizations to understand
the reasons behind donation decisions in order to ensure a sufficient supply of this
life-saving product. I conceptualize the operational factors affecting donor decisions
reported in empirical studies combined together as the service quality of the blood
collection sites and develop a game theory model, whose solution yields the desired
service quality levels at the blood collection sites and the corresponding quantities of
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blood received. I provide a game theory Nash Equilibrium network framework since
changes in the blood industry have resulted in greater competition among blood
collection organizations.
Indeed, as noted by Meckler and Neergaard (2002), the blood banking industry
has seen a rise in competition among blood banks in terms of recruiting and retaining
donors as the number of organizations providing blood services has grown. Donors
in parts of the United States, for example, may have the option of giving to the
American Red Cross, to a local community blood center or hospital, or to America’s
Blood Centers’ member organizations which make up North America’s largest network
of nonprofit community blood centers, and operate more than 600 blood donation
collection sites, or to the United Blood Services, if in proximity.
It is also important to emphasize that blood organizations incur huge costs for
organizing blood donation drives and other operations such as testing, processing of
collected blood, transportation, and storage which have to be met through revenue
generation. This is achieved by charging money per pint to hospitals, healthcare
clinics, and trauma centers, etc. that require blood (cf. Nagurney, Masoumi, and
Yu (2012)). The revenue generated covers costs and can be invested back into the
process to improve the services provided by the blood banks and collection agencies.
Moreover, organizations involved in blood banking and supply derive a utility in
terms of satisfaction from providing quality service. Hence, it is beneficial for them to
increase the number of donors and the amount of blood donated. However, improving
the service quality to attract more donors implies, in turn, an increase in costs. The
trade-off between the two can be easily observed by analyzing the model presented in
this chapter. Chapter 3 of this dissertation, is based on the paper by Nagurney and
Dutta (2019a).
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1.5.2 Contributions in Chapter 4
The supply chain network competition model for blood service organizations
(BSOs) in Chapter 4 makes several contributions to the existing literature on blood
supply chains. The blood supply chain network structure developed here is the first
of its kind that can capture competition on a regional as well as national level and
traces all major blood supply chain activities starting from collection, testing and
processing to storage, and distribution. I include multiple, competing blood service
organizations in which the link cost functions are not assumed to be separable. The
cost on a link may, in general, depend not only on the flow on that link but also on
flows on other links of the specific BSO’s supply chain network as well as on the flows
on links of other BSOs’ supply chain networks.
Common/shared capacities are incorporated on the supply side in terms of blood
donations, and common/shared constraints on the demand side due to demand point
constraints consisting of lower and upper bounds on the blood needed. No model,
to-date, considers such features with the former uniquely relevant to blood supply
chain network competition, not considered until this study, and the latter also very
relevant due to the need to meet the demand for blood while also minimizing wastage.
The utility functions of the blood service organizations contain revenue as well as
altruism/ beneft components with the latter being weighted. Nagurney and Li (2017)
also considered nonprofit competition with revenue and altruism features but in the
case of hospital competition on a simpler, bipartite network and with the altruism
component of an entirely different construct than herein. This model enables the
incorporation of different factors that would affect prices that distinct hospitals and
medical centers would be willing to pay for RBCs and that different blood service
organizations would, therefore, be able to charge them. This chapter is based on the
paper by Nagurney and Dutta (2019b).
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1.5.3 Contributions in Chapter 5
In this chapter, I extend the work done in Chapter 4 by adding another tier of
decision-makers comprised of insurance companies and programs or patient payer
groups that reimburse hospitals for providing transfusion services, and the last activ-
ity in the blood supply chain which is the transfusion of blood. Hence, the integrated
supply chain network model that I develop here includes all major stakeholders in the
blood supply chain; namely, the blood banks or blood service organizations, the hospi-
tals, and the patient payer groups. The network structure captures the decentralized
nature of the blood supply chains in the United States and is the first competitive
perishable product supply chain network model in healthcare with multiple tiers,
multiple paths, and multiple associated distinct types of stakeholders.
While equilibrium optimal flow of blood from blood service organizations to hos-
pitals along different paths are computed, this model also determines the amount of
blood transfused by different hospitals to patients in different payer groups. A main
focus of this chapter is to find a way to bridge the gap between payments received
by hospitals and their cost of procuring blood from blood service organizations, that
threatens the economic sustainability of blood supply chains in the United States.
Deriving inspiration from an alternative payment policy suggested in Mulcahy et
al. (2016), I developed the mathematical model here to also determine the optimal
reimbursement rates received by hospitals from payers and the optimal prices that
hospitals agree to pay to blood service organizations. This chapter is based on the
paper by Dutta and Nagurney (2018).
1.5.4 Concluding Comments
The main contributions of the research done in this dissertation are summarized
below.
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1. The mathematical models constructed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the first com-
petitive network models in the context of blood banking that capture the economics
of the blood supply chains. While in Chapter 3 the focus is only on the collection
operation from voluntary blood donors, in the subsequent chapters the entire supply
chain from blood service organizations to the end users, that is, the hospitals and
patients is modeled. The contributions are in terms of the progression of each model
with added layers of complexity.
2. It is a well-established fact that quality and customer satisfaction in service
industries can provide competitive advantage to firms (Ghobadian, Speller and Jones
(1994). There have been studies on the effect of quality in the healthcare industry
(Brook and Kosecoff (1988), Rivers and Glover (2008), Nagurney and Li (2017)).
However, the model presented in Chapter 3 is the first model that captures the effect
of service quality on competition in the blood banking industry which makes it unique.
3. In Chapters 4 and 5, I assume multiple, competing blood service organizations
in which the link cost functions are not assumed to be separable. In the case of
multiple blood supply chain networks, in contrast, Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2017)
considered link cost functions that were separable. The generality of the cost functions
here enables the modeling of supply chain network competition for resources among
the BSOs.
4. The inclusion of perishability in the models in Chapters 4 and 5 make them
pragmatic. When dealing with a highly perishable product such as blood it is imper-
ative to account for it.
5. The objective functions of the blood service organizations and hospitals include
an altruisim component which helps in capturing their nonprofit behavior.
6. Lagrange analysis presented in the different chapters provide nice economic
interpretations for the analytical results. In Chapter 3, the analysis provides economic
trade-offs associated with the upper and lower bounds of service quality levels. In
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Chapter 4, the Lagrange analysis again sheds light on the marginal loss and gain
associated with the lower and upper bounds on supply, link capacities as well as
demand, while in Chapter 5, the equilibrium Lagrange multipliers reveal the prices
charged by the BSOs to hospitals.
7. The methodologies used in this dissertation are game theory and variational
inequality theory. In Chapters 3 and 5 the governing equilibrium concept is that
of Nash equilibrium, and in Chapter 4 the problem is formulated as a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium one. Qualitative results are provided in this dissertation along with
discussion of computational procedures and results obtained from numerical cases.
8. In the final chapter, I present my conclusions and provide further directions for
research in this area.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGIES
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the fundamental theories and methodolo-
gies that are utilized in this dissertation. I first review variational inequality theory
which has been utilized throughout this dissertation as the essential methodology to
analyze the equilibria of blood supply chain networks with supply side and demand
side competition, and multiple decision-makers. Variational inequality theory is a
powerful methodology with widespread use in solving network economic equilibrium
models. Some of the relationships between variational inequality and game theory to
model the competition among blood service organizations as well as other stakehold-
ers in the blood banking industry are also presented in this chapter.
In addition, I recall the theory of Generalized Nash Equilibrium which is utilized
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Additional theorems and proofs associated with
finite-dimensional variational inequality theory can be found in Nagurney (1999).
Finally, I review the algorithms: the Euler method and the modified projection
method. The Euler method is employed to solve the variational inequality problems in
Chapters 3 and 4. The modified projection method is applied to solve the variational
inequality problem in Chapter 5.
2.1. Variational Inequality Theory
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the theory of variational inequalities
followed by qualitative results, specifically concerning the existence and uniqueness of
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solutions. All definitions and theorems are taken from Nagurney (1999). All vectors
are assumed to be column vectors.
Definition 2.1 (Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequality Problem)
The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem, VI(F,K), is to determine a
vector X∗ ∈ K ⊂ Rn, such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.1a)
where F is a given continuous function from K to Rn, K is a given closed convex set,
and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
In (2.1a), F (X) ≡ (F1(X), F2(X), . . . , Fn(X))T , and X ≡ (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)T . Re-
call that for two vectors u, v ∈ Rn, the inner product 〈u, v〉 = ‖u‖‖v‖cosθ, where θ
is the angle between the vectors u and v, and (2.1a) is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
Fi(X
∗) · (Xi −X∗i ) ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.1b)
The variational inequality problem is a general problem that encompasses a wide
spectrum of mathematical problems, including; optimization problems, complemen-
tarity problems, and fixed point problems (see Nagurney (1999)). It has been shown
that optimization problems, both constrained and unconstrained, can be reformulated
as variational inequality problems. The relationship between variational inequalities
and optimization problems is now briefly reviewed.
Proposition 2.1 (Formulation of a Constrained Optimization Problem as a
Variational Inequality)
Let X∗ be a solution to the optimization problem:
Minimize f(X) (2.2)
26
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f is continuously differentiable and K is closed and convex. Then X∗ is a
solution of the variational inequality problem:
〈∇f(X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.3)
where ∇f(X) is the gradient vector of f with respect to X, where∇f(X) ≡ (∂f(X)
∂X1
, . . . ,
∂f(X)
∂Xn
)T .
Proposition 2.2 (Formulation of an Unconstrained Optimization Problem
as a Variational Inequality)
If f(X) is a convex function and X∗ is a solution to VI(∇f,K), then X∗ is a solution
to the optimization problem (2.2). In the case that the feasible set K = Rn, then the
unconstrained optimization problem is also a variational inequality problem.
The variational inequality problem can be reformulated as an optimization prob-
lem under certain symmetry conditions. The definitions of positive-semidefiniteness,
positive-definiteness, and strong positive-definiteness are recalled next, followed by a
theorem presenting the above relationship.
Definition 2.2 (Positive Semi-Definiteness and Definiteness)
An n× n matrix M(X), whose elements mij(X); i, j = 1, ..., n, are functions defined
on the set S ⊂ Rn, is said to be positive-semidefinite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.4)
It is said to be positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v > 0, ∀v 6= 0, v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.5)
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It is said to be strongly positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ α‖v‖2, for some α > 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.6)
Theorem 2.1 (Formulation of an Optimization Problem from a Variational
Inequality Problem Under Symmetry Assumption)
Assume that F (X) is continuously differentiable on K and that the Jacobian matrix
∇F (X) =

∂F1
∂X1
. . . ∂F1
∂Xn
... . . .
...
∂Fn
∂X1
. . . ∂Fn
∂Xn
 (2.7)
is symmetric and positive-semidefinite. Then there is a real-valued convex function
f : K 7−→ R1 satisfying
∇f(X) = F (X) (2.8)
with X∗ the solution of VI(F,K) also being the solution of the mathematical program-
ming problem:
Minimize f(X)
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f(X) =
∫
F (X)Tdx, and
∫
is a line integral.
Thus, variational inequality is a more general problem formulation than an op-
timization problem formulation, since it can also handle a function F (X) with an
asymmetric Jacobian (see Nagurney (1999)). Next, I recall the qualitative proper-
ties of variational inequality problems, especially, the conditions for existence and
uniqueness of a solution.
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Existence of a solution to a variational inequality problem follows from continuity
of the function F (X) entering the variational inequality, provided the feasible set K
is compact as stated in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2 (Existence of a Solution)
If K is a compact convex set and F (X) is continuous on K, then the variational
inequality problem admits at least one solution X∗.
Theorem 2.3 (Condition for Existence if Feasible Set is Unbounded)
If the feasible set K is unbounded, then VI(F,K) admits a solution if and only if
there exists an R > 0 and a solution of VI(F,S), X∗R, such that ‖X∗R‖ < R, where
S = {X : ‖X‖ ≤ R}.
Theorem 2.4 (Existence Following a Coercivity Condition)
Suppose that F (X) satisfies the coercivity condition
〈F (X)− F (X0), X −X0〉
‖X −X0‖ → ∞ (2.9)
as ‖X‖ → ∞ for X ∈ K and for some X0 ∈ K. Then VI(F,K) always has a solution.
According to Theorem 2.4, the existence condition of a solution to a variational
inequality problem is guaranteed if the coercivity condition holds. Next, certain
monotonicity conditions are utilized to discuss the qualitative properties of existence
and uniqueness. Some basic definitions of monotonicity are provided first.
Definition 2.3 (Monotonicity)
F (X) is monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.10)
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Definition 2.4 (Strict Monotonicity)
F (X) is strictly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 > 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, X1 6= X2. (2.11)
Definition 2.5 (Strong Monotonicity)
F (X) is strongly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ α‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, (2.12)
where α > 0.
Definition 2.6 (Lipschitz Continuity)
F (X) is Lipschitz continuous on K if there exists an L > 0, such that
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≤ L‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.13)
L is called the Lipschitz constant.
Theorem 2.5 (Uniqueness Under Strict Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X) is strictly monotone on K. Then the solution to the VI(F,K)
problem is unique, if one exists.
Theorem 2.6 (Uniqueness Under Strong Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X) is strongly monotone on K. Then there exists precisely one solu-
tion X∗ to VI(F,K).
In summary of Theorems 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6, strong monotonicity of the function F
guarantees both existence and uniqueness, in the case of an unbounded feasible set
K. If the feasible set K is compact, that is, closed and bounded, the continuity of F
guarantees the existence of a solution. The strict monotonicity of F is then sufficient
to guarantee its uniqueness provided its existence.
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2.2. The Relationships between Variational Inequalities and
Game Theory
In this section, some of the relationships between variational inequalities and game
theory are briefly discussed.
Nash (1950, 1951) developed noncooperative game theory, involving multiple play-
ers, each of whom acts in his/her own interest. In particular, consider a game with
m players, each player i having a strategy vector Xi = {Xi1, ..., Xin} selected from
a closed, convex set Ki ⊂ Rn. Each player i seeks to maximize his/her own utility
function, Ui: K → R, where K = K1 × K2 × . . . × Km ⊂ Rmn. The utility of player
i, Ui, depends not only on his/her own strategy vector, Xi, but also on the strat-
egy vectors of all the other players, (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xm). An equilibrium is
achieved if no one can increase his/her utility by unilaterally altering the value of its
strategy vector. The formal definition of the Nash equilibrium is recalled as follows.
Definition 2.7 (Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy vector
X∗ = (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
m) ∈ K, (2.14)
such that
Ui(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki,∀i, (2.15)
where Xˆ∗i = (X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
i−1, X
∗
i+1, . . . , X
∗
m).
It has been shown by Hartman and Stampacchia (1966) and Gabay and Moulin
(1980) that given continuously differentiable and concave utility functions, Ui, ∀i,
the Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as a variational inequality problem
defined on K.
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Theorem 2.7 (Variational Inequality Formulation of Nash Equilibrium)
Under the assumption that each utility function Ui is continuously differentiable and
concave, X∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if X∗ ∈ K is a solution of the variational
inequality
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, X ∈ K, (2.16)
where F (X) ≡ (−∇X1U1(X), . . . ,−∇XmUm(X))T, and ∇XiUi(X) = (∂Ui(X)∂Xi1 , . . . ,
∂Ui(X)
∂Xin
).
The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium are now intro-
duced. As stated in the following theorem, Rosen (1965) presented existence under
the assumptions that K is compact and each Ui is continuously differentiable.
Theorem 2.8 (Existence Under Compactness and Continuous Differentia-
bility)
Suppose that the feasible set K is compact and each Ui, is continuously differentiable
∀i. Then existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
On the other hand, Gabay and Moulin (1980) relaxed the assumption of the com-
pactness of K and proved existence of a Nash equilibrium after imposing a coercivity
condition on F (X).
Theorem 2.9 (Existence Under Coercivity)
Suppose that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, satisfies the coercivity condition (2.9).
Then there always exists a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, Karamardian (1969) demonstrated existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium under the strong monotonicity assumption.
Theorem 2.10 (Existence and Uniqueness Under Strong Monotonicity)
Assume that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, is strongly monotone on K. Then there
exists precisely one Nash equilibrium X∗.
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Additionally, based on Theorem 2.5, uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium can be
guaranteed under the assumptions that F (X) is strictly monotone and an equilibrium
exists.
Theorem 2.11 (Uniqueness Under Strict Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, is strictly monotone on K. Then the
Nash equilibrium, X∗, is unique, if it exists.
2.3. Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE)
In this section, I present a brief discussion on Generalized Nash Equilibrium
(GNE) in which the strategies of the players, defined by the underlying constraints,
depend also on the strategies of their rivals. A frequently encountered class of General-
ized Nash games deals with a common coupling constraint that the players’ strategies
are required to satisfy (Kulkarni and Shanbhag (2012)). These games are also known
as Generalized Nash games with shared constraints (Facchinei and Kanow (2007),
Rosen (1965)).
Definition 2.10 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium)
A strategy vector X∗ ∈ K ≡ ∏Ii=1Ki, X∗ ∈ S, constitutes a Generalized Nash Equi-
librium if for each player i; i = 1, ..., I :
Ui(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki,∀X ∈ S, (2.17)
where
Xˆ∗i ≡ (X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗I ),
Ki is the feasible set of individual player and S is the feasible set consisting of the
shared constraints.
Bensoussan (1974) formulated the GNE problem as a quasivariational inequality.
However, GNE problems are challenging to solve when formulated as quasivariational
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inequality problems for which the state-of-the-art in terms of algorithmic procedures
is not as advanced as that for variational inequality problems. In Kulkarni and
Shanbhag (2012), the authors provide sufficient conditions to establish the theory of
Variational Equilibrium as a refinement of the GNE which is utilized in Chapter 4 of
this dissertation.
Definition 2.11 (Variational Equilibrium)
A strategy vector X∗ is said to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized
Nash Equilibrium game if X∗ ∈ K,X∗ ∈ S is a solution of the variational inequality:
−
I∑
i=1
〈∇XiUˆi(X∗), Xi −X∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, ∀X ∈ S. (2.18)
A notable feature of a variational equilibrium that I discuss in Chapter 4 in this
dissertation is that the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared or coupling
constraints are the same for all players in the game which provides an elegant economic
interpretation in terms of fairness.
2.4. Algorithms
In this section, I review the algorithms that are used in this dissertation. The
Euler method, which is based on the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney
(1993), and the modified projection method of Korpelevich (1977) are presented.
2.4.1 The Euler Method
The Euler-type method algorithm and it’s convergence conditions are given below.
At an iteration τ+1 of the Euler method (see also Nagurney and Zhang (1996)), where
τ denotes an iteration counter, one computes:
Xτ+1 = PK(Xτ − ατF (Xτ )), (2.19)
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where F is the function in (2.1a), and PK is the projection on the feasible set K,
defined by
PK(X) = argminX′∈K‖X
′ −X‖. (2.20)
I now provide the complete statement of the Euler method.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K.
Let τ = 0 and set the sequence {ατ} so that
∑∞
τ=0 ατ = ∞, ατ > 0 for all τ , and
ατ → 0 as τ →∞.
Step 1: Computation
Compute Xτ+1 ∈ K by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈Xτ+1 + ατF (Xτ )−Xτ , X −Xτ+1〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.21)
Step 2: Convergence Verification
If max |Xτ+1l − Xτl | ≤ , for all l, with  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance, then stop;
otherwise, set τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
Assumption 2.1
Suppose we fix an initial condition X0 ∈ K and define the sequence {Xτ , τ ∈ N} by
(2.19). I assume the following conditions:
1.
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0,aτ → 0 as τ →∞.
2. d(Fτ (x), F (x))→ 0 uniformly on compact subsets of K as τ →∞.
3. The sequence {Xτ , τ ∈ N} is bounded.
Theorem 2.12 (Convergence of the General Iterative Scheme)
Let S denote the set of stationary point of the projected dynamical system (2.19),
equivalently, the set of solutions to the variational inequality problem (2.1a). As-
sume Assuption 2.1. Suppose {Xτ , τ ∈ N} is the scheme generated by (2.19). Then
d(Xτ , S)→ 0 as τ →∞, where d(Xτ , S)→ 0 = infX∈S‖Xτ −X‖.
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Corollary 2.1 (Existence of a Solution Under the General Iterative Scheme)
Assume the conditions of Theorem 2.12, and also that S consists of a finite set of
points. Then limτ→∞Xτ exists and equals to a solution to the variational inequality.
In the subsequent chapters, for each model, I derive the explicit formulae for all
the strategy vectors in the respective variational inequalities formulated.
2.4.2 The Modified Projection Method
The modified projection method of Korpelevich (1977) can be utilized to solve a
variational inequality problem in standard form (cf. (2.1a)). This method is guaran-
teed to converge if the monotonicity (cf. (2.10)) and Lipschitz continuity (cf. (2.13))
of the function F that enters the variational inequality (cf. (2.1a)) hold, and a solution
to the variational inequality exists.
I now recall the modified projection method, and let τ denote an iteration counter.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K. Let τ = 1 and let α be a scalar such that 0 < α ≤ 1
L
, where L is the
Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. (2.13)).
Step 1: Computation
Compute X¯τ by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈X¯τ + αF (Xτ−1)−Xτ−1, X − X¯τ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.22)
Step 2: Adaptation
Compute Xτ by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈Xτ + αF (X¯τ )−Xτ−1, X −Xτ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.23)
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Step 3: Convergence Verification
If max |Xτl −Xτ−1l | ≤ , for all l, with  > 0, a prespecified tolerance, then stop; else,
set τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
Theorem 2.13 (Convergence of the Modified Projection Method)
If F (X) is monotone and Lipschitz continuous (and a solution exists), the modified
projection algorithm converges to a solution of variational inequality (2.1a).
In the following chapters, I derive the variational inequality formulations of the
competitive blood supply chain network models. The computational algorithms re-
viewed in this chapter, which are the Euler method and the modified projection
method, are also adapted accordingly to solve a number of simulated case studies.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPETITION FOR BLOOD DONATIONS
In this chapter, I develop a bipartite supply chain network consisting of two tiers
representing blood service organizations (BSOs) and blood collection regions. Each
BSO collects blood from multiple sites. The blood service organizations have, as their
strategic variables, the quality of service that they provide donors at their collection
sites in the regions. It is well-recognized that and, as highlighted in Chapter 1, the
quality of service at the blood collection sites plays a big role in repeat donations.
Moreover, donors receive no financial remuneration in this model and this is quite
reasonable since, in many countries, payments for blood donations are not permitted.
I assume that the voluntary donors react to the service quality levels and, hence, the
amount of blood received from each collection site varies depending on the level of
service quality provided.
The formal definition of the word “quality” implies the standard of something
as measured against other things of similar kind or, in other words, the degree of
excellence of something. Service quality pertaining to the blood collection process at
different facilities operated by blood service organizations would include operational
characteristics such as cleanliness, wait time, hours of donation (convenience), loca-
tion of the facilities, and treatment by staff that affect donation decisions as supported
by empirical findings in the existing literature (Gillespie and Hillyer (2002), Nguyen et
al. (2008), Aldamiz-echevarria and Aguirre-Garcia (2014), Al-Zubaidi and Al-Asousi
(2012), Yuan et al. (2011), Finck et al. (2016), Schreiber et al. (2006)). Different
facilities, even operated by the same blood service organization, may have different
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associated service quality, depending on the size, the resources available there, and
location of the service. For example, a permanent unit may be more comfortable to
some donors, and be viewed as providing a higher quality of service than a mobile
unit. Moreover, the service quality may vary from one organization to another for
similar reasons and even the experience of personnel can be a factor.
The blood service organizations in the model developed in this chapter compete
noncooperatively with the objective of maximizing their transaction utilities until a
Nash Equilibrium is achieved. Since in the United States, blood service organizations
are, for the most part, not-for-profit, the utility function consists of a service utility
or altruism term in addition to revenue generated from selling the collected blood to
healthcare facilities such as hospitals, trauma centers, and the cost of collection. The
solution of the model yields the desired service quality levels at the blood collection
sites and the corresponding quantities of blood received. Results obtained from such
a model can provide managerial insights to the blood service organizations in terms of
decisions about improving the service quality levels at their various blood collection
sites to increase the amount of blood donations that they receive as well as the
associated financial implications.
This chapter is based on the paper Nagurney and Dutta (2019a), and is organized
as follows. In Section 3.1, I present the competitive network model for blood dona-
tions, identify the Nash Equilibrium conditions, and provide the variational inequality
formulation. I also establish that the equilibrium quality level pattern of the blood
service organizations is guaranteed to exist and provide conditions for uniqueness of
the solution. Further, I derive an equivalent formulation to the variational inequality
problem for competition among the blood service organizations which utilizes La-
grange multipliers associated with the lower and upper bounds of the quality levels
that the blood service organizations can provide in the different regions in which they
have or may desire to have blood collection services and provide a richer interpre-
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tation of the underlying economic behavior of the blood service organizations. An
illustrative example is also presented. In Section 3.2, I outline the algorithm, which
yields closed form expressions at each iteration for the service quality levels, until
convergence is achieved and then demonstrate the generality of the modeling and
algorithmic framework through a series of numerical examples with accompanying
insights in Section 3.3. Lastly, I summarize the results and present the conclusions
in Section 3.4.
3.1. The Competitive Network Model for Blood Donations
Assume that there are m blood service organizations responsible for collecting the
blood donations, which are then tested, processed, and distributed to hospitals and
other medical facilities. A typical blood service organization is denoted by i. There
are n regions in which the blood collections can take place. The collection sites may
be fixed or mobile. A typical region is denoted by j. The time horizon for this model
is flexible but I have in mind a week or a month. The illustrative example in Section
3 provides an actual context for an application of the model, which is then further
expanded in the numerical examples in Section 3.3. The network structure of the
problem is depicted in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1. The Network Structure of the Game Theory Model for Blood Donations
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Let Qij denote the quality of service that BSO i provides in region j. In order
to allow flexibility I introduce upper and lower bounds on the service quality levels.
Lower bounds could be employed as a target for a blood service organization or
correspond to a minimum set by a regulatory body. An upper bound would represent
the maximum achievable quality level by an organization in a region.
Group the strategic variables for each blood service organization into the vector
Qi ∈ Rn+, and then group the quality of service levels for all blood service organizations
into the vector Q ∈ Rmn+ . So Q is essentially an m×n matrix. There is a nonnegative
lower bound and a positive upper bound imposed on each strategic variable, such
that
Q
ij
≤ Qij ≤ Q¯ij, j = 1, . . . , n. (3.1)
The feasible set Ki for blood service organization i; i = 1, . . . ,m, is defined as
Ki ≡ {Qi| (3.1) holds}. The feasible set underlying all players in the game, that is,
the blood service organizations, is denoted by K where K ≡∏mi=1Ki.
I now describe the components of the transaction utility faced by each blood
service organization that capture the total cost associated with the blood collection
in the different regions, the utility corresponding to providing the quality levels, and
the revenue generated from the blood donations. Each blood service organization
seeks to maximize its transaction utility, which depends on the quality levels not
only that it controls but also on those determined by the competing blood service
organizations in the various regions.
Each blood service organization i encumbers a total cost cˆij associated with col-
lecting blood in region j, such that
cˆij = cˆij(Q), j = 1, . . . , n, (3.2)
where cˆij is assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable for all i, j. Note
that the total cost depends, in general, on the quality of service that the blood service
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organization i provides at its facility in each region j, as well as on the quality levels
of the other blood service organizations. Some facilities may be more spacious, have
more staff, provide greater comfort, have shorter waiting times, and also be cleaner,
all factors that enter into the quality of the service and experience of the blood donors.
Also, the blood service organizations may be competing for blood service professionals
as well as other resources so that the generality of the functions in (3.2) allows for
greater modeling flexibility. The total cost functions in (3.2) also include the cost of
supplies for collecting the blood.
Each blood service organization i, since it values the service that it provides to
donors, enjoys a utility associated with the service given by: ωi
∑n
j=1 γijQij, where the
ωi and the γijs; j = 1, . . . , n, take on positive values (cf. Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and
Soylu (2016) and the references therein). This component of the transaction utility
represents a monetized utility reflecting the value that the blood service organization
places on providing collection services at quality levels in the regions under study. If
the blood service organization does not wish to consider this component, then ωi can
be set equal to zero. However, for organizations such as the American Red Cross,
these operations might give more visibility and create a goodwill among donors that
can eventually aid in fundraising for their other humanitarian operations.
In addition, each blood service organization i receives a volume of blood donations
in region j, denoted by Pij; j = 1, . . . , n, where
Pij = Pij(Q), (3.3)
where each Pij is assumed to be concave and continuously differentiable. These blood
donation functions capture competition for blood donations among the blood service
organizations based on the levels of quality of service that they provide. If need
be, these functions can include parameters associated with the level of organizational
effectiveness as well as the impact preference of donors. Donors can be expected to be
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more willing to give to reputable blood collection service organizations. Also, donors
often prefer that the blood that they donate be used in a region in proximity to them.
For example, Mews and Boenigk (2013), in an online experiment with 144 potential
donors, found that organizational reputation is easily damaged by negative news in the
press and that this leads to a significantly lower willingness to donate blood for such
an organization among potential donors. They also note that, in highly competitive
markets, as is the case in Germany (and other countries), intangible assets such as
organizational reputation and nonprofit brands have been proven to be of critical
importance.
Since blood service organizations charge for the blood that they provide and dif-
ferent organizations can and do price differently, I associate an average price pii for
blood (typically, measured in pints) for blood service organization i; i = 1, . . . ,m.
These prices correspond to the price associated with the blood collection activity
and, hence, would be fraction of the price charged for a pint of blood to hospitals and
other medical facilities. For example, the price for a pint of blood can range in the
United States from about $150 to as much as $300 and this price would also cover
testing and delivery. The revenue that blood service organization i achieves that is
associated with its blood collection activities over the time horizon is, hence, given
by pii
∑n
j=1 Pij(Q).
I now construct the optimization problem faced by blood service organization i; i =
1, . . . ,m. Each blood service organization i seeks to maximize its transaction utility,
Ui, with the transaction utility capturing income due to contractual payments for
the blood that it will distribute as well as the monetized utility that the organization
gains from providing the collection services to various regions and the costs associated
with collection. In particular, the optimization problem is as follows:
Maximize Ui = pii
n∑
j=1
Pij(Q) + ωi
n∑
j=1
γijQij −
n∑
j=1
cˆij(Q) (3.4)
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subject to (3.1).
For additional background on utility functions for nonprofit and charitable orga-
nizations, see Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Malani, Philipson, and David (2003).
The Nash Equilibrium conditions for the noncooperative game (cf. Nash (1950,
1951)) are stated below.
Definition 3.1: Nash Equilibrium for Blood Donations
A service quality level pattern Q∗ ∈ K is said to constitute a Nash Equilibrium in
blood donations if for each blood service organization i; i = 1, . . . ,m,
Ui(Q
∗
i , Qˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Qi, Qˆ∗i ), ∀Qi ∈ Ki, (3.5)
where
Qˆ∗i ≡ (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗i−1, Q∗i+1, . . . , Q∗m). (3.6)
According to (3.5), a Nash Equilibrium is established if no blood service organi-
zation can improve upon its transaction utility by altering its quality service levels,
given that the other organizations have decided on their quality service levels.
3.1.1 Variational Inequality Formulation
I now present the variational inequality formulation of the above supply chain
Nash Equilibrium in quality of service levels.
Theorem 3.1: Variational Inequality Formulation of the Nash Equilibrium
for Blood Donations
A service quality level pattern Q∗ ∈ K is a Nash Equilibrium according to Definition
3.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem:
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀Q ∈ K, (3.7)
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or, equivalently, the variational inequality:
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
]
× [Qij −Q∗ij] ≥ 0, ∀Q ∈ K.
(3.8)
Proof: We know that each feasible set Ki; i = 1, . . . ,m, is convex since it con-
sists of simple box constraints. Hence, it follows that the Cartesian product K of
these sets is also convex. Under the imposed conditions on the blood donation func-
tions Pij(Q), and the total cost functions cˆij(Q), for all i, j, we also know that the
utility functions Ui; i = 1, . . . ,m, are concave and continuously differentiable, since
the utility functions consist of such functions, and a linear expression. Therefore,
according to Proposition 2.2 in Gabay and Moulin (1980), which established the
equivalence between the solution to a Nash equilibrium problem and the solution to
the corresponding variational inequality problem, we know that each blood service
organization i; i = 1, . . . ,m, maximizes its utility according to Definition 3.1 if and
only if Q∗ ∈ K solves:
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀Q ∈ K,
which is precisely variational inequality (3.7).
In order to obtain variational inequality (3.8) from variational inequality (3.7),
note that:
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
=
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
, ∀i, j,
and, therefore, variational inequality (3.8) also holds. 2
The above variational inequality formulations of the Nash Equilibrium problem
can be put into standard variational inequality form given by (2.1a) presented in
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Chapter 2. The mn-dimensional column vector X ≡ Q and the mn-dimensional
column vector F (X) has as its (i, j)-th component, Fij:
Fij(X) ≡ −∂Ui(Q))
∂Qij
=
[
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q)
∂Qij
]
, (3.9)
with the feasible set K ≡ K. Then, clearly, variational inequality (3.7) and (3.8) can
be put into standard form (2.1a).
Existence of a solution Q∗ to variational inequality (3.7) and also (3.8) is guar-
anteed from the standard theory of variational inequalities (cf. Chapter 2) since the
function F (X) that enters the variational inequality is continuous and the feasible
set K is compact. Moreover, from the strict monotonicity condition described in
Definition 2.4 (cf. Chapter 2) we have that the equilibrium solution Q∗ is unique.
3.1.2 An Equivalent Formulation of Variational Inequality with Lagrange
Multipliers
I now describe and analyze an equivalent formulation of variational inequality
(3.7) which provides a deeper analysis of the Lagrange multipliers that are associated
with the constraints (3.1), in the form of lower and upper bounds, on the levels of
quality.
Observe that the feasible set K can be rewritten as
K = {Q ∈ Rmn : Q
ij
−Qij ≤ 0, Qij − Q¯ij ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n}. (3.10)
Also, variational inequality (3.7) can be rewritten as a minimization problem. For
example, by setting
V (Q) = −
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij), (3.11)
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we have that
V (Q) ≥ 0 inK and min
K
V (Q) = V (Q∗) = 0. (3.12)
Now consider the Lagrange function:
L(Q, λ1, λ2) = −
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij)
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λ1ij(Qij −Qij)
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λ2ij(Qij − Q¯ij), (3.13)
where Q ∈ Rmn, λ1, λ2 ∈ Rmn+ , λ1 = {λ11, . . . , λmn}, and λ2 = {λ211, . . . , λ2mn}.
Since for the convex set K the Slater condition is verified and Q∗ is a minimal
solution to problem (3.14), according to well-known theorems (see Jahn (1994)), there
exist Lagrange multiplier vectors λ¯1, λ¯2 ∈ Rmn+ such that the vector (Q∗, λ¯1, λ¯2) is a
saddle point of the Lagrange function (15), that is,
L(Q∗, λ1, λ2) ≤ L(Q∗, λ¯1, λ¯2) ≤ L(Q, λ¯1, λ¯2), ∀Q ∈ K, ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ Rmn+ , (3.14)
and
λ¯1ij(Qij −Q∗ij) = 0, λ¯2ij(Q∗ij − Q¯ij) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n. (3.15)
From the right-hand side of (3.16) it follows that Q∗ ∈ Rmn+ is a minimal point of
L(Q, λ¯1, λ¯2) in the whole space Rmn and, hence, for all i and j:
∂L(Q∗, λ¯1, λ¯2)
∂Qij
= −∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− λ¯1ij + λ¯2ij = 0 (3.16)
together with conditions (3.15).
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Conditions (3.15) and (3.16), which hold for all i and j, represent an equivalent
formulation of variational inequality (3.7).
Indeed, it is easy to see that from (3.15) and (3.16), variational inequality (3.7)
follows. For example, multiplication of (3.16) by (Qij −Q∗ij) yields
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij)− λ¯1ij(Qij −Q∗ij) + λ¯2ij(Qij −Q∗ij) = 0
and, by taking into account (3.15):
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
× (Qij −Q∗ij) = λ¯1ij(Qij −Q∗ij)− λ¯2ij(Qij −Q∗ij)
= λ¯1ij(Qij −Qij) + λ¯2ij(Q¯ij −Qij) ≥ 0. (3.17)
Summation over all i and j of (3.17) yields variational inequality (3.7).
I now proceed to analyze the marginal transaction utilities of the blood service
organizations.
From (3.16) we have that
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− λ¯1ij + λ¯2ij = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, if Q
ij
< Q∗ij < Q¯ij, then we get, using also (3.8):
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
=
[
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
]
= 0,
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n. (3.18)
On the other hand, if λ¯1ij > 0 and, hence, Q
∗
ij = Qij and λ¯
2
ij = 0, then we get that
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
=
[
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
]
= λ¯1ij,
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i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n, (3.19)
and if λ¯2ij > 0 and, hence, Q
∗
ij = Q¯ij and λ¯
1
ij = 0, we have that
−∂Ui(Q
∗)
∂Qij
=
[
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
− ωiγij − pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
]
= −λ¯2ij,
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n. (3.20)
I now proceed to analyze (3.18) through (3.20). From equality (3.18), which holds
when Q
ij
< Q∗ij < Q¯ij, observe that for blood service organization i, which provides
a quality level of service of Q∗ij to blood donors in region j, the marginal transaction
utility is zero; that is, the marginal total cost:
∑n
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
is equal to the marginal
utility associated with providing the service and the marginal revenue associated with
the acquired blood donations in region j: ωiγij + pii
∑n
k=1
∂Pik(Q
∗)
∂Qij
.
According to equality (3.19), if Q∗ij = Qij, then the minus marginal transaction
utility is equal to λ¯1ij. In other words, the marginal total cost exceeds the marginal
utility associated with providing the service and the marginal revenue. The blood
service organization i then suffers a marginal loss given by λ¯1ij.
Finally, according to (3.20), in which case Q∗ij = Q¯ij and λ¯
2
ij > 0, minus the
marginal transaction utility is equal to −λ¯2ij. In this case the marginal utility plus
the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal total cost. Blood service organization i
experiences a marginal gain given by λ¯2ij.
From the above analysis, the equilibrium/optimal Lagrange multiplier vectors of
variables λ¯1 and λ¯2 provide a rigorous interpretation of the behavior of the competition
with respect to the provision of blood services, under the quality service level bounds.
I remark that Langrangean analysis has also yielded useful insights into equilibrium
problems in cybersecurity (cf. Daniele, Maugeri, and Nagurney (2017)) and in finance
(see Daniele, Giuffre, and Lorino (2016)).
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3.1.3 An Illustrative Example
An example is now presented to illustrate some of the above concepts. I will
expand it in Section 3.3 to construct a series of numerical examples.
The example is inspired, in part, by the American Red Cross (cf. Arizona
Blood Services Region (2016)) issuing a recent call for donations since its supplies of
blood are low due to seasonal colds and flu and the devastating impact of Hurricane
Matthew, which made landfall in the United States on October 8, 2016, affected such
states as Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas, and disrupted blood donations in many
locations in the Southeast of the United States. Specifically, I focus on Tucson, Ari-
zona, where the American Red Cross held recent blood drives at multiple locations
and where there are also competitors for blood, including United Blood Services.
Example 3.1: Two BSOs and Two Blood Collection Regions
Example 3.1 serves as the baseline. It consists of two blood service organizations
(BSOs), the American Red Cross and the United Blood Services, corresponding to
uppermost nodes 1 and 2 in Figure 3.2. There are also two blood collection regions
in Tucson, denoted by the lowermost nodes in Figure 3.2. For example, in its recent
call for blood donations (cf. Arizona Blood Services Region (2016)), the America Red
Cross had two locations in Tucson for collection. United Blood Services is a nonprofit
organization that was founded in 1943 in Arizona and provides blood and services
to more than 500 hospitals in 18 states (cf. United Blood Services (2016)). United
Blood Services also collects blood in Tucson. The collection site nodes 1 and 2 are
fixed, rather than mobile, for both organizations.
The components of the transaction utility functions (3.4) of the blood service
organizations are as follows.
I consider a month of collection of whole blood cells. According to Meyer (2017),
Executive Vice President of the American Red Cross (in a private communication),
productive Red Cross sites collect, on the average, 700-840 whole blood units a month.
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Figure 3.2. Example 3.1
The blood donation functions for the American Red Cross are:
P11(Q) = 10Q11 −Q21 −Q22 + 130, P12(Q) = 12Q12 −Q21 − 2Q22 + 135.
Note that the fixed terms of 130 and 135 reflect the baseline of repeat donors that
the American Red Cross expects over the month in the two regions, respectively.
The blood donation functions for the United Blood Services are:
P21(Q) = 11Q21 −Q11 −Q12 + 123, P22(Q) = 12Q22 −Q11 −Q12 + 135.
The United Blood Services has a lower baseline population of donors in these blood
collection regions than the America Red Cross. Its attention to quality is as good or
higher than that of the American Red Cross, according to the respective functions.
The utility function components of the transaction utilities of these blood service
organizations are:
ω1 = 9, γ11 = 8, γ12 = 9,
ω2 = 10, γ21 = 9, γ22 = 10.
The above parameters reflect that Organization 2 derives greater utility from provid-
ing quality blood collection services than Organization 1.
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The total costs of operating the blood collection sites over the time horizon, which
must cover costs of employees, supplies, and energy, and providing the level of quality
service, are:
cˆ11(Q) = 5Q
2
11 + 10, 000, cˆ12(Q) = 18Q
2
12 + 12, 000.
cˆ21(Q) = 4.5Q
2
21 + 12, 000, cˆ22(Q) = 5Q
2
22 + 14, 000.
The bounds on the quality levels are:
Q
11
= 50, Q¯11 = 80, Q12 = 40, Q¯12 = 70,
Q
21
= 60, Q¯21 = 90, Q22 = 70, Q¯22 = 90.
The prices, which correspond to the collection component of the blood supply
chain, are: pi1 = 70 and pi2 = 60.
First, observe that the objective function (3.4) of each blood service organization
is, given the above functional forms, concave and continuously differentiable. In
order to solve Example 3.1, I utilize variational inequality (3.8), and, because of
the simplicity of the functions above (which I generalize for additional numerical
examples), equilibrium quality levels can easily be obtained.
Specifically, using formula (3.10) for each Fij, I obtain the following equations:
F11(Q
∗) = 10Q∗11 − 772 = 0,
F12(Q
∗) = 36Q∗12 − 921 = 0,
F21(Q
∗) = 9Q∗21 − 750 = 0,
F22(Q
∗) = 10Q∗22 − 820 = 0.
Note that we also have to be cognizant of the lower and upper bounds on the quality
levels. Solving the above equations yields : Q∗11 = 77.2, Q
∗
12 = 25.5, Q
∗
21 = 83.3, and
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Q∗22 = 82. Checking whether the values lie within the respective bounds I observe that
they all do, except for Q∗12, which, hence, is set to its lower bound so that: Q
∗
12 = 40.
According to this solution, the Red Cross stands to collect 736.7 units of blood at
region 1, since P11(Q
∗) = 736.7 and 367.7 units of whole blood at region 2. United
Blood service, on the other hand, stands to collect, since P21(Q
∗) = 922.1, that
number of units per month at region 1, and 1001.80 units in region 2 (since P22(Q
∗) =
1001.8). Hence, United Blood Services collects a larger number of units of blood in
the two regions.
It is also known, according to the Lagrangean analysis above, that, since only Q∗12
is at its lower bound and no quality service levels are at their upper bounds: λ¯111 = 0,
λ¯121 = 0, λ¯
1
22 = 0, and λ¯
2
11 = 0, λ¯
2
12 = 0, λ¯
2
21 = 0, λ¯
2
22 = 0. Also, since Q
∗
12 = Q12, I
get λ¯112 =
∑2
k=1
∂cˆ1k(Q
∗)
∂Q12
− ω1γ12 − pi1
∑2
k=1
∂P1k(Q
∗)
∂Q12
= 1359. The American Red Cross
suffers a marginal loss given by λ¯112. The transaction utilities at the equilibrium
quality levels are: U1(Q
∗) = 5, 507.20 and U2(Q∗) = 40, 285.99. In this illustrative
example, the United Blood Services organization provides a higher level of quality
services at each of its locations in Tucson and garners a higher transaction utility
than the American Red Cross.
In the numerical examples in Section 3.3, I consider more general blood donation
functions and also add both a competitor and a new region and analyze the resulting
blood service organization quality levels and the incurred transaction utilities.
3.2. The Algorithm
Here I outline the computational procedure used to solve the examples in Section
3.3. Specifically, the variational inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) are amenable to solution
via the Euler method of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) which is described in Section
2.4. Below I present the closed form expression for the service quality levels of blood
service organizations.
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Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the Blood Donation
Service Organization Game Theory Model
The elegance of this algorithm for the variational inequality (3.8) for the computation
of solutions to the model is clear from the following explicit formula (cf. also (2.21)).
In particular, I have the following closed form expression for the quality service levels
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n, at iteration τ + 1:
Qτ+1ij = max{Qij,min{Q¯ij, Qτij+aτ (pii
n∑
k=1
∂Pik(Q
τ )
∂Qij
+ωiγij−
n∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
τ )
∂Qij
)}}. (3.21)
3.3. Numerical Examples
I now present numerical examples focused on an area of Arizona. These build on
the illustrative example in Section 3.1. In Nagurney and Dutta (2019a) the Euler
method was implemented using FORTRAN on a Linux system. The convergence
criterion was  = 10−5, that is, the Euler method was considered to have converged if,
at a given iteration, the absolute value of the difference of each quality service level
(see (3.21)) differed from its respective value at the preceding iteration by no more
than the . The Euler method was initialized by setting all the quality service levels
to their lower bounds.
In the subsequent examples, Examples 3.2 through 3.6, different features are
added. In Example 3.2, more general blood donation functions than those used in Ex-
ample 3.1 are introduced and this changes the solution significantly. In Example 3.3,
a collection region is added to show how that can benefit the competing blood service
organizations. Example 3.4 incorporates an additional blood service organization to
increase the competition. With Example 3.5, it is shown how over time increased
competition can affect the outcomes. Lastly, in Example 3.6, there are three blood
service organizations competing for donations in three collection regions. Hence, with
each example a layer of complexity is added, which demonstrates the generality of
the modeling and computational framework.
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Below I provide additional information for each numerical example.
Example 3.2: Two BSOs and Two Blood Collection Regions with Different
Form of Blood Donation Functions
Example 3.2 has the same network topology as Example 3.1, that is, the one depicted
in Figure 3.2. The data are identical to those in Example 3.1 except here, significantly
more general blood donation functions are used to observe how that changes the
solutions. In particular, the new Pij functions are constructed from the ones in
Example 3.1 thus: αij
√
Pij for i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2 with α11 = 50, α12 = 30, α21 = 40,
and α22 = 20.
The computed equilibrium quality levels are:
Q∗11 = 72.43, Q
∗
12 = 40.00, Q
∗
21 = 64.61, Q
∗
22 = 70.00.
The Euler method requires 34 iterations to converge to this solution. BSO 1 provides
a higher level of quality of service in Region 1 whereas BSO 2 does in Region 2. BSO
1 collects P11 = 1341.37 units of blood in Region 1 and P12 = 607.74 units of blood in
Region 2, whereas BSO 2 collects P21 = 1074.27 units in Region 1 and P22 = 587.39
units of blood in Region 2. The revenue of BSO 1 is 136,437.78 and that of BSO 2
is: 99,699.67. The monetized service utility component of the transaction utility of
BSO 1 is 8,455.10 and that of BSO 2 is 12,814.97. BSO 1 incurs costs of 77,031.92
and BSO 2 incurs costs of 69,285.48. The revenue minus the cost (net revenue) for
BSO 1 is: 59,405.86, whereas the revenue minus the cost for BSO 2 is: 30,414.19.
The values of the transaction utilities of the blood service organizations at the
equilibrium values are, hence: U1 = 67, 860.96 and U2 = 43, 229.16. Note that both
organizations have over the time period revenues that exceed their costs, which is
important for the sustainability of their operations. Also, BSO 1 garners a larger
number of units of blood donated in each region than does BSO 2. In Region 1
BSO 1 has a higher level of quality service than does BSO 2 but in Region 2 BSO
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2 provides a higher level of quality service. However, the “brand” of BSO 1, which
is also reflected in its P12 function, dominates, although not significantly in terms of
units collected in Region 2.
Observe that both Q∗12 and Q
∗
22 are at their lower bounds. Hence, according
to the Lagrange analysis theoretical results presented in Section 3.1 we know that:
λ¯111 = λ¯
2
11 = 0 and λ¯
1
21 = λ¯
2
21 = 0. Also, we have that λ¯
1
12 = 737.03, λ¯
2
12 = 0, and
λ¯122 = 354.85, λ¯
2
22 = 0. Therefore, BSO 1 suffers a marginal loss of 737.03 associated
with its services in Region 2 and BSO 2 suffers a marginal loss of 354.85 associated
with its services in Region 2.
Example 3.3: Two BSOs and Three Blood Collection Regions
Example 3.3 has the network topology in Figure 3.3. The data are as in Example 3.2
but with the addition of a possible new blood collection point in Region 3. In this
example, the quality of service level lower bounds associated with the blood service
organizations servicing Region 3 in terms of collections are set to 0.
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Figure 3.3. Example 3.3
The data are as follows: α13 = 40, α23 = 30, and
P13(Q) = 40
√
10Q13 −Q23 + 50, P23(Q) = 30
√
11Q23 −Q13 + 50,
γ13 = 9, γ23 = 10,
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and
cˆ13(Q) = 10Q
2
13 + 15, 000, cˆ23(Q) = 9Q
2
23 + 13, 000.
The lower and upper bounds on the new links, in turn, are:
Q
13
= 0, Q
23
= 0,
Q¯13 = 60, Q¯23 = 70.
The Euler method converges in 34 iterations to the following equilibrium quality
level pattern:
Q∗11 = 72.43, Q
∗
12 = 40.00, Q
∗
13 = 38.84,
Q∗21 = 64.61, Q
∗
22 = 70.00, Q
∗
23 = 33.70.
Note that the equilibrium quality levels for Q∗11, Q
∗
12, and Q
∗
21, Q
∗
22 remain as in
Example 3.2 since the underlying functions for these blood service organization and
blood region pairs remain as in Example 3.2. Also, it is known from the theoretical
analysis in Section 3.1 that since both Q∗13 and Q
∗
23 are neither at their lower or at
their upper bounds, we have that: λ¯113 = λ¯
2
13 = λ¯
1
23 = λ¯
2
23 = 0.00.
BSO 1 receives 804.73 units of blood in Region 3 whereas BSO 2 receives 586.24
units of blood in Region 3. The revenue of BSO 1 is now 196,739.25 and that of BSO
2 is: 134,874.17. The monetized service utility component of the transaction utility is
11,601.49 for BSO 1 and 16,185.06 for BSO 2. Since now both organizations operate
a facility in an additional region the costs for BSO 1 are equal to 167,283.03 and for
BSO 2 the costs are: 127,589.64. The transaction utility for BSO 1, U1 = 41, 057.70,
and the transaction utility for BSO 2, U2, is now 23, 469.59.
The revenue for each organization is higher in this example, with a new blood
collection facility in a new region, than that obtained in Example 3.2. However, the
cost is also higher. By collecting blood donations from three regions, rather than
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two, the organizations achieve a higher monetized service utility by serving more
regions. The net revenue for BSO 1 is now 29,456.22 and it is 7,284.53 for BSO 2.
For each organization the revenue still exceeds the costs, which means that collecting
blood in Region 3 does not hurt them financially. However, the net revenue for each
organization is lower in this example than in Example 3.2.
Example 3.4: Three BSOs and Two Blood Collection Regions
Example 3.4 is constructed from Example 3.2, and has the same data, except for the
new data corresponding to the addition of a new competitor, BSO 3, as depicted in
Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. Example 3.4
The data for BSO 3 are:
P31(Q) = 50
√
11Q31 −Q21 + 50, P32(Q) = 40
√
10Q32 −Q12 + 2000,
ω3 = 10, γ31 = 10, γ32 = 11,
with the total cost functions given by:
cˆ31(Q) = 6q
2
31 + 10, 000, cˆ32(Q) = 5Q
2
32 + 12, 000,
and with the lower and upper bounds as follows:
Q
31
= 50, Q¯31 = 90,
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Q
32
= 40, Q¯32 = 80.
The price pi3 = 80. Recall that here I just consider the collection component of
the blood supply chains.
The Euler method requires 40 iterations for convergence and yields the following
equilibrium quality service level pattern:
Q∗11 = 72.43, Q
∗
12 = 40, Q
∗
21 = 64.61, Q
∗
22 = 70, Q
∗
31 = 70.73, Q
∗
32 = 66.65.
Observe that, since the blood donation functions of the original blood service or-
ganizations have not changed, their quality service levels and, hence, their transaction
utilities remain as in Example 3.2; the same holds for the donations, revenue amounts,
costs, as well as the monetized service utility component of the transaction utilities.
BSO 3 has a transaction utility U3 = 104, 706.44. The amounts of its blood
donations received are: P31 = 1, 381.47 and P32 = 2, 049.99. Its revenue is: 274,516.72
and its monetized service utility component of its transaction utility is: 14,111.81,
with its cost equal to 184,922.09. This blood service organization has a net revenue
equal to 89,594.63. BSO 3 has the highest net revenue of all the organizations, in
this example, since the net revenue for BSO 1 in Example 3.2 was 59,405.86 and
that for BSO 2: 30,414.19. This is due, in part to BSO 3 being able to achieve
the highest volume of donations. Its quality levels do not lie at the bounds so that:
λ¯131 = λ¯
2
31 = λ¯
1
32 = λ¯
2
32 = 0.
Example 3.5: Competition from BSO 3 Intensifies
Example 3.5 is constructed from Example 3.4. It is assumed that some time has
transpired and now both BSOs 1 and 2 realize that there is more competition from
BSO 3.
Hence, their blood donation functions are now modified to capture the impact of
competition from BSO 3 as follows:
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For BSO 1:
P11(Q) = 50
√
10Q11 −Q21 −Q22 − .5Q31 + 130,
P12(Q) = 30
√
12Q12 −Q21 − 2Q22 − .3Q32 + 135,
and BSO 2:
P21(Q) = 40
√
11Q21 −Q11 −Q12 − .2Q21 + 113,
P22(Q) = 20
√
12Q22 −Q11 −Q12 − .3Q32 + 135.
The remainder of the data is identical to that in Example 3.4.
The Euler method converges in 40 iterations and yields the following quality ser-
vice level pattern:
Q∗11 = 73.57, Q
∗
12 = 40, Q
∗
21 = 64.99, Q
∗
22 = 70, Q
∗
31 = 70.73, Q
∗
32 = 66.65.
The transaction utilities are now: U1 = 64, 439.25, U2 = 42, 572.30, and U3 =
104, 222.39. The volumes of blood donations are now as follows: for BSO 1: P11 =
1, 318.43, P12 = 592.46; for BSO 2: P21 = 1, 059.31, P22 = 580.15, and for BSO 3:
P31 = 1, 381.22 and P32 = 2, 049.99. BSO 1 has a revenue of 133,762.72, costs equal to
77,860.27, and a monetized service quality component of the transaction utility equal
to 8,536.80. BSO 2, in turn, enjoys a revenue of 98,367.77, encumbers costs equal to
68,644.69, and a monetized service quality component of its transaction utility equal
to 12,849.21. BSO 3 obtains a revenue of 274,497.03, incurs costs of 185,38.53, and a
monetized service quality component of its transaction utility equal to 15,112.89.
Observe that only Q∗12 and Q
∗
22 are, again, at their lower bounds. Hence, according
to the Lagrange analysis theoretical results presented in Section 3.1 we know that:
λ¯111 = λ¯
2
11 = 0, λ¯
1
21 = λ¯
2
21 = 0, λ¯
1
31 = λ¯
2
31 = 0 and also λ¯
1
32 = λ¯
2
32 = 0. Also, we now
have that λ¯112 = 720.98, λ¯
2
12 = 0, and λ¯
1
22 = 351.79, λ¯
2
22 = 0. Therefore, BSO 1 suffers
a marginal loss of 720.98 associated with its services in Region 2 and BSO 2 suffers
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a marginal loss of 351.79 associated with its services in Region 2. These marginal
losses are lower than those they suffered in Example 3.2.
Interestingly, with increased competition, blood donors benefit in that the quality
service levels provided are now as high or higher than in Example 3.4 and both blood
service organizations (BSOs) 1 and 2 provide a higher quality service in Region 1
than in Example 3.4. But, of course, this comes at a higher cost so their transaction
utilities are lower now than in Example 3.4. Also, in terms of financial sustainability,
note that for BSO 1, its net revenue is now: 55,902.45; for BSO 2, this value is:
29,723.08, and for BSO 3: 89,109.50. With increased competition, the net revenues
decrease for all blood service organizations but these are, nevertheless, still significant
and would allow for investment, whether to enhance their operations or, if feasible,
to engage in R&D and further innovation for blood services.
In addition, comparing the amounts of blood collected by the two organizations
in the two regions in Example 3.2 with the results obtained here, it is seen that the
blood collections from both regions decrease for BSO 1 and BSO 2. However, due to
the presence of a competing organization the overall blood collection increases. This
finding is consistent with the empirical findings in Bose (2015).
Example 3.6: Three BSOs and Three Blood Collection Regions
Example 3.6 is constructed from Example 3.5 but it has a new blood collection region.
Hence, as depicted in Figure 3.5, there are now three regions for blood collection, as
well as three blood service organizations.
The data remain as in Example 3.5 with the addition of the new data below:
α13 = 40, α23 = 30, α33 = 50,
P13(Q) = 40
√
10Q13 −Q23 − .2Q33 + 150,
P23(Q) = 30
√
11Q23 −Q13 − .2Q33 + 150,
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Figure 3.5. Example 3.6
P33(Q) = 50
√
10Q33 −Q23 − .3Q13 + 100,
cˆ13(Q) = 100Q
2
13 + 15, 000 cˆ23(Q) = 9Q
2
23 + 13000, cˆ33(Q) = 8Q
2
33 + 10000,
and with lower and upper bounds on the new links to Region 3 given by:
Q
13
= 0, Q
23
= 0, Q
33
= 40,
Q¯13 = 60, Q¯23 = 70, Q¯33 = 90.
Also, we have that
γ13 = 9, γ23 = 10, γ33 = 10.
The Euler method, again, converges in 40 iterations to the following equilibrium
pattern:
Q∗11 = 73.57, Q
∗
12 = 40, Q
∗
13 = 36.32,
Q∗21 = 64.99, Q
∗
22 = 70, Q
∗
23 = 31.51,
Q∗31 = 70.73, Q
∗
32 = 66.65, Q
∗
33 = 56.39.
The transaction utilities are now: U1 = 129, 918.82, U2 = 58, 877.95, and U3 =
168, 602.63.
All of the Lagrange multipliers are equal to 0 except for the following: λ¯112 =
720.98, λ¯122 = 351.79.
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All three blood service organizations enjoy a higher transaction utility by collecting
blood in all three regions, rather than just two regions.
The volumes of blood donations are now: for BSO 1: P11 = 1, 318.43, P12 =
592.46, P13 = 867.59; for BSO 2: P21 = 1, 059.31, P22 = 580.15, P23 = 635.70,
and for BSO 3: P31 = 1, 381.22, P32 = 2, 049.99, and P33 = 1, 246.49. BSO 1 has
a revenue of 194,493.95, a cost equal to 76,054.13, and a monetized service quality
component of the transaction utility equal to 11,478.99. BSO 2, in turn, enjoys a
revenue of 136,509.97, a cost 93,632.34, and a monetized service quality component
of its transaction utility equal to 16,000.32. BSO 3 obtains a revenue of 374,216.53,
incurs a cost 226,36.88, and a monetized service quality component of its transaction
utility equal to 20,751.96.
The net revenue of BSO 1 is now equal to 118,439.83; that of BSO 2 is: 42,877.63,
and that of BSO 3: 147,850.66. All blood service organizations gain by servicing
another region even in the case of competition.
3.4. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a game theory model for blood donations that focuses
on blood service organizations, which are increasingly challenged by competition in
this unique industry. Indeed, blood is a product that is life-saving, but, at the same
time, it cannot be manufactured, but must be donated by individuals. The model
is network-based and the governing concept is that of Nash Equilibrium. The blood
service organizations compete for blood donations in different regions and donors re-
spond to the quality of service that the blood service organizations provide in blood
collection. I formulated the governing equilibrium conditions as a variational in-
equality problem and prove that the solution is guaranteed to exist. Conditions for
uniqueness are also provided and additional theoretical results based on Lagrange
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theory associated with the lower and upper bounds on the service quality levels are
established.
The modeling and algorithmic framework is illustrated through a series of exam-
ples for which the computed equilibrium quality service levels as well as the Lagrange
multipliers, along with analysis are provided. The results obtained for the volume
of donations, the revenue, and the costs of each blood service organization, and the
monetized component of the transaction utility, which corresponds to the utility as-
sociated with providing quality service from the different examples, show how these
components vary depending on the intensity of competition. The results also demon-
strate how increased competition can yield benefits for blood donors in terms of
quality level of service. In addition, the examples show that the blood service organi-
zations can benefit, from enhanced transaction utility, by providing additional blood
collection sites. Importantly, the results also reveal that blood service organizations
that do “good,” can also be financially sustainable.
The results obtained from this model can also provide important managerial in-
sights. For blood collection regions that have lower quality levels, internal assessments
can be made by the blood service organizations to figure out the individual factors
responsible for such low levels such as longer wait time, unfriendly staff, etc. Ac-
cordingly, intervention techniques such as better scheduling, and improved training
of staff can be implemented. However, improving the service quality implies increase
in cost. The blood service organizations can easily observe the financial implications
of their decisions from the analysis.
In addition, it might be of value to blood service organizations to conduct surveys
at the blood collection sites and come up with service quality measures that are
weighted averages of the scores on the different operational facets mentioned in extant
literature that affect donor retention. The blood banking industry is highly regulated
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Blood collection procedures have to
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follow strict protocols stated by the FDA in order to ensure that the collected blood
is safe. This research suggests that, in addition to emphasizing safety measures for
blood collection such as proper donor screening, attention should be given to the
service quality aspects of the blood collection sites to maintain a steady supply of
blood from motivated donors.
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CHAPTER 4
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK COMPETITION AMONG
BLOOD SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
This chapter is based on the paper by Nagurney and Dutta (2019b). In the
competitive supply chain network model developed in this chapter I include multiple,
competing blood service organizations which are supplying blood to different hospitals
and trauma centers through multiple paths that include all major supply activities
such collection, processing and testing, shipment, storage and distribution. There is
a cost associated with each link representing the cost for that particular operation.
Similar to the utility function in Chapter 3, the utility function of the blood service
organizations here contains revenue as well as altruism/benefit components with the
latter being weighted. Further, in this model common/shared capacities on the blood
donations are imposed to incorporate supply side competition while upper and lower
bounds on the demand are included to address issues of shortage and wastage.
The equilibrium blood product flows in terms of RBCs are determined for each
blood service organization, given the competition and the constraints. Perishability
along the supply chain is captured and also differentiated prices are revealed. The
governing equilibrium conditions are that of Generalized Nash Equilibrium due to
the presence of shared constraints. I provide alternative variational inequality formu-
lations of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem, along with economic analysis
utilizing Lagrange theory associated with the various capacity constraints as well as
the demand constraints. Finally, an effective computational scheme is applied to
compute the equilibrium solutions in numerical examples comprising the case study.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, the model is
constructed, and alternative variational inequality formulations provided. In addition,
Lagrange analysis is conducted to gain insights into the economic meaning associated
with the supply and demand constraints. In Section 4.2, the computational procedure
is described, along with explicit formulae, at each iteration, for the RBC path flows,
and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the blood collection links, the physical
capacity link bounds, and the demand point upper and lower bounds for RBCs. I
then demonstrate the applicability of the framework through a case study consisting
of a series of numerical examples in Section 4.3. The summary of the results, and
conclusions are provided in Section 4.4.
4.1. The Multiple Blood Service Organizations Supply Chain
Network Competition Model
Blood service organizations (blood banks) collect blood periodically through blood
drives at collection facilities and/or through blood mobile units. Once whole blood
is collected at the collection sites it is sent to component laboratories for processing
and testing for disease markers. The processing involves separation of the whole
blood into components such as red blood cells, plasma, and platelets. Different blood
products have different shelf lives and each type of product also needs to be stored
at specific temperatures. Hence, supply chain management strategies for blood need
to be component-specific. I focus on RBCs in this model since these are the most
common type of blood product and are used for transfusions in surgeries, treatments
for cancer and other diseases, etc.
As depicted in Figure 4.1, there are I blood service organizations competing with
each other. Each blood service organization i can collect blood at niC collection sites.
I assume that there are J regions in which blood banks can set up collection sites or
send blood mobiles to. Each of the niC ; i = 1, .., I, collection sites belongs to a region
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Figure 4.1. Supply Chain Network Topology for I Blood Organizations
j; j = 1, . . . , J . Collected blood by i is then shipped to niB blood centers. From
there, blood is sent to niCL component laboratories for testing and processing and,
subsequently, shipped to niS storage facilities. The component laboratories may not
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be separate physical entities but may exist within the blood centers (cf. Nagurney,
Masoumi, and Yu (2012)). The subsequent tier of the supply chain network for
i; i = 1, . . . , I, in Figure 4.1, is comprised of niD distribution centers. The blood
banks may serve the same nH demand points consisting of hospitals, medical centers,
etc., and denoted by the bottom nodes: H1, . . . , HnH in Figure 4.1. These “demand
markets” may be served by multiple blood banks since this is the case in reality. For
example, Baystate Health in Massachusetts procures blood from the American Red
Cross and from the Rhode Island Blood Bank in addition to having in-house blood
collection (Merola (2017)).
Each link between a pair of nodes denotes an activity along the supply chain.
The links from the blood service organizations to the collection sites represent the
collection procedure. The next set of links to the component labs represent the
processing and testing of blood. The successive sets of links denote, respectively,
storage, shipment, and distribution to demand points. There are also some direct
links from storage facilities to demand points since in some cases blood banks work
closely with the hospitals and monitor their inventory levels and ship the required
amount of blood directly to reduce cost (Wellis (2017)). Hence, the network topology
corresponding to even a single blood service organization, as depicted in Figure 4.1,
is more general than those constructed in Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2012) and in
Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2017).
This model can be used to capture regional as well as nationwide competition.
Moreover, large blood service organizations such as the American Red Cross and
the New York Blood Center have multiple component labs, storage, and distribution
centers, whereas smaller community ones might have one each. The time horizon in
which all the activities are occurring is assumed to be one week in this model.
The network topology of the blood service organizations’ supply chains is repre-
sented by G = [N,L] where N and L denote the sets of nodes and links, respectively.
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Table 4.1. Multiplier Notation for Perishability
Notation Definition
αa The arc multiplier associated with link a, which represents the percent-
age of throughput on link a. αa ∈ (0, 1]; a ∈ L.
αap The arc-path multiplier, which is the product of the multipliers of the
links on path p that precede link a; a ∈ L and p ∈ P ; that is,
αap ≡

δap
∏
b∈{a′<a}p
αb, if {a′ < a}p 6= Ø,
δap, if {a′ < a}p = Ø,
where {a′ < a}p denotes the set of the links preceding link a in path p
and δap = 1, if link a is contained in path p, and 0, otherwise.
µp The multiplier corresponding to the percentage of throughput on path
p; that is, µp ≡
∏
a∈p
αa; p ∈ P .
Li is defined as the set of all the directed links corresponding to the sequence of
activities pertaining to the supply chain network of blood service organization i;
i = 1, . . . , I. Associated with each link a is a total operational cost function, denoted
by cˆa ∀a ∈ L, representing the cost for each activity corresponding to collection, pro-
cessing and testing, storage and distribution. A path p consists of a sequence of links
originating at one of the top origin nodes in Figure 4.1, ranging from node 1 through
node I, and ending at a destination node, corresponding to one of the demand points:
H1, . . . , HnH .
In order to capture perishability, I utilize a generalized network approach with
appropriate arc and path multipliers (see also, e.g., Nagurney et al. (2013)) as defined
in Table 4.1. Moreover, since the blood product under consideration is RBCs those
paths that would have a time length greater than 42 days are explicitly removed from
the network(s) in Figure 4.1 since they would, in effect, be infeasible (and against
Food and Drug Administration regulations).
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Let xp denote the nonnegative flow of blood on path p. Let the weekly demand
for blood from blood service organization i at demand point k be denoted by dik; i =
1, ..., I; k = H1, . . . , HnH . Let P
i
k denote the set of all paths joining blood service
organization node i with destination node Hk. The demands are grouped into the
vector d ∈ RInH+ .
The conservation of flow equation that has to hold for each blood service organi-
zation i; i = 1, . . . , I, at each demand point k; k = H1, . . . , HnH , is
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp = dik, (4.1)
that is, the demand for blood at each demand point from each blood service organiza-
tion has to be satisfied. Observe that, according to (4.1) the amount of blood product
flow along a path that arrives at a destination node is equal to the path multiplier
times the initial flow on the path since there may be losses due to testing, etc.
Moreover, the path flows must be nonnegative, that is:
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (4.2)
where P denotes the set of all paths in the network in Figure 4.1 from origin nodes
corresponding to the organizations to the destination nodes corresponding to the
demand points.
Let fa denote the flow of blood on link a. Then, the following conservation of flow
equations must also hold:
fa =
∑
p∈P
xpαap, ∀a ∈ L. (4.3)
Note that, according to (4.3), the initial product flow on link a is the sum of the
product flows along paths that contain that link, taking into account possible losses
in the preceding activities.
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As mentioned earlier, the raw material in the supply chain for blood products
cannot be manufactured but has to be collected from voluntary donors. Hence, the
total amount of blood that can be collected is restricted in terms of the percentage of
population that is eligible to donate blood in a particular region in a given week. An
eligible donor, say, in Sarasota County in Florida, is unlikely to travel to a distant
region in the state or to another state, unless it is in proximity, to donate blood.
Therefore, I specify region-based populations and recall that, typically, a donor do-
nates one pint of blood at a time. Let Lj1 denote the set of top-tier links in the
network in Figure 4.1 representing blood collection in region j. Then we have the
following constraint for each region j; j = 1, . . . , J :
∑
a∈Lj1
fa ≤ Sj, (4.4)
where Sj represents the total population eligible to donate blood in a given week in
region j; j = 1, . . . , J . Unlike commercial product supply chains with capacity con-
straints, in this case, the constraint is not on the physical capacity of the production
or collection facilities but on the actual supply of the raw material. Observe that
(4.4) is a common, that is, a shared constraint among the blood service organizations
if a given region includes collection links of multiple blood service organizations.
In addition, explicit link capacities are incorporated on all the network links in
Figure 4.1, which represent the actual physical capacities. Hence, for each blood
service organization i; i = 1, . . . , I, each link a ∈ Li has a positive associated capacity
denoted by ua. Then, the following constraints must also be satisfied:
fa ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ Li, i = 1, . . . , I. (4.5)
All the link flows in the network are grouped into the vector f ∈ RnL where nL is the
total number of elements in L, the set of all links.
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Finally, hospitals and medical centers, that is, the demand points, have con-
straints, which may be included in the contracts with the blood service organizations.
In particular, they contract for a lower bound for the weekly deliveries of blood, while
also dealing with upper bounds on the amounts that they can safely store in order to
also reduce wastage and associated costs. These constraints are as follows:
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp ≥ dk, k = H1, . . . , HnH , (4.6)
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp ≤ d¯k, k = H1, . . . , HnH , (4.7)
where dk denotes the lower bound for units of RBCs at demand point k and d¯k denotes
the upper bound at k. Observe that these are common/shared constraints for the
blood service organizations and, hence, will affect their feasible sets, as they compete
to serve the hospitals and medical centers with blood.
The total link cost on link a, denoted by cˆa, ∀a ∈ L, may, in general, be a function
of all the link flows in the network. This is to enable the modeling of competition for
resources across the blood service organizations’ supply chain networks. Hence, we
have that
cˆa = cˆa(f), ∀a ∈ L. (4.8)
For example, blood service organizations may compete for staff to conduct the various
supply chain network activities; moreover, they may compete for freight services for
distribution purposes, etc.
The price that demand point k is willing to pay for a unit of RBCs from blood
service organization i is denoted by ρik for i = 1, . . . , I; k = H1, . . . HnH and is given
by the function:
ρik = ρik(d), i = 1, . . . , I; k = H1 . . . , HnH . (4.9)
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Hence, the price charged per unit of RBCs may, in general, depend on the vector of
demands, due to the competition among the hospitals and medical centers for blood.
The prices represent the value that a hospital or medical center places on a unit of
RBC from a specific blood service organization and that it is willing to pay. These
price functions may incorporate parameters reflecting the duration of the contract, if
the BSO is selected by the particular hospital, as well as historical information as to
the reliability of the former.
In addition, since the majority of blood banks in the United States are nonprofits,
there is a utility associated with the service that they provide (cf. Nagurney, Alvarez
Flores, and Soylu (2016)). Let γik correspond to a measurement of the satisfaction
that blood service organization i derives from supplying blood to demand point k.
The overall such “service” utility of blood service organization i associated with all
the demand points is then given by
∑HnH
k=H1
γikdik. This service utility also represents
altruism (cf. Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016)). In addition, each blood
service organization i associates a weight ωi with its service utility, which monetizes
it. According to the function ωi
∑HnH
k=H1
γikdik, the greater the amount made available,
the more patients that can benefit and, therefore, the greater the good that can be
accomplished.
By synthesizing the above revenue and cost terms as well as what may be consid-
ered to be a weighted altruism function, the utility function of blood service organi-
zation i; i = 1, . . . , I, denoted by Ui, can be expressed as:
Ui =
HnH∑
k=H1
ρik(d)dik + ωi
HnH∑
k=H1
γikdik −
∑
a∈Li
cˆa(f). (4.10)
The utility function (4.10) is assumed to be concave and continuously differentiable.
It is to be noted that this is the utility of each blood service organization over a time
horizon of a week.
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In this model, the blood service organizations are trying to maximize their utility,
subject to constraints (4.1)-(4.7), while competing for the quantity of blood to be
obtained and to be supplied to the hospitals and medical centers. Hence, each blood
service organization has, as its strategies, its vector of path flows, Xi, such that
Xi ≡ {{xp}|p ∈ P i} ∈ RnPi+ , (4.11)
where P i denotes the set of all paths associated with i and nP i denotes the number
of paths from i to the demand points. Then, X is the vector of all the blood banks’
path flows, that is, X ≡ {{Xi}|i = 1, . . . , I}. I, also, for simplicity of notation, use
x ≡ X.
Using the conservation of flow equations (4.3), shared constraint (4.4) can be
rewritten, for each region j = 1, . . . , J , in terms of the strategic variables, i.e., the
path flows, as: ∑
a∈Lj1
∑
p∈P
xpδap ≤ Sj, j = 1, . . . , J. (4.12)
Since collection of blood is the first activity in the network and there are no preceding
links, from the definition of the arc-path multiplier we have αap = δap.
Similarly, the individual blood bank’s capacity constraints for all activities can be
rewritten as follows:
∑
p∈P
xpαap ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ Li, i = 1, . . . , I. (4.13)
The i-th blood bank’s individual feasible set is defined as, Ki, given by
Ki ≡ {Xi|(4.2) and (4.13) hold for i}. (4.14)
Further, I define the feasible set consisting of the shared constraints, S, as:
S ≡ {X| (4.12), (4.6), and (4.7) hold}. (4.15)
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Also, in view of (4.1), the demand price functions (4.9) can be reexpressed as:
ρˆik = ρˆik(x) ≡ ρik(d), i = 1, . . . , I; k = H1, . . . , HnH . (4.16)
Using the conservation of flow equations (4.1) through (4.3), and, given the form of
the total link cost functions, the demand price functions, and the weighted altruism
functions, I can define each blood service organization utility function in terms of
path flows only, that is, Uˆi(X) ≡ Ui; i = 1, . . . I. These utilities are then grouped into
an I-dimensional vector Uˆ , where
Uˆ = Uˆ(X). (4.17)
In this model it is assumed that the blood service organizations compete noncooper-
atively in an oligopolistic market framework in which each blood service organization
selects its blood product flows to maximize its utility, until an equilibrium is achieved,
according to the following definition.
Definition 4.1: Blood Supply Chain Network Generalized Nash Equilib-
rium
A blood product path flow pattern X∗ ∈ K ≡ ∏Ii=1Ki, X∗ ∈ S, constitutes a blood
supply chain network Generalized Nash Equilibrium if for each blood service organi-
zation i; i = 1, ..., I :
Uˆi(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Uˆi(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki,∀X ∈ S, (4.18)
where
Xˆ∗i ≡ (X∗1 , . . . , X∗i−1, X∗i+1, . . . , X∗I ).
According to (4.18) an equilibrium is established if no blood service organization
can unilaterally improve upon its utility by selecting an alternative vector of blood
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product flows, given the blood product flows of the other blood service organizations,
and subject to the capacity constraints, both individual and shared ones, the shared
demand constraints, and the nonnegativity constraints. It is to be noted that K and
S are both convex sets.
If there are no coupling, that is, shared, constraints in this problem then X and
X∗ in Definition 4.1 need only lie in the feasible set K, and, under the assumption
of concavity of the utility functions and that they are continuously differentiable, we
know that (cf. Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Nagurney (1999)) the solution to what
would then be a Nash Equilibrium problem (see Nash (1950, 1951)) would coincide
with the solution to the following variational inequality problem: determine X∗ ∈ K,
such that
−
I∑
i=1
〈∇XiUˆi(X∗), Xi −X∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (4.19)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in the corresponding Euclidean space and
∇XiUˆi(X) denotes the gradient of Uˆi(X) with respect to Xi.
However, as mentioned earlier, since here the blood service organizations have
common constraints on the amount of blood that can be collected, and on the amounts
to be delivered, the strategies of each BSO affect both the objective functions as well
as the feasible sets of the other BSOs. Consequently, this is a Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE) which cannot be directly formulated as variational inequality
problem, but may be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality.
4.1.1 Variational Equilibrium and Variational Inequality Formulation
I now define the variational equilibrium which, as emphasized in Chapter 2, Sec-
tion 2.3 is a refinement of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium and is a specific type
of GNE (see Kulkarni and Shahbhang (2012)). In a GNE defined by a variational
equilibrium, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints are all
77
the same which provides a fairness interpretation and makes sense from an economic
standpoint. Specifically, we have:
Definition 4.2: Variational Equilibrium
A strategy vector X∗ is said to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized
Nash Equilibrium game if X∗ ∈ K,X∗ ∈ S is a solution of the variational inequality:
−
I∑
i=1
〈∇XiUˆi(X∗), Xi −X∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, ∀X ∈ S. (4.20)
I now expand the terms in the variational inequality (4.20). From the definition of
a gradient, it is known that
−∇XiUˆi(X) =
[
−∂Uˆi
∂xp
; p ∈ P ik; k = H1, . . . , HnH
]
. (4.21)
We also know that, in view of (4.1) and (4.10), that for paths p ∈ P ik:
−∂Uˆi
∂xp
= −
∂(
∑HnH
l=H1
ρil(d)
∑
q∈P il µqxq + ωi
∑HnH
l=H1
γil
∑
q∈P il µqxq −
∑
b∈Li cˆb(f))
∂xp
.
(4.22)
Then, making use of (4.1) and (4.3) and the expression (4.16), we have that for
p ∈ P ik:
∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
≡
∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f)
∂fa
αap, (4.23a)
∂ρˆil(x)
∂xp
≡ ∂ρil(d)
∂dik
µp, (4.23b)
and obtain for p ∈ P ik:
−∂Uˆi
∂xp
=
∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
− ωiγikµp − ρˆik(x)µp −
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqxq
 . (4.24)
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Hence, (4.20) is equivalent to the variational inequality: determine x∗ ∈ K, x∗ ∈ S
such that:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
−ωiγikµp− ρˆik(x∗)µp−
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q
]
× [xp−x∗p] ≥ 0,
∀x ∈ K, x ∈ S. (4.25)
For simplicity, I refer to ∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
as the marginal total cost of path p.
Variational inequality (4.25) can now be put into the standard form given by
(2.1a) in Chapter 2. Let the p-th component of F (X) for a given i, k, p ∈ P ik, ∀i, k,
be [
∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
− ωiγikµp − ρˆik(x)µp −
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqxq
]
, (4.26)
with K ≡ K1 ≡ K∩S, then variational inequality (4.25) can be put into the standard
form.
Remark: Existence of an Equilibrium Solution
It is assumed that the feasible set K is nonempty, which will be the case if the
capacities on the links and blood donor regions are sufficient to satisfy the sum of the
demands for blood at the demand points. An equilibrium blood flow pattern X∗ =
x∗ ∈ K satisfying variational inequality (4.26); equivalently, variational inequality
(4.25), is guaranteed to exist since the function F (X) is continuous under the imposed
assumptions and the feasible set K is compact, due to the nonnegative assumption on
the blood path flows and the link and blood donor regional upper bound capacities.
4.1.2 Alternative Variational Inequality Formulations and Lagrange Anal-
ysis with Economic Interpretation
In this part, I first present an alternative variational inequality formulation to the
one in (4.25), again, in path flows, but using Lagrange multipliers. I then conduct an
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economic analysis using Lagrange theory and conclude with, yet, another variational
inequality, which I utilize for computational purposes in Section 4.2.
Let ηj, ∀j, and θa; a ∈ L, denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with con-
straints (4.12) and (4.13), respectively. In addition, let σk; ∀k, denote the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the k-th lower bound demand constraint (4.6) and let k;
∀k, denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the k-th upper bound demand
constraint (4.7). The above Lagrange multipliers are grouped into the respective vec-
tors: η ∈ RJ+, θ ∈ RnL+ , σ ∈ RnH+ , and  ∈ RnH+ . Also, let βp; ∀p ∈ P , denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with each path p nonnegativity constraint (4.2) and
I group these Lagrange multipliers into the vector β ∈ RnP+ . I define the feasible set
K2 ≡ {(x, β, η, θ, σ, )|x ∈ RnP+ , β ∈ RnP+ , η ∈ RJ+, θ ∈ RnL+ , σ ∈ RnH+ ,  ∈ RnH+ }. Then,
we have the following result:
Theorem 4.1: Alternative Variational Inequality Formulation of the Vari-
ational Equilibrium in Path Flows
The variational inequlity (4.25) is equivalent to the variational inequality: determine
the vector of equilibrium path flows and Lagrange multipliers, (x∗, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗) ∈
K2, such that:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
−β∗p+
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗j δap+
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαap−ωiγikµp−σ∗kµp+∗kµp−ρˆik(x∗)µp
−
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q
]
× [xp − x∗p]
+
∑
p∈P
x∗p×[βp−β∗p ]+
J∑
j=1
[
Sj−
∑
a∈Lj1
∑
p∈P
x∗pδap
]
×[ηj−η∗j ]+
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li
[
ua−
∑
p∈P
x∗pαap
]
×[θa−θ∗a]
+
HnH∑
k=H1
(
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
∗
p − dk)× (σk − σ∗k) +
HnH∑
k=H1
(d¯k −
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
∗
p)× (k − ∗k) ≥ 0,
∀(x, β, η, θ, σ, ) ∈ K2. (4.27)
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Proof: By setting:
V (x) =
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
−ωiγikµp−ρˆik(x∗)µp−
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q
]
×[xp−x∗p],
(4.28)
variational inequality (4.25) can be rewritten as:
MinKV (x) = V (x∗) = 0. (4.29)
Under the previously imposed assumptions we know that all the underlying functions
in (4.29) are continuously differentiable and convex.
Then let:
bp = −xp ≤ 0, ∀p,
ej =
∑
a∈Lj1
∑
p∈P
xpδap − Sj ≤ 0, ∀j,
ga =
∑
p∈P
xpαap − ua ≤ 0, ∀a,
hk = dk −
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp ≤ 0, ∀k,
rk =
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp − d¯k ≤ 0, ∀k,
(4.30)
and
Γ(x) = (bp, ej, ga, hk, rk)p∈P ;j=1,...,J ;a∈L;k=H1,...,HnH . (4.31)
Hence, the feasible set K can be rewritten as
K = {x ∈ RnP+ : Γ(x) ≤ 0}. (4.32)
I now construct the Lagrange function:
L(x, β, η, θ, σ, ) =
I∑
i=1
(−
HnH∑
k=H1
ρˆik(x)
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp − ωi
HnH∑
k=H1
γik
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp +
∑
a∈Li
cˆa(Ax))
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+
∑
p∈P
βpbp +
J∑
j=1
ηjej +
∑
a∈L
θaga +
HnH∑
k=H1
σkhk +
HnH∑
k=H1
krk, (4.33)
∀x ∈ RnP+ ,∀β ∈ RnP+ ,∀η ∈ RJ+,∀θ ∈ RnL+ ,∀σ ∈ RnH+ ,∀ ∈ RnH+ ,
where A is the arc-path incidence matrix with component ap = 1, if link a is contained
in path p and 0, otherwise; β is the vector with components: {βp, ∀p ∈ P}, with η
and the other vectors of Lagrange multipliers as defined above.
It is straightforward to establish that the feasible set K is convex and that the
Slater condition holds. Then, if x∗ is the minimal solution to problem (4.29), there
exist β∗ ∈ RnP+ , η∗ ∈ RJ+, θ∗ ∈ RnL+ , σ∗ ∈ RnH+ , and ∗ ∈ RnH+ such that the vector
(x∗, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗) is a saddle point of the Lagrange function (4.33), that is:
L(x∗, β, η, θ, σ, ) ≤ L(x∗, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗) ≤ L(x, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗), (4.34)
∀x ∈ RnP+ ,∀β ∈ RnP+ ,∀η ∈ RJ+,∀θ ∈ RnL+ ,∀σ ∈ RnH+ ,∀ ∈ RnH+ ,
and
β∗pb
∗
p = 0, ∀p ∈ P,
η∗j e
∗
j = 0, ∀j,
θ∗ag
∗
a = 0, ∀a ∈ L,
σ∗kh
∗
k = 0, 
∗
kr
∗
k = 0, ∀k. (4.35)
From the right-hand side of (4.35) it follows that x∗ ∈ RnP+ is a minimal point
of L(x, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗) in the entire space RnP and, therefore, we have that for all
p ∈ P ik, ∀i, ∀k:
∂L(x∗, β∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗)
∂xp
=
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγikµp − ρˆik(x∗)µp −
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q − β∗p +
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗j δap
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+
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαap − σ∗kµp + ∗kµp = 0, (4.36)
together with conditions (4.35). Conditions (4.35) and (4.36) correspond to an equiv-
alent variational inequality to that in (4.25). For example, if we multiply (4.36) by
(xp − x∗p) and sum with respect to p ∈ P ik, ∀i, ∀k, we obtain:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∂Cˆp(x∗)
∂xp
− ωiγikµp − ρˆik(x∗)µp −
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q
× (xp − x∗p)
=
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
β∗pxp −
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
β∗px
∗
p
−
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lij
η∗jxpδap +
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗jx
∗
pδap
−
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαapxp +
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαapx
∗
p
+
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
σ∗kµpxp−
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
σ∗kµpx
∗
p−
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∗kµpxp+
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∗kµpx
∗
p.
(4.37)
Examining the expressions on the right-hand side of the equal sign in (4.37) it is
known that for j = 1, . . . , J , ∀a ∈ L, and for k; k = H1, . . . , HnH :
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
βpx
∗
p = 0,
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗jx
∗
pδap = η
∗
jSj,
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
θ∗aαapx
∗
p = θ
∗
aua,
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I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
σ∗kµpx
∗
p = σ
∗
kdk,
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
∗kµpx
∗
p = 
∗
kd¯k. (4.38)
Hence, the right-hand side of (4.37) simplifies to:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
β∗pxp −
J∑
j=1
η∗j (
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Lij
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
xpδap − Sj)−
∑
a∈L
θ∗a(fa − ua)
+
HnH∑
k=H1
σ∗k(
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp − dk)−
HnH∑
k=H1
∗k(
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpxp − d¯k) ≥ 0, (4.39)
and the conclusion follows. 2
I now provide an economic interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers. I consider
a path p ∈ P ik for a fixed i and k where x∗p > 0, that is, the equilibrium blood flow on
the path is positive. Then, from the first line of (4.35) it is known that β∗p = 0. In
particular, I consider multiple distinct cases which are given below.
Case I: None of the Associated Constraints are Active
Let us first consider the case when the associated path capacity and demand con-
straints are not active, that is, in equality (4.36) we have that, in addition to β∗p = 0,
the corresponding η∗j = 0, as well as the corresponding θ
∗
a = 0, with also σ
∗
k = 0 and
∗k = 0. Hence, we then have that (4.36) satisfies
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγikµp − ρˆik(x∗)µp −
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q − β∗p +
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗j δap
+
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαap − µpσ∗k + µp∗k = 0
⇐⇒ ∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q, (4.40)
which means that, in this case, the marginal total cost on path p is equal to the
marginal utility associated with weighted altruism of the pair (i, k) plus the marginal
revenue associated with the path p.
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Case II: The Associated Donor Supply Constraints Are Active but Other
Capacity and Demand Constraints Associated with the Path Are Not
I now consider the situation in which the blood collected in the regions that link a of
path p is contained in is equal to the available supply, in which case the corresponding
η∗j of those regions j will be positive. Also, the other capacity and demand constraints
relevant to path p are not at their bounds. Hence, we then get from (4.36) that
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q −
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗j δap, (4.41)
and, therefore,
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
< ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q. (4.42)
This result is quite intuitive, since it implies that the marginal total cost on path p is
less than the marginal utility associated with the weighted altruism plus the marginal
revenue associated with the path p. This situation is beneficial for BSO i.
Case III: One or More Links on the Path Are at Their Capacities But No
Other Associated Capacity or Demand Constraints Are Active
In this case it is known that (4.36) yields:
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q −
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαap, (4.43)
and, therefore,
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
< ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q. (4.44)
This is also reasonable, since if the path p has one or more links at their capacities,
then one would expect that the marginal total cost of that path would be less that
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the marginal utility associated with the weighted altruism/benefit function plus the
marginal revenue associated with the path p.
Case IV: The Demand Point That the Path Is Destined to Has Its Demand
at the Lower Bound Whereas No Other Associated Constraints Are Active
In this case it is known that σ∗k > 0 and all other relevant Lagrange multipliers are
zero so that expression (4.36) now yields:
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q + µpσ
∗
k, (4.45)
and, hence,
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
> ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q. (4.46)
This is not a desirable situation since the marginal total cost on the path p now
exceeds the marginal utility associated with the weighted altruism/benefit function
plus the marginal revenue associated with the path p.
Case V: The Demand Point That the Path Is Destined to Has Its Demand
at the Upper Bound Whereas No Other Associated Constraints Are Active
I now consider the case when the demand at point k is at its upper bound and no
other associated constraints are active (and, therefore, all other associated Lagrange
multipliers are equal to zero). We know that then ∗k > 0 and we have that, according
to (4.36):
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q − µp∗k, (4.47)
and, consequently,
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∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
< ωiγikµp + ρˆik(x
∗)µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q. (4.48)
According to (4.48), the marginal total cost on path p, in this case, is less than
the marginal utility associated with the weighted altruism/benefit function plus the
marginal revenue of the BSO and demand point pair (i, k). This is clearly another
desirable situation.
Taking into account the Lagrange multipliers, an equivalent variational formula-
tion to variational inequality (4.27) is the following: determine the vector of equilib-
rium path flows and Lagrange multipliers, (x∗, η∗, θ∗, σ∗, ∗) ∈ K3, such that:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
k=H1
∑
p∈P ik
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
+
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
η∗j δap +
∑
a∈Li
θ∗aαap−ωiγikµp−σ∗kµp + ∗kµp− ρˆik(x∗)µp
−
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
∗)
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
µqx
∗
q
]
× [xp − x∗p]
+
J∑
j=1
[
Sj −
∑
a∈Lj1
∑
p∈P
x∗pδap
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] +
I∑
i=1
∑
a∈Li
[
ua −
∑
p∈P
x∗pαap
]
× [θa − θ∗a]
+
HnH∑
k=H1
(
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
∗
p − dk)× (σk − σ∗k) +
HnH∑
k=H1
(d¯k −
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
∗
p)× (k − ∗k) ≥ 0,
∀(x, η, θ, σ, ) ∈ K3, (4.49)
where K3 ≡ {(x, η, θ, σ, )|x ∈ RnP+ , η ∈ RJ+, θ ∈ RnL+ , σ ∈ RnH+ ,  ∈ RnH+ }.
For the case study in Section 4.3, I utilize variational inequality (4.49). It is to
be noted that variational inequality (4.49) can also be put into standard form (2.1a)
(cf. Chapter 2).
4.2. The Computational Procedure
In this section, I describe the realization of the Euler method (cf. Chapter 2)
which is discussed in details in Section 2.4. As shown in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)
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and Nagurney and Zhang (1996), for convergence of the general iterative scheme, the
sequence {aτ} must satisfy:
∑∞
τ=0 =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞.
Specifically, the notable feature of this algorithm, when applied to the blood supply
chain network competition model, is that it yields closed form expressions for the
variables at each iteration, resulting in an elegant procedure for computations and
solution.
Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the Alternative Vari-
ational Inequality Formulation (4.49)
In particular, for this problem, we have the following closed form expressions for the
path flows at iteration τ + 1. For each path p ∈ P ik,∀i, k, we have:
xτ+1p = max{0, xτp + aτ (ρˆik(xτ )µp +
HnH∑
l=H1
∂ρˆil(x
τ )
∂xp
∑
q∈P il
xτqµq + ωiγikµp −
∂Cˆp(x
τ )
∂xp
−
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈Lj1
ητj δap −
∑
a∈Li
θτaαap + σ
τ
kµp − τkµp)}. (4.50)
The Lagrange multipliers associated with blood collection links a ∈ Lj1; j =
1, . . . , J , are computed according to:
ητ+1j = max{0, ητj + aτ (
∑
a∈Lj1
∑
p∈P
xτpδap − Sj)}. (4.51)
The closed form expression for the Lagrange multipliers for the capacity constraint
on link a ∈ Li; i = 1, . . . , I is:
θτ+1a = max{0, θτa + aτ (
∑
p∈P
xτpαap − ua)}. (4.52)
Next, I provide the closed form expressions for the Lagrange multipliers associated
with the upper and lower bounds on the demands. The explicit formulae for the
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Lagrange multipliers associated with the lower bounds on the demands at demand
points: k = H1, . . . , HnH , are:
στ+1k = max{0, στk + aτ (dk −
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
τ
p)}. (4.53)
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the upper bounds on the demands at
the demand points: k = H1, . . . , HnH , in turn, are computed according to:
τ+1k = max{0, τk + aτ (
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ik
µpx
τ
p − dk)}. (4.54)
The algorithm is assumed to have converged when the absolute value of successive
iterates is less than or equal to the imposed convergence tolerance .
4.3. Numerical Examples
The numerical examples are inspired by a particular region of New England in
which there is growing competition between blood service organizations. The exam-
ples are stylized but capture the features of the game theory model and demonstrate
the types of insights that can be revealed.
In the paper Nagurney and Dutta (2019b) the Euler method was implemented in
FORTRAN and a Linux system at the University of Massachusetts Amherst was used
for the computations. The Euler method was initialized with all variables identically
equal to 0.00. The {aτ} sequence utilized was: .1{1, 12 , 12 , 13 , . . .}. The convergence
tolerance utilized was 10−6; in other words, the algorithm was terminated when the
absolute value of successive computed variable iterates was less than or equal to this
value. The numerical examples below contain explicit input and output data.
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Example 4.1: Baseline Example with Two BSOs and Four Hospitals
I consider two blood service organizations (BSOs), with BSO 1 being a local one, and
BSO 2 being an iconic national one. Please refer to Figure 4.2 for the supply chain
network topology for all the numerical examples. BOS 1 has two collection sites,
a single blood center for processing and testing as well as a single component lab
and storage facility, similar to, for example, the Rhode Island Blood Center, which
is based in Providence, Rhode Island. BSO 2, in turn, has three collection sites, two
blood centers for testing and processing, two component labs and storage facilities,
as well as distribution centers.
There are four demand points with the first and third, denoted, respectively, by H1
and H3 denoting major trauma hospitals and the other two: H2 and H4 corresponding
to smaller hospitals.
Also, there are three regions, as depicted in Figure 4.2, with Region 2 being
common (that is, in proximity) to a collection site of each organization. Here regions
correspond to counties.
I now provide the data for this example. Example 4.1 serves as the baseline from
which other examples are constructed.
The number of people eligible to donate blood in each of the regions are:
S1 = 6000, S2 = 2400, S3 = 3000.
Such values are reasonable since the Northeast has a higher percentage of senior
citizens (65 years and above) (Wilson (2013)) and older people are found to be less
likely to donate or retire from donating after a certain age ( Shaz et al. (2011), Aleccia
(2017)).
The weekly upper and lower bounds on the demand at each hospital are given
below:
dH1 = 200, dH1 = 350,
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Figure 4.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Examples 4.1-4.4
dH2 = 60, dH2 = 150,
dH3 = 200, dH3 = 300,
dH4 = 100, dH4 = 120.
The link definitions, associated link capacities, arc multipliers, total cost func-
tions, and computed equilibrium link flows and associated link Lagrange multipliers
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are provided in Table 4.2. Since BSO 2 operates on a national level, it has more
resources than BSO 1 which is reflected in many of the link capacities. The cost
functions and demand price functions are constructed using information obtained
from Tracy (2010), Carlyle (2012), Gunpinar and Centeno (2015), and Masoumi, Yu
and Nagurney (2017). Also, there are losses on links associated with testing and
processing, and, hence, those arc multipliers are less than 1.
The demand price functions are as follows:
BSO 1:
ρ1H1(d) = −0.07d1H1 − 0.02d2H1 + 300, ρ1H2(d) = −0.08d1H2 − 0.03d2H2 + 310,
ρ1H3(d) = −0.05d1H3 − 0.01d2H3 + 300, ρ1H4(d) = −0.04d1H4 − 0.02d2H4 + 280.
BSO 2:
ρ2H1(d) = −0.05d2H1 − 0.01d1H1 + 280, ρ2H2(d) = −0.07d2H2 − 0.04d1H2 + 290,
ρ2H3(d) = −0.03d2H3 − 0.01d1H3 + 280, ρ2H4(d) = −0.05d2H4 − 0.02d1H4 + 270.
The equilibrium link solution are reported in Table 4.2 since the number of paths
is quite large - equal to 60, whereas the number of links is 38.
In addition, it is assumed that the weights associated with the altruism compo-
nent of the BSOs’ objective functions are both equal to 1 so that ω1 = ω2 = 1.
Furthermore, we have that γ1H1 = 2, γ1H2 = 1, γ1H3 = 2, and γ1H4 = 1, whereas
γ2H1 = 2, γ2H2 = 1, γ2H3 = 2, and γ2H4 = 1. Hence, both BSOs assign a higher value
to servicing the larger hospitals.
It can be seen from Table 4.2 that four of the links are at their capacities and
these are links: 13, 34, 36, and 38. All these links are shipment links. Link 13 is
associated with BSO 1, whereas the other links are in BSO 2’s supply chain network.
The BSOs are advised to invest in enhancing the capacities in these links.
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Table 4.2. Definition of Links, Associated Weekly Link Capacities, Arc Multipliers,
Total Operational Link Cost Functions, Equilibrium Link Solution, and Link Capacity
Equilibrium Lagrange Multipliers for Example 4.1
Link a From Node To Node ua αa cˆa(f) f
∗
a θ
∗
a
1 1 C11 250 1.00 0.24f
2
1 + 0.6f1 139.33 0.00
2 1 C12 200 1.00 0.4f
2
2 + 0.9f2 87.59 0.00
3 C11 B
1
1 300 1.00 0.06f
2
3 + 0.1f3 139.33 0.00
4 C12 B
1
1 250 1.00 0.07f
2
4 + 0.16f4 87.59 0.00
5 B11 CL
1
1 500 0.97 0.36f
2
5 + 0.45f5 226.92 0.00
6 CL11 S
1
1 500 1.00 0.02f
2
6 + 0.04f6 220.11 0.00
7 S11 D
1
1 500 1.00 0.03f
2
7 + 0.09f7 166.40 0.00
8 D11 H1 50 1.00 0.4f
2
8 + 0.7f8 21.37 0.00
9 D11 H2 50 1.00 0.5f
2
9 + 0.9f9 28.38 0.00
10 D11 H3 100 1.00 0.15f
2
10 + 0.8f10 76.64 0.00
11 D11 H4 60 1.00 0.35f
2
11 + 0.6f11 40.00 0.00
12 S11 H1 50 1.00 0.4f
2
12 + 0.9f12 33.71 0.00
13 S11 H3 20 1.00 0.7f
2
13 + 1f13 20.00 5.02
14 2 C21 250 1.00 0.25f
2
14 + 0.7f14 130.81 0.00
15 2 C22 300 1.00 0.2f
2
15 + 0.8f15 148.27 0.00
16 2 C23 200 1.00 0.3f
2
16 + 0.5f16 112.99 0.00
17 C21 B
2
1 100 1.00 0.12f
2
17 + 0.3f17 70.11 0.00
18 C21 B
2
2 150 1.00 0.08f
2
18 + 0.27f18 60.71 0.00
19 C22 B
2
1 100 1.00 0.16f
2
19 + 0.45f19 70.86 0.00
20 C22 B
2
2 200 1.00 0.1f
2
20 + 0.5f20 77.41 0.00
21 C23 B
2
1 100 1.00 0.2f
2
21 + 0.6f21 35.85 0.00
22 C23 B
2
2 100 1.00 0.05f
2
22 + 0.08f22 77.14 0.00
23 B21 CL
2
1 600 0.98 0.36f
2
23 + 0.8f23 176.81 0.00
24 B22 CL
2
2 500 0.96 0.3f
2
24 + 0.7f24 215.25 0.00
25 CL21 S
2
1 500 1.00 0.02f
2
25 + 0.05f25 173.28 0.00
26 CL22 S
2
2 500 1.00 0.03f
2
26 + 0.04f26 206.64 0.00
27 S21 D
2
1 150 1.00 0.15f
2
27 + 0.4f27 88.02 0.00
28 S21 D
2
2 150 1.00 0.18f
2
28 + 0.65f28 85.25 0.00
29 S22 D
2
1 200 1.00 0.09f
2
29 + 0.12f29 116.35 0.00
30 S22 D
2
2 150 1.00 0.14f
2
30 + 0.5f30 90.30 0.00
31 D21 H1 100 1.00 0.24f
2
31 + 0.8f31 48.90 0.00
32 D21 H2 80 1.00 0.32f
2
32 + 0.9f32 51.65 0.00
33 D21 H3 100 1.00 0.25f
2
33 + f33 63.82 0.00
34 D21 H4 40 1.00 0.5f
2
34 + 0.8f34 40.00 3.02
35 D22 H1 150 1.00 0.1f
2
35 + 0.35f35 96.01 0.00
36 D22 H2 20 1.00 0.5f
2
36 + 0.8f36 20.00 8.80
37 D22 H3 80 1.00 0.35f
2
37 + 0.7f37 39.53 0.00
38 D22 H4 20 1.00 0.4f
2
38 + 0.9f38 20.00 22.84
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I also report the additional equilibrium Lagrange multipliers for this example. In
particular, we have that: η∗1 = η
∗
2 = η
∗
3 = 0.00, since none of the supply/donor upper
bound constraints in the three regions are binding.
The equilibrium demands for the RBCs at the demand points from the BSOs are:
d∗1H1 = 55.09, d
∗
1H2
= 28.39, d∗1H3 = 96.64, d
∗
1H4
= 40.00,
d∗2H1 = 144.91, d
∗
2H2
= 71.65, d∗2H3 = 103.36, d
∗
2H4
= 60.00,
and the associated demand prices for the RBCs at the equilibrium demand solution
are:
ρ1H1(d
∗) = 293.25, ρ1H2(d
∗) = 305.58, ρ1H3(d
∗) = 294.13, ρ1H4(d
∗) = 277.20,
ρ2H1(d
∗) = 272.20, ρ2H2(d
∗) = 283.85, ρ2H3(d
∗) = 275.93, ρ2H4(d
∗) = 266.20.
Hence, none of the demands are at the imposed upper bounds and, consequently,
all the associated Lagrange multipliers ∗k; k = 1, . . . , 4, are equal to 0.00. On the
other hand, three of the demands are at the imposed lower bounds, at demand points:
H1, H3, and H4, and, therefore, the associated Lagrange multipliers: σ
∗
H1
, σ∗H3 , and
σ∗H4 , are all positive. In particular, these Lagrange multipliers, at equilibrium, have
the following computed values:
σ∗H1 = 0.55, σ
∗
H2
= 0.00, σ∗H3 = 5.80, σ
∗
H4
= 27.63.
I now report, for completeness, components of the objective function (cf. (4.10))
for BSO 1 and for BSO 2. For BSO 1, at the equilibrium solution, the revenue is
equal to: 64,341.70; the altruism component of the utility function is: 371.84, and the
total cost associated with its supply chain is: 33,099.85, resulting in a net revenue of:
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31,241.85 and a utility of: 31,613.70. As for BSO 2 its revenue is equal to: 104,275.07;
its altruism component of its utility function is: 628.19, and the total cost associated
with its supply chain network is: 86,525.06, yielding a net revenue of: 17,750.01 and
a utility of: 18,378.20.
Example 4.2: Upper and Lower Bounds on Demands Removed
Example 4.2 is constructed from Example 4.1 and has the identical data except that
the demand lower and upper bound constraints at the four hospital demand points are
removed. In Example 4.2 the potential impacts of removing such constraints in terms
of the RBC deliveries and the associated prices as well as the BSOs’ net revenues and
utilities are explored. The variational inequality (4.49) was adapted accordingly to
remove the terms and variables associated with the demand lower and upper bounds
and the Euler method was, as well. The computed equilibrium link flow pattern and
link capacity Lagrange multipliers are reported in Table 4.3.
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the three regions remain as in Example
4.1, that is, η∗1 = η
∗
2 = η
∗
3 = 0.00, since none of the supply/donor upper bound
constraints in the three regions are binding. The link capacities at links 13 and 38
are now at their upper bounds. These were also at their upper bounds in Example
4.1 but links 34 and 36 are no longer at their upper bounds.
The equilibrium demands for the RBCs at the demand points from the BSOs are
now:
d∗1H1 = 67.08, d
∗
1H2
= 34.48, d∗1H3 = 99.99, d
∗
1H4
= 13.32,
d∗2H1 = 158.41, d
∗
2H2
= 77.42, d∗2H3 = 97.0, d
∗
2H4
= 41.32,
and the associated demand prices for the RBCs at the equilibrium demand solution
are:
ρ1H1(d
∗) = 292.14, ρ1H2(d
∗) = 304.92, ρ1H3(d
∗) = 294.03, ρ1H4(d
∗) = 278.64,
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Table 4.3. Link, Equilibrium Link Solution, and Link Capacity Equilibrium La-
grange Multipliers for Example 4.2
Link a f ∗a θ
∗
a
1 136.03 0.00
2 85.49 0.00
3 136.03 0.00
4 85.49 0.00
5 221.51 0.00
6 214.87 0.00
7 155.56 0.00
8 27.78 0.00
9 34.48 0.00
10 79.99 0.00
11 13.32 0.00
12 39.30 0.00
13 20.00 13.10
14 128.84 0.00
15 146.03 0.00
16 111.29 0.00
17 69.08 0.00
18 59.76 0.00
19 69.81 0.00
20 76.22 0.00
21 35.31 0.00
22 75.98 0.00
23 174.20 0.00
24 211.96 0.00
25 170.71 0.00
26 203.48 0.00
27 84.32 0.00
28 86.39 0.00
29 111.31 0.00
30 92.17 0.00
31 54.97 0.00
32 57.42 0.00
33 61.40 0.00
34 21.84 0.00
35 103.44 0.00
36 20.00 0.00
37 35.64 0.00
38 19.84 13.60
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ρ2H1(d
∗) = 271.41, ρ2H2(d
∗) = 283.20, ρ2H3(d
∗) = 276.09, ρ2H4(d
∗) = 267.67.
Without the imposition of demand bounds at the hospital demand points, the
total equilibrium demand at H1 = 225.49; the total demand at H2 = 111.90; the
total demand at H3 = 197.03, and that at H4 = 54.64.
For BSO 1 we have that, at the equilibrium solution, the revenue is equal to:
63,221.34; the altruism component of the utility function is: 381.94, and the total cost
associated with its supply chain is: 31,685.55, leading to a net revenue of: 31,535.79
and a utility of: 31,917.73. As for BSO 2, its revenue is now equal to: 102,772.48;
its altruism component of its utility function is: 629.65, and the total cost associated
with its supply chain network is now: 83,461.70, yielding a net revenue of: 19,310.78
and a utility of: 19,940.43.
Both blood service organizations now enjoy higher net revenues, as well as higher
utilities, without the demand constraints. However, observe that, without those con-
straints, both hospitals H3 and H4 may suffer serious shortfalls in terms on needed
RBCs since dH3 = 200 and dH4 = 100 and the total deliveries are only, respectively
197.03 and 54.64. This example illustrates the merits of imposing lower demand
bounds, which can be part of the contracts between the hospital(s) and the BSO(s).
Also, another interesting result is regarding the altruism component of the BSO
utility functions. In Example 4.1, BSO 1 enjoyed an altruism component value of
371.84, whereas now, in Example 4.2, it enjoys an altruism component value of 381.94.
BSO 2 enjoyed an altruism component value of 628.19, whereas, in Example 4.2, the
corresponding value is 629.65. Hence, the respective BSO altruism component values
have increased.
Example 4.3: Decrease in Supply Capacity
Example 4.3 is also constructed from Example 4.1 and has the same data except for
the following. However, a major disruption is introduced in the form of a disease so
that the number of those eligible to donate blood drops considerably. In particular,
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let us now have that:
S1 = 500, S2 = 220, S3 = 120.
The new computed equilibrium link flow solution and corresponding Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the link capacity constraints are reported in Table 4.4.
Observe that now, unlike in Example 4.1, and due to a much decreased volume
of possible donations, the constraints for both Regions 2 and 3 are tight and the
associated Lagrange multipliers are now: η∗1 = 0.00, η
∗
2 = 109.82, and η
∗
3 = 85.00.
The equilibrium demands for the RBCs at the demand points in Example 4.3 are:
d∗1H1 = 77.39, d
∗
1H2
= 23.21, d∗1H3 = 116.17, d
∗
1H4
= 45.68,
d∗2H1 = 122.61, d
∗
2H2
= 36.79, d∗2H3 = 83.33, d
∗
2H4
= 54.33.
The associated demand prices for the RBCs at the equilibrium demand solution are:
ρ1H1(d
∗) = 292.13, ρ1H2(d
∗) = 307.04, ρ1H3(d
∗) = 293.33, ρ1H4(d
∗) = 277.09,
ρ2H1(d
∗) = 273.10, ρ2H2(d
∗) = 286.50, ρ2H3(d
∗) = 276.33, ρ2H4(d
∗) = 266.37.
The equilibrium total demands at the four hospital demand points are at their
respective lower bounds. The Lagrange multipliers, at the equilibrium, associated
with the lower and upper bounds on the demands at the four demand points are now:
σ∗H1 = 107.14, σ
∗
H2
= 90.43, σ∗H3 = 110.02, σ
∗
H4
= 129.07,
and
∗H1 = 0.00, 
∗
H2
= 0.00, ∗H3 = 0.00, 
∗
H4
= 0.00.
I now report the values, at the computed equilibrium, of the components of the
objective function (cf. (4.10)) for BSO 1 and for BSO 2. For BSO 1 the revenue
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Table 4.4. Link, Equilibrium Link Solution, and Link Capacity Equilibrium La-
grange Multipliers for Example 4.3
Link a f ∗a θ
∗
a
1 237.60 0.00
2 33.49 0.00
3 237.60 0.00
4 33.49 0.00
5 271.09 0.00
6 262.96 0.00
7 196.94 0.00
8 3.38 0.00
9 23.21 0.00
10 96.67 0.00
11 45.68 0.00
12 46.01 0.00
13 20.00 13.10
14 186.51 0.00
15 68.06 0.00
16 51.94 0.00
17 86.42 0.00
18 100.09 0.00
19 35.42 0.00
20 32.64 0.00
21 18.86 0.00
22 33.07 0.00
23 140.70 0.00
24 165.80 0.00
25 137.89 0.00
26 159.17 0.00
27 68.17 0.00
28 9.72 0.00
29 86.81 0.00
30 72.36 0.00
31 42.78 0.00
32 25.43 0.00
33 52.44 0.00
34 34.33 0.00
35 79.83 0.00
36 11.36 0.00
37 30.89 0.00
38 20.00 13.60
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obtained is now equal to: 76,616.49; the altruism component of the utility function
is: 574.02, and the total costs associated with its supply chain is: 50,978.78 resulting
in a net revenue of: 25,637.71 and a utility of: 26,094.73. As for BSO 2, its revenue
is now equal to: 81,522.08; its altruism component of its utility function is: 503.00,
and the total cost associated with its supply chain network is: 87,042.11, yielding a
net revenue of: -5,520.03 and a utility of: -5,017,03.
With a much reduced donor base, the two BSOs still manage to meet their de-
livery obligations. However, BSO 1 suffers a reduction in net revenue and utility of
approximately 20%, as compared to the corresponding values in Example 4.1. BSO
2, on the other hand, experiences not only a significant reduction in net revenue and
utility, but these attain negative values and, hence, BSO 2 incurs a financial loss. This
example illustrates that blood service organizations need to maintain a sufficiently
large donor base for the life-saving product that is blood. This is especially essential
in times such as disease outbreaks as well as during different times of various seasons
when donors may not be available due to holidays or inclement weather.
Example 4.4: Decrease in Capacities of Critical Links
Example 4.4 is also constructed from Example 4.1 but in Example 4.4 the impacts of
decreased capacity associated with BSO 2’s testing and processing and storage links
24 and 26 due to a natural disaster are explored. The data is the same as in Example
4.1 except that now the link upper bounds u24 = 200 and u26 = 200. The computed
equilibrium link flow pattern and associated Lagrange multiplier pattern are reported
in Table 4.5.
Observe that links: 13, 24, 34, 36, and 38 are now at their capacities.
The equilibrium Lagrange multipliers associated with the bounds on donors in the
three regions are: η∗1 = η
∗
2 = η
∗
3 = 0.00 since these constraints are not binding.
The equilibrium demands for the RBCs at the demand points in Example 4.4 are:
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Table 4.5. Link, Equilibrium Link Solution, and Link Capacity Equilibrium La-
grange Multipliers for Example 4.4
Link a f ∗a θ
∗
a
1 140.65 0.00
2 88.43 0.00
3 140.65 0.00
4 88.43 0.00
5 229.08 0.00
6 222.21 0.00
7 167.35 0.00
8 22.45 0.00
9 26.22 0.00
10 78.68 0.00
11 40.00 0.00
12 34.86 0.00
13 20.00 5.71
14 127.67 0.00
15 144.65 0.00
16 109.84 0.00
17 72.21 0.00
18 55.46 0.00
19 72.05 0.00
20 72.60 0.00
21 37.80 0.00
22 71.94 0.00
23 182.15 0.00
24 200.00 17.81
25 178.51 0.00
26 192.00 0.00
27 90.63 0.00
28 87.88 0.00
29 107.11 0.00
30 84.89 0.00
31 48.47 0.00
32 46.50 0.00
33 62.77 0.00
34 40.00 1.74
35 94.22 0.00
36 20.00 5.23
37 38.55 0.00
38 20.00 21.38
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d∗1H1 = 57.31, d
∗
1H2
= 26.22, d∗1H3 = 98.68, d
∗
1H4
= 40.00,
d∗2H1 = 142.69, d
∗
2H2
= 66.50, d∗2H3 = 101.32, d
∗
2H4
= 60.00.
The associated demand prices for the RBCs, in turn, at the equilibrium demand
solution are:
ρ1H1(d
∗) = 293.13, ρ1H2(d
∗) = 305.91, ρ1H3(d
∗) = 294.05, ρ1H4(d
∗) = 277.20,
ρ2H1(d
∗) = 272.29, ρ2H2(d
∗) = 284.30, ρ2H3(d
∗) = 275.97, ρ2H4(d
∗) = 266.20.
The equilibrium total demands at the hospital demand points H1, H3, and H4
are at their respective lower bounds. The Lagrange multipliers, at the equilibrium,
associated with the lower and upper bounds on the demands at the four demand
points are now:
σ∗H1 = 4.11, σ
∗
H2
= 0.00, σ∗H3 = 9.08, σ
∗
H4
= 30.20,
and
∗H1 = 0.00, 
∗
H2
= 0.00, ∗H3 = 0.00, 
∗
H4
= 0.00.
BSO 1’s revenue is now equal to: 64,925.04; the altruism component of the utility
function is: 78.20, and the total costs associated with its supply chain is: 33,706.32.
Hence, the net revenue is: 31,218.71 and the utility is: 31,596.91. BSO 2’s revenue
is now equal to: 101,693.17; its altruism component of its utility function is: 614.52,
and the total cost associated with its supply chain network is: 84,635.16, resulting in
a net revenue of: 17,058.01 and a utility of: 17,672.53.
Note that, with decreased capacity on critical links, BSO 2’s net revenue as well as
utility decrease relative to their respective values in Example 4.1. Interestingly, the
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reduced capacity of BSO 2 also affects BSO 1 and, although it now has higher rev-
enues, it also incurs higher costs, resulting in a reduced value of net revenue (31,218.71
versus 31,241.85). This suggests that the blood service organizations may gain by co-
operating rather than competing.
4.4. Summary and Conclusions
The blood services industry in the United States is undergoing major changes,
which include increasing competition among blood banks, that is, blood service or-
ganizations. In this chapter, I presented the first game theory model for competitive
supply chain networks associated with blood service organizations that includes not
only perishability but also an altruism component in their objective functions since
they are nonprofit organizations. In addition to capacities on the links represent-
ing the network economic activities associated with such supply chain networks, I
also incorporated upper bounds reflecting donations in different regions as well as
lower bounds and upper bounds associated with the demand for RBCs at the various
demand points, which correspond to hospitals and medical centers. Such demand
constraints ensure that each hospital or medical center has the minimum amount
needed for a given week while also guaranteeing that waste will be reduced because
of the upper bounds.
The novel features of the competitive supply chain network game theory model
resulted in a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), rather than just a Nash Equilib-
rium, since the utility function of each blood service organization depends on its own
strategies in the form of blood path flows, as well as those of the other BSOs, and
the feasible sets do as well. The concept of a variational equilibrium is utilized to
transform the problem into a variational inequality problem in which the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the shared / common constraints are equal among the
competitors. This provides a nice economic fairness interpretation.
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Alternative variational inequality formulations are also provided and a Lagrange
analysis with economic interpretations are presented. An algorithm was outlined
which resolves the problem into closed form expressions at each iteration in terms of
path flows and the various Lagrange multipliers. The algorithm was then applied to
compute solutions to a series of numerical examples for which full input and output
data are reported. The examples illustrated the impacts of disruptions as in a reduc-
tion in the number of donors as well as that of decreases in capacities of critical links
such as testing and processing on RBC prices, demands, net revenues of the blood
service organizations, and their overall utilities. The framework here focused on com-
petition among blood service organizations not only in terms of blood donations but
also for business with hospitals as well as along their supply chain networks through
the generality of the link total cost functions.
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CHAPTER 5
MULTITIERED BLOOD SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK
COMPETITION: LINKING BLOOD SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS, HOSPITALS, AND PAYERS
This chapter is based on the paper by Dutta and Nagurney (2018). In this chapter,
I develop a multitiered blood supply chain network model. Extending the work in
Chapter 4, here I move further down the blood supply chain to include another tier
of stakeholders to the competitive blood supply chain network framework. In the
network structure presented here there are three distinct tiers of decision-makers
namely blood service organizations, hospitals and medical centers, and payers such
as government programs and private insurance companies.
While in the Chapter 4 I focused only on the economic transactions between the
blood service organizations and hospitals, in this chapter both the key economic rela-
tionships in the blood banking industry are considered through the reimbursements
received by hospitals for transfusing blood to patients from the payer groups as well as
the price per unit of blood charged by the blood service organizations to the hospitals.
The behavior of the individual decision-makers is discussed and their optimality
conditions are presented. The variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium
conditions for the entire blood supply chain is also provided. The objective here
is to determine the equilibrium flows along various paths from the blood service
organizations to the hospitals, the amount of blood transfused by different hospitals
to patients belonging to different payer groups in order to meet the demand, the
price per unit that hospitals agree to pay to the different blood suppliers, and the
reimbursements received by different hospitals from different payer groups.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, I present the
multitiered blood supply chain network competition model, consisting of blood service
organizations, hospitals, and the payers. The behavior of each class of decision-
makers is described, and a unified variational inequality derived, whose solution yields
equilibrium blood logistical flows and prices. Illustrative examples are presented for
clarification and exposition purposes. In Section 5.2, qualitative properties of the
equilibrium pattern are given, and existence established under reasonable conditions.
The algorithm that is applied is outlined in Section 5.3, and explicit formulae at a
given iteration presented, along with conditions for convergence. Lastly, I present a
case study in Section 5.4 and summarize the results, and present my conclusions in
Section 5.5.
5.1. The Multitiered Blood Supply Chain Network Compe-
tition Model
The blood supply chain network (cf. Figure 5.1) consists of I competing blood
service organizations (BSOs), with a typical BSO denoted by i, HnH hospitals, with a
typical hospital denoted by j, and TnT payers, with a typical payer denoted by k. The
BSOs are depicted by the top-most nodes in Figure 5.1 and the payers by the bottom
nodes. Examples of patient payer types include: Medicare, Medicaid, other public
health insurance programs, private health insurance such as UnitedHealthcare, the
uninsured, etc. Each blood service organization i collects blood from niC collection
sites that include fixed and mobile sites. Once blood is collected by BSO i; i =
1, . . . , I, it is sent to niP component laboratories for testing and processing where
whole blood is separated into components such as Red Blood Cells (RBCs), platelets,
and plasma.
Blood is shipped from the component laboratories of each BSO i to niS storage
facilities that constitute the fifth tier of the supply chain network. The next level
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Figure 5.1. Blood Supply Chain Network Topology
of nodes represents the niD; i = 1, . . . , I, distribution centers. At times, the compo-
nent laboratories, storage facilities, and distribution centers are not separate physical
entities but exist within the blood centers. At the seventh tier blood reaches hos-
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pitals from multiple suppliers with whom they have contracts (Merola (2017)). Up
till the seventh tier this network structure is identical to Figure 4.1 (cf. Chapter 4).
However, in contrast to Chapter 4, here the hospitals also compete with one another
for patients belonging to different payer groups denoted by the last tier of nodes as
mentioned earlier. Each set of links between a pair of nodes denotes an activity along
the supply chain such as, for example, the collection of whole blood from donors,
shipment, testing and processing, storage, distribution, and, finally, transfusion.
In the subsequent sections the behavior of the blood service organizations is dis-
cussed and then that of the hospitals and, finally, the payers.
5.1.1 Behavior of the Blood Service Organizations and Their Optimality
Conditions
A path is a sequence of links, which are directed, and originates at a top origin
node representing a blood service organization and ending at a hospital node (cf.
Figure 5.1). N and L are defined as the sets of nodes and links, respectively, up to
the seventh tier representing the hospitals with Li denoting the set of links in BSO
i’s supply chain for i = 1, . . . , I. Associated with each link a, ∀a ∈ L, is a total cost
function cˆa representing the cost for the activity.
A significant challenge in managing blood supply chain is the perishable nature
of blood. Every component of blood is perishable with different expiration rates and
shelf lives. In order to capture perishability, the generalized network approach with
appropriate arc and path multipliers provided in Table 4.1 (cf. Chapter 4) is utilized
here. Since, again, we are dealing with RBCs those paths that would have a time
length greater than 42 days are explicitly removed from the network(s) in Figure 5.1
since they would, in effect, be infeasible (and against Food and Drug Administration
regulations).
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Some of the functions defined below were used in Chapter 4. xp denotes the
nonnegative flow of blood on a path p sent from a BSO to a hospital. Let the
contracted amount of blood supplied by BSO i to hospital j be denoted by qij; i =
. . . , I; j = H1, . . . , HnH . This is assumed to be the projected demand for a week. Let
P ij denote the set of all paths joining BSO i with hospital j and P is the set of all
paths.
The conservation of flow equation that has to hold for each BSO i; i = 1, . . . , I,
at hospital j; j = H1, . . . , HnH , is:
∑
p∈P ij
xpµp = qij, (5.1)
where µp ≡
∏
a∈p
αa; p ∈ P, denotes the multiplier corresponding to the percentage
of throughput on path p (cf. Table 4.1). Hence, (5.1) implies that the sum of all
the actual, after perishability is factored in, path flows from a particular BSO to a
particular hospital should be equal to their contracted supply amount. The total
amount of blood supplied by a blood service organization i, qi, can be written as∑HnH
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij xpµp = qi.
Since the path flows must be nonnegative, we have that:
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P. (5.2)
Let fa denote the flow of blood on link a. Then, the following conservation of flow
equations must hold:
fa =
∑
p∈P
xpαap, ∀a ∈ L. (5.3)
According to (5.3), the initial blood product flow on link a is the sum of the
product flows along paths that contain that link, taking into account possible losses
in the preceding activities. All the flows corresponding to links in L are grouped into
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the vector f ∈ RnL where nL is the total number of elements in L. The total link cost
on a link a is assumed to be, in general, a function of all the flows in the network.
Therefore, we have that
cˆa = cˆa(f), ∀a ∈ L. (5.4)
The total cost on each link is assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable.
The total cost incurred by a blood service organization will be the sum of all the total
costs on links operated by the blood service organization. The price per unit charged
by BSO i to hospital j is denoted by ρ1∗ij . I discuss how the equilibrium prices are
recovered, once the model is solved, later in this section. The revenue generated by
each BSO is the product of the unit price and the amount of blood supplied.
As noted earlier, blood service organizations in the United States are predomi-
nantly nonprofits. Therefore, there is a utility associated with the service that they
provide (cf. Nagurney, Alvarez Flores, and Soylu (2016) and Nagurney and Li (2017)).
Let γij correspond to a measurement of the satisfaction that blood service organiza-
tion i derives from supplying blood to hospital j. The overall such “service” utility
of blood service organization i associated with all the demand points is then given by∑HnH
j=H1
γijqij, similar to the service utility function described in Chapter 4. In addi-
tion, each blood service organization i associates a weight ωi with its service utility,
which monetizes it.
The utility function of blood service organization i; i = 1, . . . , I, denoted by Ui,
can be expressed as:
Ui =
HnH∑
j=H1
ρ1∗ij qij + ωi
HnH∑
j=H1
γijqij −
∑
a∈Li
cˆa(f), (5.5a)
or, equivalently, in terms of path flows, through the use of (5.1) and (5.3):
Uˆi =
HnH∑
j=H1
ρ1∗ij
∑
p∈P ij
xpµp + ωi
HnH∑
j=H1
γij
∑
p∈P ij
xpµp −
∑
a∈Li
˜ˆca(x), (5.5b)
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with˜ˆca(x) ≡ cˆa(f), ∀a ∈ L.
It is to be noted that the utility of each blood service organization is over a time
horizon of a week.
The blood service organizations seek to maximize their utility, while competing
for the quantity of blood supplied. Hence, each BSO has as its strategic variables, its
path flows, with Xi denoting the vector of path flows corresponding to blood service
organization i; i = 1, . . . , I:
Xi ≡ {{xp}|p ∈ P i}} ∈ RnPi+ , (5.6)
where P i denotes the set of all paths associated with BSO i and nP i denotes the
number of paths from BSO i to the hospitals. X is the vector of all path flows, that
is, X ≡ {{Xi}|i = 1, . . . , I}. Further, the feasible set for blood service organization i
is defined as Ki ≡ {Xi|xi ∈ RnPi+ }. All vectors, as before, are column vectors.
The blood service organizations compete noncooperatively in an oligopolistic mar-
ket framework in which each blood service organization selects its own optimal blood
product flows to maximize its utility, given the optimal ones of its competitors. The
governing equilibrium concept underlying the behavior of the blood service organiza-
tions is, therefor, that of Nash (1950, 1951) equilibrium. The optimality conditions for
all the blood service organizations simultaneously can be expressed as the following
variational inequality (cf. Gabay and Moulin (1980), Nagurney (1999)): determine
x∗ ∈ K1, K1 ≡∏Ii=1Ki, such that:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − ρ1∗ij µp
]
× [xp − x∗p] ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K1, (5.7)
where ∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
is for path p ∈ P ij given by
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∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
≡
∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f)
∂fa
αap. (5.8)
The optimality conditions as expressed by (5.7) provide a nice economic interpretation
that a blood service organization will supply blood to a hospital by a path p (flow on
the path will be positive) if the “marginal total cost” on the path is exactly equal to
marginal utility associated with weighted altruism of the pair (i, j) plus the marginal
revenue associated with the path p, with perishability accounted for.
5.1.2 Behavior of the Hospitals and Their Optimality Conditions
I now discuss the competition among the hospitals. Hospitals are the stakeholders
in the blood supply chain network who are involved in transactions with both blood
suppliers, the BSOs, and the patient payer groups.
Each hospital j decides to transfuse an amount qjk of RBCs to patient group k.
The total amount of blood transfused by hospital j; j = H1, . . . , HnH , cannot exceed
the total amount it receives from its contracted suppliers. Therefore, the following
condition must be satisfied
TnT∑
k=T1
qjk ≤
I∑
i=1
qij, (5.9a)
or, equivalently,
TnT∑
k=T1
qjk ≤
I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
xpµp. (5.9b)
The price charged by hospital j; j = H1, . . . , HnH , for per unit of RBC transfused
is denoted by ρ2∗j . Similar to blood service organizations, many hospitals are not-
for-profits and, hence, will have a weighted altruism factor in their utility function
which is given as βj
∑TnT
k=T1
θjkqjk. In the case of a for profit hospital the weight βj
will simply be zero.
In addition to the cost of acquiring blood from the suppliers, hospitals incur a
holding cost for maintaining a proper inventory of blood. This cost is denoted by hj
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for hospital j; j = H1, . . . , HnH , and is a function of
∑TnT
k=T1
qjk, the total amount of
blood transfused at hospital j.
The optimization problem for hospital j; j = H1, . . . , HnH , then becomes
Maximize ρ2∗j
TnT∑
k=T1
qjk + βj
TnT∑
k=T1
θjkqjk − hj(
TnT∑
k=T1
qjk)−
I∑
i=1
ρ1∗ij
∑
p∈P ij
xpµp, (5.10)
subject to constraint (5.9b) and the nonnegativity constraints: xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ Pj,
where Pj is the set of all paths terminating in j, and qjk ≥ 0 for all j and k.
Now the optimality conditions of the hospitals are obtained, assuming that each
hospital is faced with the above optimization problem, and that the hospitals compete
in a noncooperative manner to maximize their utilities, given the actions of the other
hospitals. It is to be noted that the hospitals seek to determine the optimal quantities
to be supplied to the patient groups as well as the amount to be received from different
suppliers. Assuming that the holding cost for each hospital is convex and continuous,
the optimality conditions for all hospitals, simutaneously, coincide with the solution
of the variational inequality: determine (x∗, q∗, η∗) ∈ K2 satisfying
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
ρ1∗ij µp−η∗jµp
]
× [xp−x∗p]+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
−ρ2∗j −βjθjk+
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk)
∂qjk
+η∗j
]
×[qjk − q∗jk] +
HnH∑
j=H1
[ I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
x∗pµp −
TnT∑
k=T1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] ≥ 0
∀(x, q, η) ∈ K2, (5.11)
with the feasible set K2 defined as:
K2 ≡ {(x, q, η)|x ∈ RnP+ , q ∈ RnHnT+ , η ∈ RnH+ }. (5.12)
Here ηj is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (5.9) for hospital j, η is
the nH-dimensional vector of all the multipliers, and q denotes the nHnT -dimensional
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vector of blood flows between the hospitals and patient groups. For further back-
ground on such a derivation, see Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002) and the refer-
ences therein. Similar to (5.7), in this derivation of the variational inequality the
prices charged are not considered to be variables. They become endogenous variables
in the complete equilibrium model.
The economic interpretation of the hospitals’ optimality conditions are discussed
and the justification of the hj functions is provided. From the first term in (5.11)
it can be inferred that if there is positive flow of blood products between a blood
service organization and hospital, then η∗j is precisely equal to the hospital’s payment
to the supplier, ρ1∗ij . From the second term of (5.11) we see that if q
∗
jk is positive,
that is, if patients from payer group k get transfusions from hospital j, then the
unit price charged by hospital j, ρ2∗j , plus its marginal service utility, βjθjk, is exactly
equal to its marginal cost of holding inventory plus its unit cost of procuring blood
(since η∗j = ρ
1∗
ij ). Further, from the third term in (5.11) it can be inferred that if η
∗
j
is positive, then the amount of blood received by hospital j is exactly equal to the
amount of blood transfused at hospital j. Hence, it can be said that the inventory
holding cost of a hospital is a function of the total amount of blood transfused at a
hospital.
5.1.3 Behavior of the Payer Groups and Equilibrium Conditions
As mentioned earlier, the payers are conceptualized as patients belonging to dif-
ferent payer groups. Since most of the surgeries requiring blood transfusion such as
knee replacements, cardiovascular surgery, organ transplants, etc., are planned ahead
of time, it is assumed that the demand for blood at each payer node depends on the
reimbursement that the payers (insurers) are willing to give. The type of insurance is
also known before blood transfusion takes place. Since for a patient getting treatment
at a hospital, the blood required for transfusion will be provided by that particular
114
hospital, it is expected that the demand at each hospital from each payer group may
be different. Demand at patient payer group k for transfusions at hospital j is de-
noted by djk. The amount that payer type k is willing to reimburse to hospital j is
given as ρ3jk. Thus, we have that
djk = djk(ρ
3), ∀j,∀k, (5.13)
where ρ3 is the nHnT -dimensional vector of payer prices. The demand is assumed
to be monotonically decreasing in the reimbursement for j, but increasing in the
reimbursements for other hospitals. However, it is to be noted that if the demand is
quite price inelastic then the coefficients should be set accordingly.
In reality, healthcare payments received by different hospitals from the same payer
might vary significantly (Luhby (2013)). The reimbursement or payer price can de-
pend on several factors such as the payer mix, whether it is a teaching or non-teaching
hospital, the hospital’s location, its healthcare network, etc. For example, Medicare
pays a higher rate to teaching hospitals while private insurance companies negotiate
better rates for hospitals in their network.
The payers take into account not only the price charged by the hospitals in de-
termining which hospital to choose, but also the transaction cost. Let cjk denote
the transaction cost between hospital j and payer group k. It is assumed that the
transaction cost is continuous, positive, and of the general form
cjk = cjk(q), ∀j,∀k. (5.14)
Following the work of Nagurney, Dong and Zhang (2002) (see also Nagurney (2006)),
we have that the equilibrium conditions are: For all hospitals j; j = H1, . . . , HnH ,
and payers k = T1, . . . , TnT :
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ρ2∗j + cjk(q
∗)

= ρ3∗jk if q
∗
jk > 0,
≥ ρ3∗jk if q∗jk = 0.
(5.15)
and
djk(ρ
3∗)

= q∗jk if ρ
3∗
jk > 0,
≤ q∗jk if ρ3∗jk = 0.
(5.16)
Conditions (5.15) imply that, in equilibrium, if q∗jk is positive, that is, there are
patients at demand market k that get blood transfusions from hospital j, then the
price charged by the hospital plus the transaction cost does not exceed the price that
the payer is willing to reimburse. Conditions (5.16) state that, if the equilibrium price
that a particular payer group is willing to pay for the blood product from a particular
hospital is positive, then the quantity of blood obtained from a hospital is precisely
equal to the demand of blood for that payer group. These conditions correspond to
the well-known spatial price equilibrium conditions but applied to an entirely novel
context of multitiered blood supply chain networks (cf. Takayama and Judge (1971),
Nagurney (1999), and the references therein).
In equilibrium, conditions (5.15) and (5.16) will have to hold for all k, and can, in
turn, be expressed as the variational inequality problem (see, e.g., Nagurney (1999)):
determine (q∗, ρ3∗) ∈ K3, such that
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[ρ2∗j + cjk(q
∗)− ρ3∗jk]× [qjk − q∗jk] +
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[q∗jk − djk(ρ3∗)]× [ρ3jk − ρ3∗jk] ≥ 0
∀(q, ρ3) ∈ K3, (5.17)
where the feasible set K3 ≡ {(q, ρ3) ∈ R2nHnT+ }.
5.1.4 The Equilibrium Conditions of the Blood Supply Chain
In equilibrium, the amount of blood supplied by the blood service organizations
must be equal to the amount of blood received by the hospitals. In addition, the
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amount of blood transfused by the hospitals must be equal to the amount needed by
the patients. Furthermore, the equilibrium quantities and price pattern in the blood
supply chain must satisfy the sum of the inequalities (5.7), (5.11), and (5.17), in order
to formalize the agreements between the tiers. Hence, although there is competition
across a tier of decision-makers, whether BSOs or hospitals, there is cooperation
between tiers and the prices assist in this. I now state this explicitly in the following
definition.
Definition 5.1: Multitiered Blood Supply Chain Network Equilibrium
The equilibrium state of the supply chain is one where the blood product (RBC) flows
between the three distinct tiers of decision-makers coincide and the blood flows and
prices satisfy the sum of the optimality conditions (5.7), (5.11), and (5.17).
The following theorem is now established.
Theorem 5.1: Variational Inequality Formulation
The equilibrium conditions governing the supply chain model with competition are
equivalent to the solution of the variational inequality problem given by: determine
(x∗, q∗, η∗, ρ3∗) ∈ K4 satisfying:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − η∗jµp
]
×[xp − x∗p]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[cjk(q
∗) +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk)
∂qjk
+ η∗j − βjθjk − ρ3∗jk]× [qjk − q∗jk]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
[ I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
x∗pµp−
TnT∑
k=T1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] +
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[q∗jk − djk(ρ3∗)]× [ρ3jk − ρ3∗jk] ≥ 0
∀(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ K4, (5.18)
where K4 ≡ {(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ RnP+2nHnT+nH+ }.
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Proof: At first the necessity condition is established, that the equilibrium conditions
imply variational inequality (5.18). Observe that, indeed, the summation of (5.7),
(5.11), and (5.17), yields variational inequality (5.18), after algebraic simplification.
For sufficiency the converse is now established, that is, that a solution to varia-
tional inequality (5.18) satisfies the sum of inequalities (5.7), (5.11), and (5.17), and
is, therefore, an equilibrium according to Definition 5.1. To inequality (5.18) add the
term −ρ1∗ij µp + ρ1∗ij µp to the term in the first set of brackets preceding the multiplica-
tion sign and add the term −ρ2∗j + ρ2∗j to the term in brackets preceding the second
multiplication sign. Such “terms” do not change the value of the inequality since
their value is equal to zero, with the resulting inequality of the form
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − η∗jµp − ρ1∗ij µp + ρ1∗ij µp
]
×[xp − x∗p]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[cjk(q
∗) +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk)
∂qjk
+ η∗j − βjθjk − ρ3∗jk − ρ2∗j + ρ2∗j ]× [qjk − q∗jk]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
[ I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
x∗pµp−
TnT∑
k=T1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] +
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[q∗jk− djk(ρ3∗)]× [ρ3jk− ρ3∗jk] ≥ 0,
∀(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ K4, (5.19)
which, in turn, can be rewritten as
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
−ωiγijµp−ρ1∗ij µp
]
×[xp−x∗p]+
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
[
ρ1∗ij µp−η∗jµp
]
×[xp−x∗p]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
−ρ2∗j − βjθjk +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk)
∂qjk
+ η∗j
]
× [qjk − q∗jk] +
HnH∑
j=H1
[ I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
x∗pµp
−
TnT∑
k=T1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] +
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[ρ2∗j + cjk(q
∗)− ρ3∗jk]× [qjk − q∗jk]
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+HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[q∗jk − djk(ρ3∗)]× [ρ3jk − ρ3∗jk] ≥ 0, ∀(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ K4. (5.20)
But inequality (5.20) is equivalent to the price and product flow pattern satisfying
the sum of (5.7), (5.11), and (5.17). The proof is complete. 2
The variational inequality (5.18) can be rewritten in standard variational inequal-
ity form ( cf. 2.1a) that is: determine Y ∗ ∈ K ⊂ RN , such that
〈F (Y ∗), Y − Y ∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ∈ K, (5.21)
where Y ≡ (x, q, η, ρ3), F (Y ) ≡ (Fp, F 1jk, Fj, F 2jk)p∈P ij ;i=1,...,I;j=H1,...,HnH ;k=T1,...,TnT , and
the specific components of the function F are given by the functional terms preceding
the multiplication signs in (5.18). The term 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in N -
dimensional Euclidean space, where N here is nP + 2nHnT + nH and K ≡ K4.
The variables in the variational inequality problem are: the product (RBC) flows
from the blood service organizations to the hospitals, x, the quantities of blood trans-
fused by the hospitals to the patient groups, q, the prices associated with transfusing
and storing blood by the hospitals, η, and the demand market prices or reimbursement
rates, ρ3.
I now discuss how to recover the blood service organizations’ equilibrium prices,
ρ1∗ij , for all i, j, and the hospitals’ equilibrium prices, ρ
2∗
j , for all j, from the solution
of the variational inequality (5.18). In the previous discussion in Section 5.1.2, it is
mentioned that if there is positive flow of blood products between a blood service
organization and hospital, then η∗j is precisely equal to the hospital’s payment to the
supplier, ρ1∗ij . η
∗
j is obtained from the solution of the inequality (5.18). On the other
hand, prices charged by the hospitals, ρ2∗j s, can be obtained by finding a q
∗
jk > 0, and
then from (5.15) setting
ρ2∗j = ρ
3∗
jk − cjk(q∗),
where ρ3∗jk is obtained from the solution of variational inequality (5.18).
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The result that, in equilibrium, the sum of the amounts of blood supplied to
each hospital is equal to the sum of the amounts of blood transfused at that hospital
is now established. This implies that each hospital, assuming utility maximization,
purchases from the blood service organizations only the amount of blood that is
actually transfused to the patients. Variational inequality (5.18) is utilized to establish
the above mentioned result. From the third term in (5.18) we can see that if η∗j > 0,
then we have
∑I
i=1
∑
p∈P ij x
∗
pµp =
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk. In other words, the “market clears” for
hospital j. Let us now consider the case where η∗j = 0. From (5.7) it is evident that,
if x∗p > 0, then we have that
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
= ωiγijµp + ρ
1∗
ij µp,
and, if x∗p = 0, then we have that
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
≥ ωiγijµp + ρ1∗ij µp.
Hence, from the first term in inequality (5.18), we can say that, if η∗j = 0, then
∂Cˆp(x
∗)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp ≥ 0,
which implies that x∗p = 0, p ∈ P ij , ∀i, j. It follows then from the third term of
(5.18) that
∑TnT
k=T1
q∗jk = 0, and, hence, the market clears also in this case since the
flow into a hospital is equal to the flow out and equal to zero. Thus, established the
following is established:
Corollary 5.1
The market for the blood product clears for each hospital at the supply chain network
equilibrium.
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5.1.5 Illustrative Examples
In this section I present two examples to illustrate some of the above mentioned
concepts. The blood supply chain topology is depicted in Figure 5.2. A case study
with a more elaborate blood supply chain network topology is presented in Section
5.4.
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Figure 5.2. The Blood Supply Chain Network Topology for the Illustrative Examples
Example 5.1: Network with Two BSOs, Two Hospitals and One Payer
There are two blood service organizations supplying blood to two hospitals. The
hospitals in turn treat patients who belong to the group Payer Type T1. From each
BSO there are two paths reaching each hospital. For simplicity, each path consists of
two links. The paths are defined as follows: p1 = (1, 2), p2 = (1, 3), p3 = (4, 5), and
p6 = (4, 6). The time horizon is assumed to be a week.
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The total link cost functions are:
cˆ1(f1) = f
2
1 + 1.5f1, cˆ2(f2) = f
2
2 + 2f2, cˆ3(f3) = f
2
3 + 2.5f3,
cˆ4(f4) = f
2
4 + 2f4, cˆ5(f5) = f
2
5 + 2f5, cˆ6(f6) = f
2
6 + 2.5f6.
In this example it is assumed that no amount blood is lost in the supply chain;
hence, the arc-path multipliers, µps are all equal to 1, ∀p. Again, for ease of calcula-
tion, the parameters associated with the altruism components of the utility functions
are all zero, i.e, ω1 = ω2 = βH1 = βH2 = 0. The holding cost functions for the two
hospitals are:
hH1(qH1T1) = 1.5× qH1T1 , hH2(qH2T1) = 1.5× qH2T1 .
The transaction cost functions between the hospitals and payers are:
cH1T1(qH1T1) = qH1T1 + 100, cH2T1(qH2T1) = qH2T1 + 100.
The demand price functions are:
dH1T1 = −0.005ρ3H1T1 + 0.002ρ3H2T1 + 100, dH2T1 = −0.005ρ3H2T1 + 0.002ρ3H1T1 + 100.
Using inequality (5.18) ten linear equations are obtained which are as follows:
4x∗p1 + 2x
∗
p2
+ 3.5− η∗H1 = 0,
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4x∗p2 + 2x
∗
p1
+ 4− η∗H2 = 0,
4x∗p3 + 2x
∗
p4
+ 4− η∗H1 = 0,
4x∗p4 + 2x
∗
p3
+ 4.5− η∗H2 = 0,
q∗H1T1 + η
∗
H1
− ρ3∗H1T1 + 101.5 = 0,
q∗H2T1 + η
∗
H2
− ρ3∗H2T1 + 101.5 = 0,
x∗p1 + x
∗
p3
− q∗H1T1 = 0,
x∗p2 + x
∗
p4
− q∗H2T1 = 0,
q∗H1T1 + 0.005ρ
3∗
H1T1
− 0.002ρ3∗H2T1 − 100 = 0,
q∗H2T1 + 0.005ρ
3∗
H2T1
− 0.002ρ3∗H1T1 − 100 = 0.
The equilibrium blood path flows from the blood service organizations to the hospitals
obtained by solving the above equations are: x∗p1 = x
∗
p2
= 49.29, x∗p3 = x
∗
p4
= 49.21.
In the absence of the altruism factors, we have that the η∗j s are precisely equal to
the prices charged by the blood service organizations, ρ1∗ij s. The equilibrium prices
charged by the BSOs are: η∗H1 = 299.25, η
∗
H2
= 299.75, respectively. This means
that Hospital H1 agrees to pay $299.25 per unit of blood and Hospital H2 agrees
to pay $299.75 per unit of blood. The price per unit charged by the hospitals are:
ρ2∗H1 = 300.75 and ρ
2∗
H2
= 301.25. This makes sense and is fair since Hospital H2 pays
a higher price for acquiring the blood, the price charged is also slightly higher than
that of Hospital H1.
At equilibrium, the quantities of blood transfused at each hospital are: q∗H1T1 =
q∗H2T1 = 98.50. Lastly, the reimbursements that Payer type T1 is willing to pay to
Hospital H1 and Hospital H2 are: ρ
3∗
H1T1
= 499.25 and ρ3∗H2T1 = 499.75, respectively.
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Example 5.2: Introducing Fractional Arc Multipliers
In this example, the data remain as in Example 5.1, except that the arc multipliers
are modified so that not all are equal to 1:
α1 = 1, α2 = 0.95, α3 = 1, α4 = 1, α5 = 1, α6 = 0.98.
Hence, the path multipliers are:
µp1 = 1× 0.95 = 0.95, µp2 = 1, µp3 = 1, µp4 = 1× 0.98 = 0.98.
Again, using inequality (5.18), we obtain the following set of equations:
3.9x∗p1 + 2x
∗
p2
+ 3.5− 0.95η∗H1 = 0,
4x∗p2 + 2x
∗
p1
+ 4− η∗H2 = 0,
4x∗p3 + 2x
∗
p4
+ 4− η∗H1 = 0,
3.96x∗p4 + 2x
∗
p3
+ 4.5− 0.98η∗H2 = 0,
q∗H1T1 + η
∗
H1
− ρ3∗H1T1 + 101.5 = 0,
q∗H2T1 + η
∗
H2
− ρ3∗H2T1 + 101.5 = 0,
0.95x∗p1 + x
∗
p3
− q∗H1T1 = 0,
x∗p2 + 0.98x
∗
p4
− q∗H2T1 = 0,
q∗11 + 0.005ρ
3∗
H1T1
− 0.002ρ3∗H2T1 − 100 = 0,
q∗H2T1 + 0.005ρ
3∗
H2T1
− 0.002ρ3∗H1T1 − 100 = 0.
The equilibrium path flows are now: x∗p1 = 48.35, x
∗
p2
= 51.36, x∗p3 = 52.53, x
∗
p4
=
48.10.
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The equilibrium prices charged by the BSOs are: η∗H1 = 310.29, η
∗
H2
= 307.63,
respectively. The price per unit charged by Hospital H1 and Hospital H2 are ρ
2∗
H1
=
311.75 and ρ2∗H2 = 307.63, respectively.
At equilibrium, the quantities of blood transfused at each hospital are: q∗H1T1 =
98.46, and q∗H2T1 = 98.49. The reimbursements that Payer Type T1 is willing to pay to
Hospital H1 and Hospital H2 are: ρ
3∗
H1T1
= 510.26, and ρ3∗H2T1 = 506.12, respectively.
If we compare the results in the two examples, we can see that even under the
consideration that a fraction of the collected blood perishes or is wasted along the
supply chain, the amount of blood transfused at each hospital remains almost same.
However, while in Example 5.1 all the paths had similar flows, in Example 5.2, the
paths without perishability have higher flows than those with perishability. Due to
wastage of some amount of collected blood the cost is likely to increase, and hence, the
equilibrium prices obtained in Example 5.2 are higher. The payer agrees to pay higher
rates in Example 5.2 which enables the hospitals to pay higher prices to the blood
suppliers in order to cover the cost of the wasted blood and still meet the demand.
Hence, the blood supply chain functions efficiently even in the face of perishability of
blood products.
5.2. Qualitative Properties
In this section, some qualitative properties of the solution to the variational in-
equality (5.18) are provided. I first present the existence results. Since the feasible
set underlying the variational inequality problem (5.18), K4, is not compact it is not
possible to derive existence of a solution from the sole assumption of continuity of the
function F (Y ) (cf. Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia (1980)). However, we can impose
a rather weak condition to ensure the existence of a solution pattern. Let
Kb ≡ {(x, q, η, ρ3)|0 ≤ x ≤ b1; 0 ≤ q ≤ b2; 0 ≤ η ≤ b3; 0 ≤ ρ3 ≤ b4}, (5.22)
125
where b = (b1, b2, b3, b4) and x ≤ b1; q ≤ b2; η ≤ b3; ρ3 ≤ b4 means that xp ≤ b1; qjk ≤
b2; ηj ≤ b3; ρ3jk ≤ b4 for all p ∈ P ij ,∀i, j, k. Then Kb is a bounded, closed convex subset
of RnP+2nHnT+nH+ . Thus, the following variational inequality:
〈F (Y b), Y − Y b〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y b ∈ Kb, (5.23)
admits at least one solution Y b ∈ Kb, from the standard theory of variational in-
equalities, since Kb is compact and F is continuous. Following Kinderlehrer and
Stampacchia (1980)( see also Theorem 1.5 in Nagurney (1999)), we have:
Lemma 5.1
Variational inequality 5.21 admits a solution if and only if there exists a b > 0 such
that variational inequality (5.23) admits a solution in Kb with
xb < b1, q
b < b2, η
b < b3, ρ
3b < b4. (5.24)
Under the conditions in Theorem 5.2 below it is possible to construct the upper
bounds b1, b2, b3, and b4 large enough so that the restricted variational inequality
(5.23) will satisfy the boundedness condition (5.24) and, thus, existence of a solution
to the original variational inequality problem according to Lemma 5.1 will hold.
Theorem 5.2: Existence of a Solution
Suppose that there exist positive constants M , N , and R with R > 0 such that:
∂Cˆp(x)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp ≥M, ∀x with xp ≥ N, p ∈ P ij ,∀i, j, (5.25)
cjk(q) +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
qjk)
∂qjk
≥M, ∀q with qjk ≥ N, ∀j, k,
djk(ρ
3) ≤ N, ∀ρ3 with ρ3jk > R,∀j, k. (5.26)
Then variational inequality (5.21); equivalently, variational inequality (5.18), admits
at least one solution.
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Proof: Follows from Lemma 5.1. See also the proof of existence for Proposition 1 in
Nagurney and Zhao (1993) and the existence proof in Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang
(2003). 2
It can be argued that, from an economics perspective, assumptions (5.25) and
(5.26) are reasonable, since, when flow of RBCs on a path between a blood service
organization and a hospital pair is large, it can be expected the “marginal” cost on
the path minus the marginal service utility associated with the weighted altruism to
exceed a positive lower bound. Similarly, when the amount of blood transfused by
a hospital to a patient group is positive, the transaction cost between the pair and
marginal cost of holding the blood in inventory by the hospital will exceed a lower
bound. Lastly, in case the demand market price is very high, the demand for the
product can be expected to be low (even if slightly).
Lemma 5.2: Monotonicity
Assume that the link total cost functions and the inventory holding cost functions
are convex, the transaction cost functions are monotone increasing, and the demand
functions are monotone decreasing functions. Then the vector function F that enters
the variational inequality (5.21) is monotone, that is,
〈F (Y ′)− F (Y ′′), Y ′ − Y ′′〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ K. (5.27)
Proof: Let Y ′ = (x′, q′, η′, ρ3′), Y ′′ = (x′′, q′′, η′′, ρ3′′) with Y ′ ∈ K and Y ′′ ∈ K. Then
inequality (5.26) can be seen in the following deduction:
〈F (Y ′)− F (Y ′′), Y ′ − Y ′′〉 =
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
′)
∂xp
− ∂Cˆp(x
′′)
∂xp
]
× [x′p − x′′p]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q′jk)
∂qjk
− ∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q′′jk)
∂qjk
]
× [q′jk − q′′jk]
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+HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
cjk(q
′)− cjk(q′′)
]
× [q′jk − q′′jk]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[−djk(ρ3′) + djk(ρ3′′)]× [ρ3′jk − ρ3′′jk ]
= (I) + (II) + (III) + (IV ). (5.28)
Now, we can write (I) as:
(I) =
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
∂Cˆp(x
′)
∂xp
− ∂Cˆp(x
′′)
∂xp
]
× [x′p − x′′p]
=
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f
′)
∂fa
αap − ∂cˆb(f
′′)
∂fa
αap
]
× [x′p − x′′p]
=
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
[∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f
′)
∂fa
− ∂cˆb(f
′′)
∂fa
]
×
∑
p∈P ij
[x′pαap − x′′pαap]
=
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
[∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f
′)
∂fa
− ∂cˆb(f
′′)
∂fa
]
× [
∑
p∈P ij
x′pαap −
∑
p∈P ij
x′′pαap]
=
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
[∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f
′)
∂fa
− ∂cˆb(f
′′)
∂fa
]
× [f ′a − f ′′a ]. (5.29)
Since the total link cost functions are convex, we have:
(I) =
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
[∑
a∈Li
∑
b∈Li
∂cˆb(f
′)
∂fa
− ∂cˆb(f
′′)
∂fa
]
× [f ′a − f ′′a ] ≥ 0. (5.30)
The convexity of the holding cost functions, hj(qj) for all j yields
(II) =
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q′jk)
∂qjk
− ∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q′′jk)
∂qjk
]
× [q′jk − q′′jk] ≥ 0. (5.31)
128
Since cjk, for all j, k, are assumed to be monotone increasing, and djk, for all j, k, are
assumed to be monotone decreasing, we have that
(III) =
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
cjk(q
′)− cjk(q′′)
]
× [q′jk − q′′jk] ≥ 0, (5.32)
and
(IV ) =
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[−djk(ρ3′) + djk(ρ3′′)]× [ρ3′jk − ρ3′′jk ] ≥ 0. (5.33)
Substituting (5.30) – (5.33) into the right-hand side of (5.28), it can be concluded
that (5.28) is nonnegative. The proof is complete. 2
Definition 5.2: Lipschitz Continuity
The function that enters the variational inequality problem (5.21) is Lipschitz contin-
uous if
‖F (Y ′)− F (Y ′′)‖ ≤ L ‖Y ′ − Y ′′‖ ∀Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ K, (5.34)
where L > 0 is known as the Lipschitz constant.
The properties of monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity are utilized to establish
the convergence of the algorithm in the following section.
5.3. Algorithm: The Modified Projection Method
In this section, the realization of the modified projected method (cf. Section 2.4.2)
for the computation of the variational inequality (5.18) is described. Below I present
each step of the computation with respect to this model and provide the explicit
formulae.
The statement of the modified projection method for the solution of variational
inequality 5.21, applied to the blood supply chain network model, is as follows, where
τ is the iteration counter:
Step 0. Initialization
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Initialize with Y 0 ∈ K. Set τ = 1 and select ψ, such that 0 < ψ ≤ 1/L, where L is
the Lipschitz constant (see (5.34)).
Step 1: Computation
Compute Y¯ τ by solving the variational inequality subproblem (cf. (2.22)):
〈Y¯ τ + ψF (Y τ−1)− Y τ−1, Y − Y¯ τ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ∈ K. (5.35a)
(5.35a) is now expanded, according to the details of (5.18), for this model. Com-
pute (x¯τ , q¯τ , η¯τ , ρ¯3τ ) ∈ K4 by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
x¯τp + ψ
(
∂Cˆp(x
τ−1)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − ητ−1j µp
)
− xτ−1p
]
× [xp − x¯τp]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
q¯τjk + ψ
(
cjk(q
τ−1) +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
qτ−1jk )
∂qjk
+ ητ−1j − βjθjk − ρ3jkτ−1
)
− qτ−1jk
]
×[qjk − q¯τjk +
HnH∑
j=H1
[
η¯τj + ψ
( I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
xτ−1p µp −
TnT∑
k=T1
qτ−1jk
)
− ητ−1j
]
× [ηj − η¯τj ]
+
TnT∑
k=T1
[
ρ¯3τjk + ψ
(
qτ−1jk − djk(ρ3τ−1)
)
− ρ3jkτ−1
]
× [ρ3jk − ρ¯3τjk ] ≥ 0, ∀(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ K4.
(5.35b)
Step 2: Adaptation
Compute Y τ by solving the variational inequality subproblem (cf. (2.23)):
〈Y τ + ψF (Y¯ τ )− Y τ−1, Y − Y τ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ∈ K. (5.36a)
(5.36a) is now expanded according to (5.18). Compute (xτ , qτ , ητ , ρ3τ ) ∈ K4 by
solving the variational inequality subproblem:
I∑
i=1
HnH∑
j=H1
∑
p∈P ij
[
xτp + ψ
(
∂Cˆp(x¯
τ )
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − η¯τj µp
)
− xτ−1p
]
× [xp − xτp]
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+HnH∑
j=H1
TnT∑
k=T1
[
qτjk +ψ
(
cjk(q¯
τ ) +
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
q¯τjk)
∂qjk
+ η¯τj −βjθjk− ρ¯3τjk
)
− qτ−1jk
]
× [qjk− qτjk]
+
HnH∑
j=H1
[
ητ + ψ
( I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
x¯τpµp −
TnT∑
k=T1
q¯τjk
)
− ητ−1
]
× [ηj − ητj ]
+
TnT∑
k=T1
[
ρ3τjk + ψ
(
q¯τjk − djk(ρ¯3τ )
)
− ρ3jkτ−1
]
× [ρ3jk − ρ3τjk ] ≥ 0, ∀(x, q, η, ρ3) ∈ K4.
(5.36b)
Step 3: Convergence Verification
If |Y τ − Y τ−1| ≤ , for  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance level, then stop; otherwise, set
τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1 (cf. Subsection 2.4.2).
Specifically, for this model, if |xτp − xτ−1p | ≤ , |qτjk − qτ−1jk | ≤ , |ητj − ητ−1j | ≤
, |ρ3τ − ρ3τ−1| ≤  ∀p ∈ P ij , i = 1, ..., I, j = H1, ..., HnH , k = T1, ..., TnT for  > 0, a
pre-specified tolerance level, then stop; otherwise, set τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
Explicit Formulae for the Modified Projection Method
The elegance of this algorithm applied to the blood supply chain network competition
model in that at each iteration, closed form expressions are obtained for the variables,
resulting in an easy to implement computational procedure. Below the closed form
expressions for the solutions of (5.35b) are provided .
The closed form expression for the blood path flows at iteration τ is: For each
path p ∈ P ij ,∀i, j, compute:
x¯τp = max
{
0, xτ−1p − ψ
(
∂Cˆp(x
τ−1)
∂xp
− ωiγijµp − ητ−1j µp
)}
. (5.37)
The amount of blood transfused, qjk, ∀j, k, at iteration τ , is computed according
to:
q¯τjk = max
{
0, qτ−1jk −ψ
(
cjk(q
τ−1)+
∂hj(
∑TnT
k=T1
qτ−1jk )
∂qjk
+ητ−1j −βjθjk−ρ3jkτ−1
)}
. (5.38)
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The Lagrange multipliers, ηj, j = H1, . . . , HnH , are computed at iteration τ using
the formula:
η¯τj = max
{
0, ητ−1 − ψ
( I∑
i=1
∑
p∈P ij
xτ−1p µp −
TnT∑
k=T1
qτ−1jk
)}
. (5.39)
Lastly, at iteration τ , the closed form expression for the demand prices, ρ3jk, j =
H1, . . . , HnH ; k = T1, . . . , TnT , is:
ρ¯3τjk = max
{
0, ρ3
τ−1
jk − ψ
(
qτ−1jk − djk(ρ3τ−1)
)}
. (5.40)
Analogous closed form expressions to those above can be easily obtained also for
(5.36b).
5.4. The Case Study
In this section, I present a case study that is solved using the modified Projection
Method. Although the network structure is stylized the aim is to capture the complex
landscape of blood banking in Southern California. There are three major blood ser-
vice organizations; namely, the American Red Cross, the San Diego Blood Bank, and
LifeStream, that collect and supply blood to hospitals in Southern California that have
been facing shortages in recent times (Austin (2018), Hayden (2018)). LifeStream, a
community based nonprofit blood bank, supplies blood products and services to more
than 80 Southern California hospitals in five counties: San Bernardino, Riverside, Los
Angeles, Orange, San Diego, and Imperial, while San Diego Blood Bank, another a
regional nonprofit blood service organization, serves San Diego, Imperial, Los Ange-
les, and Orange Counties. The American Red Cross also has a strong presence in
this region with multiple donor centers and supply contracts with UC San Diego and
Scripps Health facilities (Sisson (2017)).
In the network structure shown in Figure 5.3 there are two blood service orga-
nizations, one a smaller regional blood bank such as LifeStream or the San Diego
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Blood Bank, and, the other – a larger one such as the American Red Cross. Both of
these blood service organizations supply blood to two hospitals which treat patients
belonging to three payer groups: two private ones such as those covered by the Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, which has one of the highest customer satisfaction ratings
according to a NCQA 2015-2016 report, and Blue Shield of California, which has one
of the lowest ratings according to the same report, and the other – a government
payer program such as Medicare or Medicaid. Given that hospitals and blood centers
are facing shortages, it is not unreasonable to assume that each hospital has more
than one supplier to mitigate the risk of running out of blood as observed in the
Northeastern part of the United States. I now provide the data for this problem.
Baseline Example: Two BSOs, Two Hospitals and Three Payers
In Lagerquist et al. (2017), the authors provide an analysis of the cost of transfusing
one unit of RBC in a Canadian hospital. Based on their data, the per unit cost of
inventory and storage at the hospital was obtained as 30.80 CAD.
Using this information and converting it to USD the inventory holding costs for the
two hospitals are constructed as:
hH1(
T3∑
k=T1
qH1k) = 23.6× (qH1T1 + qH1T2 + qH1T3),
and
hH2(
T3∑
k=T1
qH2k) = 24× (qH2T1 + qH2T2 + qH2T3).
Below, I present the transaction cost functions for this problem. It is to be noted
that this cost might include various costs that are not directly associated with the
procurement of blood, and maintaining it’s inventory such as cost of cross matching,
transfusion, and administrative costs for billing, etc. Linear cost functions are used
which are given as follows:
cH1T1(qH1T1) = 0.5qH1T1+10, cH1T2(qH1T2) = 0.5qH1T2+9, cH1T3(qH1T3) = 0.5qH1T3+8,
133
12
3 13
14
15
Blood
Organizations
Organization 1
l1 l
Organization 2
2









fl
J
J
J
J
J^?









fl
J
J
J
J
J^lC11 l
4
5
6
16
17
18 19
20
21
C12
lC13
Collection
lC21 l lC23C22
Shipment
S
S
S
S
Sw




/? ? ?
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs
?






+




/
S
S
S
S
Sw
Collection
Sites
lB11
7
lB21 lB22
Testing &
Processing
? ? ?
Blood
Centers
8
lP 11
22 23
lP 21 lP 22
Storage
? ? ?
Component
Labs
l
9
S11
lS21 lS22
24 25
26 29
27 28
Shipment
? ?
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs?






+
Storage
Facilities
lD11
11
12
10
30
32
31 33
lD21 lD22
Distribution
Distribution
Centers
Hospitals lH1 lH2?
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs?
Transfusion
S
S
S
S
S
S
Sw






/l
T1
l
T3
l
T2
bbbbbbbbbbbb
""""""""""""
Payers
Figure 5.3. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Case Study
cH2T1(qH2T1) = 0.5qH2T1+10, cH2T2(qH2T2) = 0.5qH2T2+10, cH2T3(qH2T3) = 0.5qH2T3+8.
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While it is mentioned in Section 5.1 that reimbursements received by a hospital
from different payers might vary, the transaction costs might also vary depending
on the type of payer. According to Ho and Lee (2017) average cost per patient
for a hospital varies from one payer to another due to long-term relationships with
particular insurance companies or due to ” complementarities in information systems
with some insurers.”
Assuming that the overall base weekly demand for RBCs across all payer types
at each hospital is 250 units the demand price functions are constructed as follows:
dH1T1 = −0.007ρ3H1T1 + 0.001ρ3H2T1 + 100, dH2T1 = −0.005ρ3H2T1 + 0.003ρ3H1T1 + 100,
dH1T2 = −0.007ρ3H1T2 + 0.001ρ3H2T2 + 50, dH2T2 = −0.005ρ3H2T2 + 0.003ρ3H1T2 + 50,
dH1T3 = −0.007ρ3H1T3 + 0.001ρ3H3T1 + 100, dH2T3 = −0.005ρ3H2T3 + 0.003ρ3H1T3 + 100.
The weights associated with the altruism components of the blood service organi-
zations’ objective function are ω1 = ω2 = 1. The coefficients of the altruism function
are assumed to be γ1H1 = 1, γ1H2 = 1, γ2H1 = 1, γ2H2 = 1. The hospitals also have
an altruism component in their objective functions and the associated weights are
assumed to be βH1 = βH2 = 1, while the coefficients are θH1T1 = 1, θH1T2 = 1, θH1T3 =
2, θH2T1 = 1, θH2T2 = 1, θH2T3 = 2. Both the hospitals associate greater service utility
in treating patients belonging to government payer program.
In the paper by Dutta and Nagurney (2018) the modified projection method was
implemented in FORTRAN and a Linux systems at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst was used for the computations. The algorithm was initialized by setting
all the variables equal to 0.00 and with ψ set to .05. The algorithm was considered
to have converged when the absolute difference of the difference of each successive
iterate was less than or equal to 10−4. The equilibrium conditions held with an
excellent accuracy.
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In Table 5.1 I provide the total link cost functions, the arc multipliers associated
with each link as well as the computed equilibrium link flows. The total link cost
functions capture the fact that the two most expensive operations for the blood
services organizations are collection of blood from donors, and testing and processing
of the collected units.
In addition to the computed equilibrium link flow values in Table 5.1, which are
obtained from the equilibrium path flows, the other computed equilibrium values of
the variables are:
η∗H1 = 184.92, η
∗
H2
= 194.67,
q∗H1T1 = 98.46, q
∗
H1T2
= 48.61, q∗H1T3 = 98.55,
q∗H2T1 = 99.43, q
∗
H2T2
= 49.53, q∗H2T3 = 99.41.
and
ρ3∗H1T1 = 257.76, ρ
3∗
H1T2
= 231.83, ρ3∗H1T3 = 245.80
ρ3∗H2T1 = 268.39, ρ
3∗
H2T2
= 233.43, ρ3∗H2T3 = 266.37.
Using the procedure described in Section 5.1.4, the equilibrium prices of the BSOs
and that of the hospitals are recovered: ρ1∗1H1 = ρ
1∗
2H1
= 184.92 and ρ1∗1H2 = ρ
1∗
2H2
=
194.67. Also, ρ2∗H1 = 198.52 and ρ
2∗
H2
= 208.67.
Also, for completeness, I provide the incurred demands at the equilibrium prices
at the different payers and these are:
dH1T1 = 98.46, dH1T2 = 48.61, dH1T3 = 98.55,
dH2T1 = 99.43, dH2T2 = 49.53, dH2T3 = 99.41,
Finally, the incurred utilities of the blood service organizations and the hospitals
at the equilibrium pattern are presented. The utility of BSO 1 is: 25,187.59 and that
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Table 5.1. Definition of Links, Associated activity, Arc Multipliers, Total Opera-
tional Link Cost Functions, and Equilibrium Link Solution
Link a From Node To Node αa cˆa(f) f
∗
a
1 1 C11 1.00 0.45
2
1 + 0.6f1 49.96
2 1 C12 1.00 0.35f
2
2 + 0.5f2 57.35
3 1 C13 1.00 0.32f
2
3 + 0.6f3 64.24
4 C11 B
1
1 1.00 0.09f
2
4 + 0.36f4 49.96
5 C12 B
1
1 1.00 0.12f
2
5 + 0.5f5 57.35
6 C13 B
1
1 1.00 0.1f
2
6 + 0.35f6 64.24
7 B11 P
1
1 0.98 0.5f
2
7 + 0.86f7 171.55
8 P 11 S
1
1 1.00 0.12f
2
8 + 0.5f8 168.12
9 S11 D
1
1 1.00 0.09f
2
9 + 0.5f9 64.36
10 S11 H1 1.00 0.05f
2
10 + 0.68f10 103.76
11 D11 H1 1.00 0.04f
2
11 + 0.8f11 0.00
12 D11 H2 1.00 0.06f
2
12 + 0.8f12 64.36
13 2 C21 1.00 0.3f
2
13 + 0.8f13 104.72
14 2 C22 1.00 0.25f
2
14 + 0.65f14 138.95
15 2 C23 1.00 0.32f
2
15 + 0.6f15 97.36
16 C21 B
2
1 1.00 0.1f
2
16 + 0.28f16 82.57
17 C21 B
2
2 1.00 0.15f
2
17 + 0.3f17 22.15
18 C22 B
2
1 1.00 0.15f
2
18 + 0.35f18 33.17
19 C22 B
2
2 1.00 0.12f
2
19 + 0.45f19 105.78
20 C23 B
2
1 1.00 0.16f
2
20 + 0.5f20 53.18
21 C23 B
2
2 1.00 0.08f
2
21 + 0.6f21 44.17
22 B21 P
2
1 0.98 0.4f
2
22 + 0.65f22 168.93
23 B22 P
2
2 0.97 0.45f
2
23 + 0.8f23 172.11
24 P 21 S
2
1 0.96 0.02f
2
24 + 0.05f24 165.55
25 P 22 S
2
2 1.00 0.04f
2
25 + 0.07f25 166.94
26 S21 D
2
1 1.00 0.2f
2
26 + 0.4f26 80.61
27 S21 D
2
2 1.00 0.18f
2
27 + 0.6f27 78.32
28 S22 D
2
1 1.00 0.12f
2
28 + 0.45f28 99.96
29 S22 D
2
2 1.00 0.15f
2
29 + 0.5f29 66.98
30 D21 H1 1.00 0.08f
2
30 + 0.5f30 75.12
31 D21 H2 1.00 0.1f
2
31 + 0.6f31 105.45
32 D22 H1 1.00 0.12f
2
32 + 0.35f32 66.75
33 D22 H2 1.00 0.16f
2
33 + 0.4f33 78.55
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of BSO 2: 47,806.95. The utility of Hospital H1 is: 985.40 and that of Hospital H2:
495.25.
I now consider three variants of the baseline example, in which the weights asso-
ciated with altruism are modified. Specific changes made to the Basline Example are
reported below. The remainder of the data remains as in the Baseline Example. The
computed equilibrium flows are reported in Table 5.2 for all the Variants.
Variant 1: Altruism Weights for BSOs Set to Zero
In Variant 1 the weights of the BSOs are all set to zero, that is, ω1 = ω2 = 0.
Besides the reported link equilibrium values in Table 5.2, the modified projection
method also yielded the following equilibrium values for the other variables:
η∗H1 = 283.54, η
∗
H2
= 293.33,
q∗H1T1 = 97.87, q
∗
H1T2
= 48.02, q∗H1T3 = 97.96,
q∗H2T1 = 99.23, q
∗
H2T2
= 49.33, q∗H2T3 = 99.21,
and
ρ3∗H1T1 = 356.08, ρ
3∗
H1T2
= 330.15, ρ3∗H1T3 = 344.12
ρ3∗H2T1 = 366.95, ρ
3∗
H2T2
= 332.00, ρ3∗H2T3 = 364.93
For completeness, I also report the recovered prices at the top tier and the middle
tier. Specifically, we have: ρ1∗1H1 = ρ
1∗
2H1
= 283.54 and ρ1∗1H2 = ρ
1∗
2H2
= 293.33. In
addition, we have that: ρ2∗H1 = 297.14 and ρ
2∗
H2
= 307.33.
Also, for completeness, I would like to mention that the incurred demands at the
equilibrium prices at the different payers are exactly equal to the corresponding q∗jk
value, which conforms well with the equilibrium conditions.
The utility of BSO 1 is now: 24,952.65 and that of BSO 2 is: 47,365.72, whereas
the utility of Hospital H1 is: 979.48 and that of Hospital H2 is: 493.29.
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Table 5.2. Links and Link Equilibrium Solution for Variant Examples
Link a From Node To Node Variant 1 f ∗a Variant 2 f
∗
a Variant 3 f
∗
a
1 1 C11 49.71 49.94 49.68
2 1 C12 57.08 57.32 57.04
3 1 C13 63.93 64.20 63.89
4 C11 B
1
1 49.71 49.92 49.68
5 C12 B
1
1 57.08 57.32 57.04
6 C13 B
1
1 63.93 64.20 63.89
7 B11 P
1
1 170.72 171.44 170.61
8 P 11 S
1
1 167.31 168.01 167.20
9 S11 D
1
1 64.26 64.34 64.25
10 S11 H1 103.05 103.67 102.95
11 D11 H1 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 D11 H2 64.26 64.34 64.25
13 2 C21 104.22 104.66 104.16
14 2 C22 138.29 138.27 138.21
15 2 C23 96.89 97.30 96.83
16 C21 B
2
1 82.18 82.52 82.13
17 C21 B
2
2 22.04 22.13 22.03
18 C22 B
2
1 33.01 33.15 32.99
19 C22 B
2
2 105.28 105.72 105.21
20 C23 B
2
1 52.93 53.15 52.90
21 C23 B
2
2 43.96 44.15 43.94
22 B21 P
2
1 168.12 168.82 168.02
23 B22 P
2
2 171.29 172.00 171.18
24 P 21 S
2
1 164.76 165.45 164.66
25 P 22 S
2
2 166.15 166.84 166.04
26 S21 D
2
1 80.23 80.56 80.18
27 S21 D
2
2 77.94 78.27 77.89
28 S22 D
2
1 99.49 99.90 99.42
29 S22 D
2
2 66.66 66.94 66.62
30 D21 H1 74.53 75.04 74.45
31 D21 H2 105.18 105.42 105.15
32 D22 H1 66.28 66.68 66.22
33 D22 H2 78.33 78.52 78.30
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Variant 2: Altruism Weights for Hospitals Set to Zero
In Variant 2, only the weights associated with the hospitals are set to zero, that is, we
have βH1 = βH2 = 0 with all the rest of the data as in the Baseline Example. Please
refer to Table 5.2 for the computed equilibrium link flows.
As can be seen from Table 5.2 all the equilibrium link flows are higher than the
corresponding values for Variant 1.
The other computed equilibrium values of the variables are:
η∗H1 = 184.74, η
∗
H2
= 194.49,
q∗H1T1 = 98.41, q
∗
H1T2
= 48.56, q∗H1T3 = 98.42,
q∗H2T1 = 99.41, q
∗
H2T2
= 49.46, q∗H2T3 = 99.42,
and
ρ3∗H1T1 = 267.54, ρ
3∗
H1T2
= 241.62, ρ3∗H1T3 = 265.55
ρ3∗H2T1 = 278.20, ρ
3∗
H2T2
= 253.33, ρ3∗H2T3 = 276.20
As for the equilibrium prices at the top and middle tiers, these are now: ρ1∗1H1 =
ρ1∗2H1 = 184.74 and ρ
1∗
1H2
= ρ1∗2H2 = 194.49. In addition, we have: ρ
2∗
H1
= 278.20 and
ρ2∗H2 = 218.49
As in the above examples, the q∗jk value coincides with the incurred equilibrium
demand djk(ρ
3∗),∀j, k.
The utility of BSO 1 is now: 25,156.20 and that of BSO 2: 47,747.99, whereas the
utility of Hospital H1 is: -0.02 and that of Hospital H2 is: 0.01.
This result is quite interesting. First, note that the entire supply chain of each
BSO is captured in the model. As for the hospitals, the focus is on its blood supply
operations, but each hospital engages in numerous other activities. The utilities of
both hospitals without the altruism component of the objective functions are essen-
tially zero, which implies economic sustainability on the part of the blood operations.
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It is important to emphasize that the hospitals are nonprofits and, were they for profit
organizations, then their respective objective functions would be modified from those
in (5.10). Moreover, it is to be noted that in the United States, blood transfusion
costs account for 1% of a hospitals budget, typically, which is considered to be high
(Hemez (2016)).
Variant 3: All Altruism Weights Set to Zero
In Variant 3, all the weights associated with altruism for all the BSOs and all the
hospitals were identically equal to zero, with the rest of the data as in the Baseline
Example. This would correspond, in effect, to the stakeholders in terms of the BSOs
and the hospitals being non altruistic and operating, more or less, in a profit-like
manner. Please refer to Table 5.2 for the computed equilibrium link flow pattern.
Observe that, of the three Variant examples, the equilibrium link flows are the lowest
for Variant 3. Also, note that the highest equilibrium link flows occur in the Baseline
Example. The computed equilibrium values for the other variables are:
η∗H1 = 283.36, η
∗
H2
= 293.15,
q∗H1T1 = 97.82, q
∗
H1T2
= 47.94, q∗H1T3 = 97.83,
q∗H2T1 = 99.21, q
∗
H2T2
= 49.26, q∗H2T3 = 99.22,
and
ρ3∗H1T1 = 365.87, ρ
3∗
H1T2
= 339.94, ρ3∗H1T3 = 363.87
ρ3∗H2T1 = 376.76, ρ
3∗
H2T2
= 351.78, ρ3∗H2T3 = 374.76
The recovered equilibrium prices charged by the hospitals to the BSOs are: ρ1∗1H1 =
ρ1∗2H1 = 283.36 and ρ
1∗
1H2
= ρ1∗2H2 = 293.15. The recovered prices at the hospitals are:
ρ2∗H1 = 306.96 and ρ
2∗
H2
= 317.15. The utility of BSO 1 is now: 24,921.40 and that
of BSO 2: 47,307.50, whereas the utility of Hospital H1 is now: -.12 and that of
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Hospital H2: .06. Again, the utilities of both hospitals are essentially zero in this
variant, which represents that none of the stakeholders assign a positive value to the
altruism component in their respective objective functions.
5.4.1 Additional Discussion of the Numerical Results for Baseline Exam-
ple and Its Variants
As can be seen from the numerical results in the case study the equilibrium prices
increase down the tiers, which is very reasonable economic behavior. Furthermore, as
can be seen from Variant 3, the equilibrium prices charged to the various payers are the
highest of all the examples comprising the case study. This is intuitive since in Variant
3 without the altruism weights, the blood service organizations and hospitals act like
profit-maximizing entities. The prices paid by the hospitals to the blood suppliers
that are obtained in the Baseline Example and its Variants more or less tally with
the prices reported in empirical studies of Toner et al. (2011) and Ellingson et al.
(2017). In Toner at al. (2011), the authors report that the average cost of acquisition
of one unit of RBCs in the West is 228.31 with a standard deviation of 42. According
to Ellingson et al. (2017), the interquartile range for the price paid by hospitals in
the United States for a unit of leukocyte-reduced RBCs in 2015 was 197 to 228, while
that of non-leukocyte-reduced RBCs was 185 to 205.
Again, I emphasize that, although the case study is stylized it, nevertheless, il-
lustrates important features of this unique supply chain in which the product cannot
be produced but must be donated, while, at the same time, it then undergoes mul-
tiple activities of testing, processing, and distribution to hospitals, with subsequent
dissemination to needy patients for the medical procedures. Moreover, the model
captures, in a novel way, that payments for blood services can depend on the method
of payment and reimbursement to hospitals.
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5.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a mathematical model that integrates the behaviors
of three major stakeholders in the blood supply chain: blood service organizations,
hospitals and medical centers, and patient payer groups. The model captures the
current competitive landscape of the blood banking industry in the United States,
and explores a cost-based pricing scheme for blood products that is aimed at bridging
the disconnect between actual costs of acquiring a unit of red blood cells for transfu-
sion and the payments received by the hospitals and the blood suppliers. The model
optimizes, under competition, the flow of blood through the paths joining the blood
service organizations with the hospitals, the amount of blood transfused to each pa-
tient payer group at each hospital, and determines the equilibrium prices charged by
the blood service organizations, and the reimbursements received by the hospitals.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first perishable product supply chain net-
work model to include the complex economic interplays between the different tiers
of decision-makers in the blood supply chain. I also quantify and incorporate the
nonprofit or altruistic nature of blood centers and hospitals through a service utility
component in their utility functions.
The theory of variational inequalities was utilized to formulate the equilibrium
conditions for each stakeholder, and, subsequently, the entire integrated supply chain.
Qualitative properties are also presented as well as examples for illustrative purposes.
The algorithm is outlined and applied to solve numerical examples comprising a case
study focusing on blood service organizations in California.
The equilibrium prices obtained reveal how the prices increase as the blood service
organizations and hospitals act less altruistically. Under every scenario that is ex-
amined the prices obtained closely resemble those in practice. The results also show
that the equilibrium prices increase in progression down the tiers, which ensures the
economic stability of the blood supply chain. In terms of policy implications the
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results show the benefit of having a pricing scheme for blood products based on the
volume of blood transfused and the actual costs of all the supply chain operations,
and how the reimbursements to hospitals vary by payer type.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1. Conclusions
The aim of this dissertation was to analyze how horizontal competition among
blood centers, the key players in the blood banking industry, and their supply chains
has affected the supply of the product and the economic stability of the industry. Rise
in competition among blood centers is one of the several emerging issues in the blood
banking system in the United States. The changes in the industry in response to
these challenges provide interesting areas for research that have immense healthcare
policy implications.
One of the most pressing issues faced by blood centers or blood service organiza-
tions is recruitment of donors since the blood banking industry is solely dependent
on altruistic voluntary donors for the raw material. With the rise in the number of
blood service organizations, the blood collection operation has become more and more
competitive (Barton (2002), Smith (2011)). Competition among blood service orga-
nizations also exists for supply contracts with hospitals and trauma centers (Barber
(2013), Brantley (2017)).
Due to the potential for fatal consequences caused by unavailability of blood prod-
ucts, to-date, most of the studies on blood banking have justifiably focused on prob-
lems such as inventory planning to minimize shortage and wastage, vehicle routing
problems for transshipment of excess blood between hospitals, and so on. However,
with phenomena such as increase in cost of testing donated blood and other opera-
tions, the price of blood varying considerably across the United States, it is essential
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to scrutinize the economic aspects associated with each activity in the supply chain.
Blood centers, which are nonprofit organizations, incur high costs in collecting, pro-
cessing, testing, storing, and distributing blood to the demand markets. They charge
the hospitals and other medical facilities a fee per pint of blood supplied to recover
these costs. The hospitals in turn get reimbursed for their costs by payers such
as private insurance companies, and government programs such as Medicare, Medi-
caid. However, there appears to be a disconnect between the reimbursements received
and the actual costs of acquiring blood. Hence, several regional as well as national
level blood service organizations have been operating at low margins (Mulcahy et al.
(2016)).
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I developed a non-cooperative game theory model
for blood service organizations competing on the quality of service provided at their
collection sites with the objective of maximizing their utility which consists of revenue,
cost and an altruism component. I imposed upper and lower bounds on the quality
levels and derived the economic implications of each. In Chapter 4, I constructed and
analyzed a competitive blood supply chain network model that captures the supply
side as well as demand side competition among blood centers. Each important activity
in the blood supply chain is mapped, associated costs considered and persihability
of the product along the various paths in the network is also included. The novel
features of the model resulted in a Generalized Nash Equilibrium. In Chapter 5, I
extended the blood supply chain network framework by incorporating an additional
tier of decision-makers; namely, the patient payer groups. The multitiered network
captures the decentralized nature of the blood banking system in the United States
and tests the merits of a proposed cost-based payment policy for blood products.
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6.2. Future Research
This dissertation has demonstrated how competitive game theory techniques can
be used effectively to test the status quo in blood banking as well as proposed pol-
icy changes that can make management of the blood supply chain more efficient.
However, as the industry adapts itself to various changes and new policies are put
forward, opportunities for future research emerge. In this section, I discuss some of
those directions.
6.2.1 Outsourcing of Donor Testing
In recent times in response to the greater uncertainty in demand, and an increase
in the cost of operations, blood service organizations have adopted various methods
to adjust to the changes in the market and to sustain themselves economically. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been a growing trend of mergers and acquisitions
among blood service organizations. However, another recent development in the blood
banking industry is the consolidation of the donor testing facilities and outsourcing
of the testing operation by smaller blood collection establishments to centralized
laboratories that can afford to maintain this capital-intensive operation. According
to Dr. Jorge Rios, Medical Director of the American Red Cross Blood Services,
East Division, at present the cost of testing ranges from 40 to 60 USD per donor,
and it varies with the volume of units tested. The cost also depends on the size of
the independent testing laboratory; the bigger the lab, the lower is the cost (Rios
(2018)). I intend to study the financial implications of outsourcing the blood testing
operation by the regional blood banks to centralized testing laboratories on the various
stakeholders in the industry.
Due to the nonprofit nature of blood service organizations they do not sell blood
to hospitals to increase profits but charge them a fee to recover their costs (Engel
(2007)) and a large part of that cost is attributed to testing the collected blood for
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various infectious diseases. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the United
States is responsible for ensuring that the supply of blood in the country is safe. The
FDA provides a list of tests to be carried out on the collected blood which include tests
for HIV, Hepatitis B, C, Syphilis, Zika virus, etc. FDA recommended the screening
of individual units of donated whole blood and blood components for Zika virus by
blood centers in all states in the United States in 2016 (Nelson (2017)).
Ellingson et al. (2017) conducted a nation wide study to determine the projected
cost of the Zika virus test on donated blood and found that it would cost 137 mil-
lion USD (with 95% confidence interval) annually. Indeed, this test has added to
the financial stress faced by blood service organizations in the times of decreasing
revenue margins. While it is important to test collected blood for the virus before
transfusion to minimize any risk, Saa´ et al. (2018) found that the screening of indi-
vidual donations in the United States had a low yield while being extremely costly.
According to Branswell (2018) the Zika testing operation ran by the American Red
Cross costs roughly $137 million a year, and resulted in detection of only eight units
that tested positive for the virus between June 2016 and September 2017. The article
also mentions that “The high screening cost and low number of positive detections
works out to about $5.3 million for each positive unit the Red Cross pulled from the
system”.
Given such conditions it is not surprising that in 2018 the American Red Cross
consolidated its National Testing Laboratories and joined Creative Testing Solutions
(CTS) to become the largest nonprofit blood donor testing laboratory organization
in the United States (America’s Blood Centers (2017b)). According to the website
Creative Testing Solutions, owned by three major players in the industry, the Amer-
ican Red Cross, OneBlood, and Vitalant, will test approximately 9 million donor
samples, which is about 75 percent of the country’s blood supply, at six high volume
laboratory facilities located in Charlotte, Dallas, Phoenix, Portland, St. Louis, and
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Tampa in 2018 (CTS (2018)). In addition to CTS, the other players in the market
include Qualtex Laboratories, ViroMed Laboratories, and blood service organizations
such as the New York Blood Center, which conduct their own testing, and also for
other regional blood banks.
While the size of CTS might allow it to offer lower prices than its competitors
to blood centers due to economies of scale, it might also provide leverage with test
builders and even with regulators. However, the creation of such an organization
also raises concern with respect to the stability and the resilience of the blood supply
chain in the United States in case of disruption leading to unavailbility of testing
services for days, or even weeks (Katz (2017)). Hence, it would be of great value
to study the effect of this new development in the blood banking industry and the
trade-offs between outsourcing and in-house blood testing. The network structure in
Chapter 4 can be extended to include outsourced testing. This can be achieved by
introducing links denoting outsourced testing and nodes representing external testing
laboratories. In addition, we can investigate and model the behavior of the donor
testing facilities as a separate tier of decision makers in the multitiered blood supply
chain network.
6.2.2 Inclusion of Brokers
The changing dynamics in the blood banking sector have also given rise to new
business models such as the brokerage model. Mulcahy et al. (2016) explains the
brokerage business model where organizations connect hospitals in need of blood
with blood centers with excess blood. Revenue is generated through fees charged
on each completed transaction. Two prominent examples of a brokerage model are
the National Blood Exchange (NBE), a program run by the American Association
of Blood Banks, and a software technology and services company called Bloodbuy.
Bloodbuy uses a series of matching algorithms to pair a hospital with a blood bank
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based on the amount of blood available at the blood bank and what the hospital is
willing to pay.
The brokerage system has several merits. Hospitals contracting with blood cen-
ters from various parts of the country have already become prevalent. These new
organizations make nationwide procurement of blood easier as they can ensure that
hospitals and health centers anywhere in the country can get their demand fulfilled
without having to pay unfair high prices. One of the advantages of this model re-
ported in Mulcahy et. al. (2016) is that it provides price transparency and can result
in cost savings. It can induce more competitive pricing for both blood centers and
hospitals while minimizing shortage and wastage of blood. A game theory model can
be developed and analyzed with the brokers constituting a separate tier of decision-
makers. Such a model can capture the monetary transactions of the brokers and can
also verify the perceived merits of the brokerage model.
The brokerage model also adds an intriguing layer of complexity to the modeling
of blood supply chain networks. NBE claims to be a resource sharing program but
Bloodbuy is a profit-maximizing company. The inclusion of profit-maximizing entities
in the blood banking industry, which has traditionally operated in the nonprofit
sector, has not been studied. At the same time we can study the operation of a
program such as NBE from a system optimization perspective which can reveal the
effect of centralization on the efficiency of the blood banking system.
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